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The purpose of this study is to examine the reactions of 
veterans from the Pacific theater during World War II to the 
Japanese radio propaganda broadcasts of "Tokyo Rose\" by 
collecting verbatim statements. Veterans were sought 
through the Western Montana Military Officers Association 
and through a letter to the editor of The Missoulian. Their 
statements were recorded on audiotape in personal 
interviews. The veterans chosen for the study came from 
around the U.S., served in different branches of the Armed 
Forces, and held varying ranks and occupations. 
For perspective, two intelligence specialists were also 
consulted. One had broadcast propaganda for the U.S. during 
the liberation of occupied France, and one had worked for 
the Voice of America in Vietnam. Two media historians 
contributed statements, one about the origins of the Armed 
Forces Radio Network and one about the role of U.S. 
propaganda agencies during World War II. These respondents 
were interviewed by telephone and the conversations recorded 
with their permission. 
From 1942-1945 the nature of Japanese propaganda underwent 
a significant change. Early in the war, when the Japanese 
were winning, their broadcasts contained accurate news and 
intelligence. After their losses in the Battle of Midway 
(June 1942), falsified battle results became the norm. Many 
women were used as announcers, and all were called "Tokyo 
Rose" by the servicemen. But from 1943 through 1945, the 
"Zero Hour" program, on the air from 6:00 - 7:15 p.m., used 
the American Iva Toguri as a disc jockey. These programs 
contained the least propaganda and were the most popular, 
but resulted in her conviction for treason. 
The half-hour documentary created from the collected 
statements is an attempt to tell the story of Iva Toguri, 
the most famous of roughly 20 "Tokyo Rose" broadcasters, who 
is still oddly misunderstood by the American public. 
Transcripts of her broadcasts under the name of "Orphan Ann" 
were recorded from the National Archives in Washington, and 
telephone interviews were obtained with two people who 
played a part in her situation; Dr. Clifford Uyeda, who 
headed the committee to obtain her pardon by President 
Gerald Ford, and Mariano Villarin, who was subpoenaed by the 
FBI from the Philippines in 1949 to testify against her. 
The collected statements reveal that propaganda's success 
depends upon three things: the circumstances surrounding it, 
the truthfulness of its content, and the appeal of the music 
and entertainment used to attract listeners. 
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PREFACE 
"War of Words and Music" is designed to be heard. The 
use of radio entertainment to reach across enemy lines and 
demoralize fighting men had its origin during World War II. 
As developments in radio transmission pushed the frontiers 
of technology, broadcasters thrust their polyglot frenzy of 
messages into the air. 
By the end of the war, Japanese propaganda in the Pacifi 
had clearly backfired. When the U. S. entered Japan, 
Admiral O'Brien issued a mock citation to "Tokyo Rose" for 
raising the morale of U.S. soldiers. 
The first object of the documentary is to tell the story 
of Iva Toguri, the most famous of roughly twenty "Tokyo 
Rose" broadcasters. It is an attempt to examine a wrong, t 
restore to one brave American who was a prisoner of her 
situation a respected place in American radio history. 
But there were more announcers than Iva Toguri, even 
though hers was probably the best-liked voice from Radio 
Tokyo. This story also tries to examine the soldiers' 
responses to enemy propaganda and disinformation. Veiled i 
American music, it came on board ship as they lined up for 
dinner, or into their tents, or into the lonely cockpits of 
the planes while they kept watch at night. While they 
served in relative isolation, far from home, the music 
managed to remind them of what they were fighting for. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In war more than any other time, the role of the media is 
crucial to linking isolated people with events in the rest 
of the world. This study examines the use of radio for 
propaganda by Japan to American servicemen during World War 
II, and looks at the response by Americans both during and 
after the war. 
The Japanese programs employed both men and women as 
announcers, and played American popular music to attract 
listeners. American soldiers called the women, 
collectively, "Tokyo Rose," This format for propaganda has 
been used in wars since then with embellishments, but its 
effectiveness can only be determined by hearing the 
soldiers' recollections in their own words. 
Though "Tokyo Rose" propaganda attracted listeners, it 
failed to demoralize the American soldiers at whom it was 
aimed. Japan's use of U.S. popular music and other cultural 
images sometimes evoked nostalgia, but the false news and 
propaganda sounded more like political wishful thinking than 
truth. 
Even today in the U.S. the myth persists that "Tokyo 
Rose" was a traitor or even a double agent. The 
Biographical Dictionary of World War II describes "her" as 
one person, a propaganda broadcaster who was indicted for 
treason by a grand jury in San Francisco.1 This view is not 
1' 
held by the servicemen, although many talk about the 
broadcasters as if they were one person. The image of 
betrayal came after the war, when one announcer was found to 
have been an American citizen, a nisei born in California, 
and was brought to trial in San Francisco.i 
The strange story of Iva Toguri, whose role as a prisoner 
of the situation in wartime Tokyo has been documented in 
both popular and scholarly studies, became a cause celebre 
in the 1970s when the Japanese American Citizens' League 
petitioned President Ford for her pardon. On January 29, 
1976, President Gerald Ford pardoned Iva Toguri, and on June 
20 of the same year CBS broadcast an interview of her with 
Morley Safer on "60 Minutes." But even at the time of the 
trial, from July through September, 1949, the press seemed 
to be increasingly convinced of her innocence. This was 
reflected in a poll reported by Stanton Delaplane of the San 
Francisco Chronicle; "It is an interesting point that most 
of the regular spectators who sat through 13 long weeks had 
concluded the 33-year-old Los Angeles girl was not guilty. 
The press table on a trial's end ballot voted 9-1 for 
acquittal on all eight counts (of treason)."2 
Iva Toguri*s treatment at the hands of the U.S. 
Government reveals more about post-war U.S. sentiments than 
it does about her effectiveness as a propagandist. However, 
it is not possible in these discussions to establish which 
announcer each serviceman heard; to try to separate the 
2 
influence of one disc jockey in the recollection of events 
of over 40 years ago is more than this study can undertake. 
Iva Toguri's role can be ascertained from some excellent 
material documented by her biographer, Masayo Duus, who had 
access to what remained of personnel files at Radio Tokyo 
after their destruction in 1945; from listening to the few 
remaining broadcasts made under her radio name, "Orphan 
Ann"; and from interviews with two participants in her 
story, Dr. Clifford Uyeda and Mariano Villarin. 
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PROPAGANDA 
Propaganda can only work when people believe it. Two 
approaches to gaining belief are openness and deceit. The 
"black" propaganda mentioned by Max Kraus in his interview 
conceals its origin, pretending to be information from an 
impartial or friendly source; "white" propaganda openly 
exhorts the enemy to join its side. The French scholar 
Jacques Ellul differentiates methods of persuasion still 
further. He says "vertical" propaganda originates from a 
position of authority and uses all the techniques of 
centralized mass communication to control or influence the 
crowd, who remain passive and separate recipients. 
"Horizontal" or "sociological" propaganda is made inside a 
group, promotes group discussion and adherence, and 
addresses the intellect to argue its points; but the 
information may be falsified in order to bring the 
participants into adherence to the group's goals.3 
According to these descriptions, the "Tokyo Rose" broadcasts 
would be called "white" and "vertical," that is, open about 
their source, and coming from a central authority through 
the mass media. But they were not didactic, as were the 
messages of Goebbels or Mildred Gillars, known as "Axis 
Sally" in Europe. "Tokyo Rose" and "Axis Sally" are often 
thought to differ only in geography, so a look at their 
content can be instructive. 
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A recording of a speech that "Axis Sally" directed toward 
American women shows her direct and inflammatory approach. 
,..I'm not on the side of President Roosevelt and his 
Jewish friends and his British friends. Because I've been 
brought up to be a one hundred percent American girl .... 
Believe me, as one American to another, do you love the 
British? Well, of course the answer is no. Do the British 
love us? Well, I should say not. But we're fighting for 
them, we're shedding our good young blood for this kike war, 
for this British war.4 
"Orphan Ann," as Iva Toguri called herself on the air, 
never addressed political issues. She introduced records, 
for example as follows: 
"This is Monday, washday for some, rifle-cleaning for 
some, and for the others, just another day to play. So 
let's all get together and forget those washday blues. 
Here's Kay Kaiser, Sully Mason and all the playmates. So 
come join the parade, you boneheads."5 
The attempt to inspire war-weariness in the listeners had 
little or no effect on the men, who welcomed the music 
wholeheartedly. 
Evidence shows that early in the war, in 1942, Japanese 
propaganda was different from the sort of banter Iva used to 
introduce records. Rex Gunn, a veteran and journalist, and 
colleague of Stanton Delaplane, who covered Iva Toguri's 
trial for the San Francisco Chronicle, published a book 
about Iva Toguri in 1977. He found the first use of the 
name "Tokyo Rose" to have been recorded in a ship's log by a 
U.S. submariner, and credits the voice to Fumi (or Foumy) 
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Saisho, a former University of Michigan student who became 
Radio Tokyo's principal female announcer and an interpreter 
for Shigetsugu Tsuneishi, the chief Of propaganda. She went 
to work at Radio Tokyo in 1938 and broadcast as "Madame 
Tojo" throughout the war.6 
That was the original, authentic GI Tokyo Rose - a 
newscaster, not a disc jockey or a torch singer, not a 
nostalgia peddler as she was later pictured to be. Prior to 
the Battle of Midway (June 4-6, 1942) there was nothing 
playful about her. We credited hers as the voice of our 
daily fears. Her roll call of our outfits on the move 
sounded like the crack of doom....She was the victorious 
enemy.7 
Veteran Dick Grant, who served in New Guinea, said: "We 
listened to her news, yeah. It was very interesting. Oh, 
they know we're coming tomorrow - that's very interesting. 
But we were just as alert then. This didn't scare us at 
all." Veteran Will Clover, who fought at Midway, said: "We 
used to turn on the radio - we knew her schedules - and we'd 
turn on the radio just to hear what she had to say that we 
knew wasn't true." 
Radio Tokyo had 13 affiliated stations in Japanese 
outposts, and structured the propaganda programs in a 
similar format.8 However, the personalities of the women 
seem to have been as varied as their accents. One, the 
elderly Mrs. Henry Topping, was a retired missionary who 
visited the American POWs and then reported that they were 
"as comfortable and happy as they could be away from home," 
and thought the Japanese soldier in general was "not a bad 
fellow at all."9 Cut from a different cloth. Myrtle Lipton 
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was an Asian-American who broadcast from Manila with'a low-
pitched husky voice, according to an article in Yank 
Magazine, who enjoyed nights spent "seeing the town," and 
had "starlet's legs" as well as other physical charms.10 
Her broadcasts were more in keeping with the "Tokyo Rose" 
stereotype described in rumor. Her script-writer. Ken 
Murayama, testified in in 1949 at Iva Toguri's trial, "We 
had stories of girls having dates with men at home, while 
possibly their husbands and sweethearts might be fighting in 
the Southwest Pacific area...."11 These women were never 
charged with war crimes; only Iva Toguri was brought to 
trial. 
The Japanese propaganda was more effective at home than 
it was abroad. Shortwave radio use was strictly forbidden 
to the Japanese public under the military government; even 
the employees at Radio Tokyo were not allowed to listen 
unless there was good reason.12 Foreign news did not reach 
the general population, and Iva Toguri, brought up with 
American standards of freedom of speech, had conflicts with 
others when she worked at the Domei News Agency, which 
monitored foreign news, because she heard how reports from 
London and San Francisco differed from the local fare.13 
Reviewing the state of world propaganda, the New York 
Times printed an article on June 27, 1943 entitled "The 
Short Waves at the Half-Year." The author compared Allied 
and Axis propaganda, and talked about the increase in 
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shortwave transmissions from Africa and South America as 
European countries under Nazi domination shifted their 
centers of resistance from their fallen capitals, 
Shortwaves, the article said, are "delicate barometers of 
coming events." It contrasted the "theatrical fanfares" 
from Berlin to "the known day-to-day effectiveness, in terms 
of civilian resistance to the Nazis, of the European 
broadcasts emanating from London."14 Japanese propaganda 
was not mentioned. 
People's reaction to propaganda depends on variable 
factors: the impact the war has on them, the strength of 
popular support at home, the credibility of the speaker, and 
the strength of the cultural symbols. If there are several 
sources of information available from which to triangulate a 
perspective on events, propaganda may have no effect at all. 
When "Axis Sally" played the song "Lili Marlene" after 
her address to the women of America, she introduced it as a 
piece their "husbands and sons in North Africa have learned 
to love so much."15 This song could be relied upon to stir 
the emotions, but emotions can be ambivalent: it was a 
German song, popularized by Marlene Dietrich, who left Nazi 
Germany and entertained the Allied troops. In the "Zero 
Hour," the early-evening program in which Iva Toguri 
participated, she played "My Resistance Is Low," by Bonnie 
Baker, making a tongue-in-cheek joke about the title; "My, 
what taste you have sir, she said."16 Her use of humor must 
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have contributed to her popularity. 
Veteran Paul Snyder, in his interview, pointed out that 
"Tokyo Rose" had "played a lot of Harbor Lights," a song 
that he associated with his girl back home. He did not feel 
demoralized by this, he said; the submariners were avid 
listeners, because they heard American music. It is 
interesting to see how far the Japanese were at the 
beginning of the war from understanding the importance of 
using American popular music as a way of evoking emotions. 
Masayo Duus, Iva Toguri's biographer, tells this account: 
The Japanese radio propaganda efforts were plagued with 
problems. The more fanatic patriots insisted that the 
broadcasts include the mystical nationalism characteristic 
of domestic propaganda. This was not likely to have much 
effect on overseas audiences ... .At one point Tsuneishi and 
his staff even came up with the idea of getting together a 
group of actors to recite Shinto prayers over the radio.17 
As a means of attracting American servicemen, it is hard 
to conceive of a less effective type of program. 
Marie-Louise von Franz, a student of psychologist Carl 
Jung, raises the important question of whether the 
unconscious part of the human psyche can be influenced by 
propaganda at all. She investigates the symbols present in 
films made as propaganda to deliberately try to influence 
the public, and concludes; "If a.man who wants to influence 
public opinion misuses symbols for this purpose, they will 
naturally impress the masses in so far as they are true 
symbols, but whether or not the mass unconscious will be 
emotionally gripped by them is something that cannot be 
9 
calculated in advance, something that remains completely 
I 
irrational."18 If the servicemen had emotional 
associations with particular songs, this was a private 
experience. The advantage to the Japanese when they decided 
to use prisoners of war to broadcast was not just cheap 
labor; they needed the Allied prisoners to show them what to 
play . 
No amount of intensive interviewing in peacetime can 
truly be used to predict how people will react during 
wartime. The surprising feature of "Tokyo Rose" was the 
popularity of the broadcasts. They still evoke a strange 
affection from veterans who remember. 
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JAPAN'S CONTROL OF INFORMATION 
To see where the Allied prisoners fit in to Japan's 
plans, it is helpful to trace the stream of the programs' 
history. Early in the development of radio technology in 
Japan, the Ministry of Communications instituted a basic 
legal framework for the new medium stating that all program 
content required government approval.19 As government 
leaders saw the potential of the medium for political, 
social and educational uses, they abandoned plans for 
privately owned stations and established the Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai - NHK) . This 
was a government-sponsored monopoly in which private 
citizens or enterprises could own shares.20 
Early programming had a high proportion of serious 
educational content, and less than one-fifth of radio time 
was devoted to entertainment, such as traditional music and 
\ 
plays .21 
In 1934 officials from the army became members of NHK, 
and during the years of military expansion, they tightened 
official control of radio. In 1935, NHK helped to found th 
Domei News Agency, where Iva Toguri first found work as a 
typist in 1942. This agency supplied NHK with most of its 
news and information. The government established an 
Information Committee to co-ordinate propaganda, and 
censored all programs to prevent transmission of any elemen 
that could cause public disturbance or "impair the honor of 
government and public offices or of the Army or Navy..."22 
During hostilities with China in 1937 the NHK broadcast 
casualty lists, but military intervention later prohibited 
them from airing these figures.23 
Two events in 1940 foreshadowed the type of propaganda 
used at the time of "Tokyo Rose." On July 29 Japan's 
foreign minister, Arito Hachiro, began to broadcast on major 
themes of policy, and advocated "co-existence, co-prosperity 
and stabilization with other East Asian nations."24 This 
instituted the first public mention of the Greater East 
Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere, a theme of economic alliance 
with racial overtones which later formed the background of 
the propaganda war on Australia.25 Also, in December 1940 
the Cabinet Information Bureau replaced the Communications 
Ministry in the power structure of NHK. The new bureau 
declared its aim to be "the establishment of a military 
state through the unity and solidarity of the public...."26 
The new centralized authority was ready for Japan's entry 
into war with the U.S. on December 7, 1941. It had worked 
out a system of civil defense in which all broadcasts could 
be suspended during air raids, and all frequencies unified. 
At night NHK used five frequencies, each corresponding to an 
area held by their armed forces; later the number increased 
to eight.27 
The Radio Section of the Bureau consisted of three 
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officials; one chief, one official for domestic programs, 
and one official for international programs. When war broke 
out, NHK had a staff of 6,000, with more than 100 men and 
women in the Overseas Section, These included producers, 
writers, typists, announcers, directors and their 
assistants. Among them were about ten nisei. or American-
born Japanese.28 
Early in the war the tone of domestic broadcasts had been 
designed to inspire group effort, and featured such series 
as "The People's Resolve" and "Our Determination."29 But 
by 1943, war news became increasingly serious for Japan. 
American air and sea maneuvers created shortages of food and 
raw materials, and as austerity increased, it erased 
material incentives for people to continue working. By May 
1944, the government responded to the situation with a 
change of radio strategy, abandoning slogans of optimism in 
favor of pure entertainment programs that emphasized 
Japanese culture and were more popular than propaganda.30 
Overseas entertainment seems to have reflected the same 
transitory rise in quality. In an article in Collier's 
Magazine, January 8, 1944, Henry Strauss wrote: "...on the 
whole, the 'Zero Hour' is a very pleasant program to listen 
to. A session with it is enough to give a man new 
inspiration for memories of home that will keep him company 
for quite a while. If this were Tokyo's intention, we would 
gladly send our thanks, but, knowing it isn't, as a bit of 
neighborly advice, we suggest they get a new Goebbels."31 
Japan's news broadcasts, both domestic and overseas, 
continued to state that Japan was winning the war. But in 
spite of the reports of false victories, frustrations 
affecting the Japanese morale increased throughout 1944, 
One response was the creation of the "Divine Wind," the 
suicide missions against U.S. warships. Commander Nakajima, 
who headed the 201st Air Group in the Philippines, the first 
group selected by Admiral Ohnishi for suicide missions, 
wrote: "Thus the Japanese morale, this kamikaze spirit, or 
whatever one wishes to call it, was widely evident in the 
autumn of 1944. It found its culmination in kamikaze 
attacks - a climax as violent as the circumstances which 
engendered it."32 This spirit of sacrifice raised morale in 
Japan, and many of the young flyers were interviewed for 
radio at their bases with the sound of their planes in the 
background.33 But the news beamed to both domestic and 
overseas audiences contined to demonstrate the psychology of 
denial . Japanese defeats became victories when they reached 
the news. 
The New York Times kept the American public abreast of 
false news with reports from the Office of War Information 
(OWI) : 
Sept.l, 1942 - The OWI said that Japanese propaganda had 
frequently 'annihilated' the Pacific fleet. After the 
battle of the Coral Sea, it said, Japan reported the fleet 
'reduced to a fourth-rate naval power,' and after the first-
Solomon Islands battle Tokyo had it 'reduced to a third-rate 
power'.34 
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When MacArthur returned to the Philippines and the U.S. 
invasion of Leyte Gulf liberated the islands, the Times 
carried days of front-page headlines and stories about every 
aspect of the battle, comparing it to Normandy. An inside 
article on October 29, 1944 appeared under the title, "Tokyo 
Rose Stirs Philippine Mirth": 
As the Japanese defeat mounts Japanese official 
propaganda becomes increasingly tenacious. American and 
Philippine listeners here in Leyte laughed tonight when 
Tokyo Rose, broadcasting in English, said: 
"The Americans' great naval defeat caused great gloom in 
New York when news was flashed around The Times building in 
Times Square." 
It is to be wondered how long Japanese-conquered 
territories will believe this increasingly mendacious tale 
when our forces continue to make leaps of hundreds of miles 
forward and our Navy always reappears as strong as ever and 
closer and closer to Japan after each 'defeat' by the Tokyo 
radio, 
Namikawa Ryo, selected by NHK as the cabinet official of 
the international programs division, wrote in 1983; "We at 
NHK knew of the gap between the achievements of Japan and 
the USA but we could not give any hint of defeat on the air. 
The truth about all these matters was hidden from the nation 
by the Daihonei (Japanese Imperial Headquarters) and the 
mass media....If the mass media had carried news closer to 
the facts, a large part of the nation would have been able 
to assess the situation and such alarm and indescribable 
anxiety would not have been caused by the Emperor's 
ordering, in so many words, unconditional surrender."35 
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IVA TOGURI'S ROLE 
Iva Toguri was a bit player who became a star. But 
stardom, in her case, made her a casualty of all the 
prejudices and stereotypes, both racist and sexist, that 
came through the distorting ether of glamor. 
Iva Ikuko Toguri was born on July 4, 1916, in Los 
Angeles, California, one of four children of Japanese 
parents who were permanent residents of the United Staltes . 
During her childhood and student years she had very little 
contact with Japanese culture; her family spoke English at 
home, belonged to the Methodist Church, and her friends were 
mostly Caucasian. She attended public schools, studied 
music and became an accomplished pianist, as well as a 
skilled typist. In 1941 she received her bachelor's degree 
in zoology from UCLA.36 
After she graduated, her family learned that her maternal 
aunt in Japan was ill, possibly close to death. They sent 
Iva to Japan to be with her, but because of the urgency of 
the situation, did not want to wait the several months 
necessary to obtain a passport. Iva left the country with 
only her birth certificate and a State Department 
Certificate of Identification. She arrived in Japan on July 
24, 1941, with barely enough money to buy a ticket back, 
bringing quantities of food, but almost no knowledge of 
Japanese language or customs. 
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In August Iva Toguri applied for an American passport at 
the United States Consulate in Tokyo. But this was during a 
period of total prohibition of Asian immigration, under the 
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1924. Her application 
apparently was ignored; her passport never came. She tried 
to board a ship leaving December 2, 1941, but without a 
passport was refused port clearance.37 
The day after Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Army Kempeitai 
(called "Thought Control Police" by the Japanese American 
Citizens League) interrogated Iva Toguri and demanded that 
she renounce her American citizenship, or else life in Japan 
would be "very, very inconvenient."38 She refused, saying 
she had been raised as an American and would never consider 
ghanging her citizenship. The Kempeitai classified her as 
an enemy alien, restricted her movements, denied her a food 
rationing card, and constantly harassed her with visits. 
Because of her outspoken support for the United States, 
coupled with her inability to speak Japanese and the 
frequent visits from the Kempeitai, neighbors made life 
intolerable for Iva's relatives, and in 1942 they asked her 
to find another place to live. 
On her own without a food ration card, Iva faced slow 
starvation. After several weeks she found a part-time job 
typing and monitoring English language broadcasts at the 
Domei News Agency. There she met Felipe d'Aquino, a 
Portuguese citizen of Japanese ancestry. They became good 
friends J later they married. 
Her low wages barely kept her alive, and by June, 1943, 
Iva was hospitalized for beri-beri,39 Now burdened with 
debts, she found a second part-time job in August as a 
typist in the business office of Radio Tokyo. There she met 
several Allied prisoners of war who were brought in from 
Bunka camp daily to broadcast propaganda. Three of these 
men broadcast on the "Zero Hour" program: Major Charles 
Cousens, an Australian captured at Singapore; Captain 
Wallace Ince, an American captured at Corregidor; and 
Lieutenant Norman Reyes, a Filipino captured at Bataan. 
These three had had broadcasting experience before the war, 
and were ordered to work by Colonel Tsuneishi, who directed 
the radio propaganda, 40 
Iva became friendly with the POW broadcasters, and when 
in November 1943 the Japanese authorities decided to add a 
female voice to the program, Cousens chose her because of 
her pro-American sympathies. When informed by the 
authorities of her new duties, Iva tried to refuse, saying 
she had no experience. She was ordered to broadcast and 
reminded that she had "no choice" in the matter; as an enemy 
alien she had no rights.41 Although she was not directly 
s 
threatened with bodily harm, she was aware that refusal 
could result in severe punishment. 
Her appointment surprised other women employees. Some 
had several years of experience and resented not being 
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chosen. A handful of women worked as announcers, some 
nisei. born in America, and some educated abroad. When the 
bureau was shorthanded women were pulled from the typing 
pool, and several got started as announcers this way.42 
Under the pretext of correcting scripts, the three POWs 
were secretly burlesquing the Japanese propaganda. The 
Japanese censored everything before it aired, but Cousens, 
Ince and Reyes were able to use strange expressions with 
double meanings, or to slip news items out of the file of 
items to be broadcast. Probably none of these carried 
through to the listeners, but each secret change must have 
given the prisoners a sense of victory over the oppressors. 
According to Cousens' testimony, their intent was to play 
down the propaganda and provide good music that would bring 
up the morale of the troops. 
The Japanese soon saw that Cousens was a professional and 
let him write the scripts himself. Masayo Duus offers a 
possible explanation for this latitude: "Whereas the United 
States drew on its ablest announcers and journalists for its 
radio propaganda efforts, the Japanese had difficulty 
finding anyone either to announce or to write scripts. 
There were few professionally trained English-speaking 
announcers in Japan." 43 
Cousens picked Iva in part for her "rough, almost 
masculine" voice, which he thought would suit the kind of 
comedy routine he had planned.44 He promised her that she 
would not harm and would possibly help the war effort. He 
coached her in her delivery, and she went on the air on 
November 11 or 12, 1943, calling herself "Ann," the 
abbreviation for announcer. Later she changed this to 
"Orphan Ann," 
Since the music was good listening, "Zero Hour" became 
popular with the GIs. On June 29, 1943, before Iva went on 
the air, the New York Times printed an article from 
Guadalcanal: 
. Between the Tokyo radio and Japanese bombers, the nights 
are not always dull here. 
Tokyo has been beaming a program called "the zero hour" 
direct to the Russell Islands and Guadalcanal. The fellows 
like it very much because it cries over them and feels so 
sorry for them. It talks about the food that they miss by 
not being at home and tells how the war workers are stealing 
their jobs and their girls.45 
After Iva Tpguri joined the program the expanded "Zero 
Hour" ran from 6:00 -7:15 p.m. Tokyo time. To pacify the 
censors, Cousens' scripts had her call the GIs "boneheads" 
or "honorable boneheads." Following the scripts, she 
sometimes introduced herself as "your favorite enemy, Ann." 
At Cousens' request, Iva began bringing food, medicine 
and other supplies for the prisoners almost daily. In 
February or March, 1944 one of the POWs at Bunka came down 
with a high fever and chills. The POWs were issued only one 
thin futon, or cotton quilt, and the authorities refused to 
give the prisoner another one. When Cousens informed Iva of 
this situation, she brought in a blanket she had been using 
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to cover a trunk. Ince wrapped it around his body and 
brought it into camp under his coat. Iva's friend Felipe 
d'Aquino was shocked that she woul^ give away a good wool 
blanket, a valuable item in wartime Tokyo. 46 
In December Iva quit her job at the Domei monitoring 
service because of a falling-out with other employees over 
her pro-American sentiments. She questioned the 
truthfulness of Japanese news from the Imperial Headquarters 
because she had access to other information from San 
Francisco and London broadcasts, and the domestic fa>re was 
becoming more and more detached from reality. Her friend 
d'Aquino got into a fistfight defending her position. 47 
Fortunately for Iva the Danish legation needed a secretary, 
and this time she found work quickly. Lars Pederson 
Tillitse, the Danish minister, was interested in the United 
States and enjoyed talking with her. She became friends 
with his family, and often told them that she thought 
America was going to win the war. She did not tell the 
Tillitses about moonlighting at Radio Tokyo, and did not 
tell the authorities there at her job at the Danish 
legation. 
In the spring of 1944 the staff of "Zero Hour" began to 
change. The American, Captain Ince, was beaten at Bunka 
camp and disappeared for a while; a few months later he 
reappeared on another program. Major Cousens was 
hospitalized in June with a heart attack and never came back 
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to the "Zero Hour." His departure was a blow to Iva, since 
her role as Orphan Ann had been his creation. Without him 
the program lost its meaning for her. She wanted to quit, 
and began to take frequent leaves of absence. Mitsushio, 
her superior at the station who later testified against her, 
said she had better reconsider whether she could quit a 
program directly under control of the army for her own 
personal reasons.48 
In autumn of 1944 Mitsushio was promoted to chief of the 
news analysis section, and Kenkichi Oki took over the "Zero 
Hour." Oki later became the second U.S. Government witness 
to testify against Iva Toguri. He said he had ordered Iva 
to broadcast the words, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really 
are orphans now. How will you get home now that all your 
ships are sunk?"49 
These words were never recorded, although many claimed 
they heard them after the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Iva Toguri 
flatly denied ever saying them, but did remember hearing Oki 
tell Norman Reyes to use the phrase after a battle off 
Formosa. The phrase "orphans of the Pacific" was often used 
to refer to the Australian army, cut off from the Allies, 
and "your ships are gone" was another phrase frequently used 
in Japanese propaganda.50 
Words like "your ships are sunk" were not likely to 
devastate the GIs after they had landed with MacArthur and 
liberated the Philippines in what the press called a "second 
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Normandy." On Monday, October 29, 1944, the New York Times 
printed the story previously mentioned called "Tokyo Rose 
stirs Philippine Mirth." This quoted an entire dispatch 
from the Domei News Agency, not the sort of announcing that 
Iva did with her disc jockey routine, and showed that to the 
Americans, at least, Radio Tokyo was whistling in the dark. 
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MILITARY ENTERTAINMENT 
Long before the United States entered World War II, 
studies of the troops' morale had convinced the Army that it 
should provide its own entertainment internally and not 
continue to rely on outside agencies such as the Red Cross, 
the Knights of Columbus and the Salvation Army.51 Armed 
Forces Radio began in 1941 with small radio stations started 
by the troops themselves. The Government also formed three 
separate agencies — the Education and Information Office 
(I&E), the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Signal 
Corps. All of these dealt with defining war aims and 
persuading members of the armed forces that these aims were 
legitimate,52 
Beginning in 1942, under Army Chief of Staff George C. 
Marshall, Frank Capra produced the "Why We Fight" series of 
seven documentary films intended for military 
indoctrination. These were required viewing for all 
soldiers going overseas, and it was marked on each person's 
record once he had seen the films.53 These were propaganda 
films, in the sense that they simplified the truth in order 
to appeal to the emotions and inspire patriotism. However, 
they were technically brilliant, and three found commercial 
distribution within the U.S. The first in the series. 
Prelude to War, defined the events leading up to the war, 
and won an Academy Award for the best documentary of 1942. 
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Another Capra film, The Negro Soldier, was produced to 
demonstrate to black troops their particular stake in 
fighting the Axis powers. The Army Pictorial Service of the 
Signal Corps, formed after an administrative shakeup in 
1943, sponsored a trilogy directed by John Huston. The most 
famous of these, the recently discovered "Let There Be 
Light," explored the nature of psychosomatic illness as a 
response of normal men to the unendurable. 
In his study of these documentaries, Professor David 
Culbert points out that film was the chosen tool of social 
engineering, which he calls "an outgrowth of behavioral 
psychology arguing that human behavior can be manipulated 
towards socially desirable goals."54 Each nation needed to 
give its citizens a feeling of patriotic community in total 
war, and these films provided "the most comprehensive , 
statement of war aims produced in America between 1941 and 
1945 ."55 
In addition to films made for the military, radio 
entertainment provided by the Armed Forces Network 
essentially played network programming with the advertising 
removed and army spots inserted.56 An article by George 
Home in the New York Times . March 27, 1943, criticized 
their programming. Writing from the New Hebrides about U.S. 
radio and film entertainment, he said: 
The programs that reach the boys down here...could be a 
lot better....They do not want to hear a single program 
about how evil and dumb the enemy is, or a single "back the 
attack" program. They are backing it already. 
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They would like to hear more dance bands, light love 
stories, light musical comedies .... They will probably 
continue to'listen to Tokyo Rose, but no one at home need 
worry about that." 
As "Tokyo Rose" began to make ripples in the press, the 
Armed Forces Network did take notice, although how seriously 
they took it remains in doubt. The San Francisco Chronicle 
report of Iva Toguri's trial indicates that one witness, Lt. 
Ted E. Sherdeman, arrived in Australia in 1943 and, as an 
officer and former Hollywood writer in charge of Armed 
Forces Radio, "his morale was assaulted daily by the 
competitive Radio Tokyo." Delaplane reported; 
It was Sherdeman's job to wean American troops from the 
jive and propaganda fare of Tokyo to the safer but duller 
programs of the "Jungle Network."... 
At Milne Bay in New Guinea, far from Schwab's Drug Store 
on Sunset Boulevard, the expatriate Hollywood writer heard; 
"Wouldn't this be a nice night to go to a cool corner 
drugstore and have an ice cream soda?" 
Said Sherdeman: "I felt that this was very damaging to 
my morale." 
This remark was deleted by Federal Judge Michael J. 
Roche,57 
In spite of Armed Forces Radio, many of the veterans 
interviewed here say there was little or no other 
entertainment available to them. The "Zero Hour" was a hit 
before Iva Toguri joined them. Ira Wolfert's previously 
cited article in the New York Times. June 23, 1943, makes no 
mention of a female announcer, and the article by Lt. 
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I.Henry Strauss in Collier's Magazine January 8, 1944, 
talked about the program and called the announcer "Tokyo 
Tony." It is worth quoting a full paragraph from this to 
show the details attributed to someone other than Iva 
Toguri. The article may have been written before Iva went 
on the air, as two months' lead time to print was not 
unusual then; or Strauss and his company may simply not have 
thought she was important. 
It is difficult to realize that the program is not coming 
from a studio back home, so American is the voice and 
language of the announcer. Its friendliness holds you as he 
continues: "There is a place many thousands of miles away, 
a place dear to all your hearts, where you used to sip sodas 
with the girl next door; where, as a little boy, you swiped 
your mother's cookies; where your car sits on the blocks 
awaiting your return, and your dog goes to the gate every 
evening to see if you are coming down the street. We know 
how you feel, so we are going to give you music that will 
warm your hearts - music that will turn back all those weary 
miles. Our first selection for tonight will be that old 
favorite. Tommy Dorsey's arrangement of Star Dust." 
After a long description of the men's reaction to the 
music, Strauss continues: 
The recording ends, and the announcer asks, "Reminds you 
of the little girl you left behind, doesn't it? Well, don't 
waste your thoughts, brother, she's not waiting for you. 
She's probably out with some lad right now who was smart 
enough to keep himself out of these malaria-infested 
islands." 
Strauss goes on to say that although homesickness is a 
dangerous disease for fighting men, Tokyo's efforts, subtle 
or not, failed to instill it. 
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THE SHIFT IN PUBLIC OPINION 
By the end of the war, the legend of "Tokyo Rose" had 
gone beyond publicity into myth, "Tokyo Rose" may have been 
the third most well-known Japanese name to Americans after 
Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Tojo.58 As victorious 
American allies pushed into Tokyo two reporters, Clark Lee 
from International News Service and Harry Brundidge from 
Cosmopolitan. both owned by Hearst, raced into Tokyo trying 
to scoop the story of Tokyo Rose. 
They contacted a writer, Leslie Nakashima, whom Lee had 
known from the Domei News Agency before the war, but found 
no-one knew who "Tokyo Rose" was, Still they persisted 
until Nakashima introduced them to Iva Toguri, now Mrs. 
d'Aquino, They brought her and her husband Felipe to the 
Imperial Hotel and offered her $2,000 on publication of her 
exclusive story in Cosmopolitan if she would sign a contract 
saying she was "the one and only Tokyo Rose," Iva was 
elated, in part because she thought she was at last going to 
be recognized by her own country, and in part because the 
money was a fortune for war-torn Tokyo, She signed the 
agreement, and Clark Lee came out with a news story in the 
Los Angeles Examiner September 3, 1945 under the heading 
"Traitor's Pay - Tokyo Rose Got 100 Yen a Mo, - $6,60," 59 
Brundidge then wrote a first-person story to sound like a 
confession of treason, and sent the story to Frances 
28 
Whiting, editor of Cosmopolitan Magazine in New York. She 
informed him the next morning by cable that she would not 
run a story about a traitor. Brundidge, needing to absolve 
himself from the terms of the contract, arranged a mass news 
conference for "Tokyo Rose," and then handed the 17 pages of 
notes typed by Clark Lee over to the Eighth Army CIC offices 
of General Willard Thorpe, saying it was her confession as a 
trait or.60 
Iva Toguri was arrested in September 1945 and held in 
Sugamo prison along with many other Japanese of all levels 
of official status. A year later, on October 25, 1946, she 
was released. The Justice Department had decided not to 
prosecute for lack of evidence. 
* * * * *  
In 1945, Americans who had been united by the war effort 
came home to find society fragmented into diverse elements 
once again facing separate problems. A new form of social 
engineering took place; an attempt to rid society of its 
disaffected fringe elements by addressing the issues of 
loyalty and treason. The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes 
trials were two main arenas where the world tried to come to 
grips with principles of morality; acts of sadism and 
brutality became targets of investigation. In the U.S., 
treason trials overhauled the recent past and loyalty oaths 
attempted to protect the country's future, as the press 
peddled the fear of a domestic "red menace."61 
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On November 25, 1946, President Truman created the 
President's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty,62 Its 
recommendations became the basis for Executive Order 9835, 
requiring the loyalty investigation of all employees and 
applicants for employment with the executive branch. Those 
charged with disloyalty went before their own agency's 
loyalty board; appeals came before the Civil Service 
Commission's Loyalty Review Board. The order also directed 
the Attorney General to furnish the board with a list of 
subversive organizations. The FBI, the chief investigative 
agency, was permitted to conceal the identity of its 
confidential informants,63 
At this time Tom Clark was Attorney General under Truman, 
and like many other public figures he took a public beating 
from the vitriolic Walter Winchell. At this time many 
members of Congress, especially in the House Un-American 
Activities Committee, thought the administration was "soft 
on traitors."64 Winchell, formerly pro-Roosevelt and anti­
fascist, had swung sharply to the right, and in 1948 was at 
the peak of his influence. In addition to his New York 
Mirror column syndicated in 800 daily newspapers, his Sunday 
night broadcasts commanded the biggest audience in radio -
perhaps 20 million. Critic John Crosby wrote: "The Walter 
Winchell rating is a gauge on how nervous the nation is. 
When the United States is worried, his rating is high. When 
the United States is serene, his rating is low."65 
30 
When Iva Toguri tried to return to the United States in 
1947, the Chief of the Passport Division at the State 
Department wrote to the Justice Department asking for an 
opinion on her attempt to re-establish citizenship. The 
Assistant Attorney General under Clark wrote that after 
analyzing the available evidence a prosecution for treason 
was not warranted, and there was no objection to granting 
her a passport. A few days later the Commander of the 
American Legion publicly asked the Justice Department to 
expedite the prosecution of "Tokyo Rose" to forestall her 
attempt to re-establish residence in the U.S. Concurrently, 
Brundidge had managed to get a series of articles published 
in the Nashville Tennessean in May 1948 in which he stated 
that Clark had in his possession "a signed confession by 
Tokyo Rose."65 Letters and resolutions of protest from 
local Legion branches flowed steadily into the Justice 
Department through early 1948. Publicity from an anti-
Japanese organization in California called the "Native Sons 
of the Golden West" joined the protest as this group sent 
letters to numerous top officials.67 
Walter Winchell took up the "Tokyo Rose" issue after 
receiving a letter from a Gold Star mother whose son had 
been killed in the war. Winchell apparently had a grudge 
against the Attorney General for not letting him know in 
advance of the official announcement of his appointment to 
office.68 1948 was an election year and the democratic 
administration's popularity was at a low ebb. It had become 
politically expedient to take a strong stand against 
treason. 
The Constitution defines treason against the United 
States (in Article III, Section 3) as "adhering to their 
enemies, giving them aid and comfort." To establish this 
requires "the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt 
act." The need to establish overt acts is designed to 
protect citizens from false accusations by the government, 
since treason is a crime not necessarily accompanied by 
objective results. 
Three years after the war ended the Justice Department 
began to move on a number of World War II cases . From 
January 25 through March 11, 1949, "Axis Sally" was tried in 
Washington, D.C. The trials, although seemingly similar, 
differed substantially in content, 
Mildred Gillars was in fact the only "Axis Sally," and 
she called herself "Sally" on the air. At first she also 
claimed duress as a motive, but on the second day in court 
changed her story, saying that love for her former teacher, 
Max Otto Koischewitz, formerly of Hunter College, had 
motivated her allegiance to the Nazi cause.69 The jury 
found her guilty on one count of treason involving a Nazi 
broadcast called "Vision of Invasion." Broadcast in May, 
1944, the play was beamed overseas to American homes and to 
U.S. troops waiting to invade Normandy. Miss Gillars 
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participated in the role of an American mother who dreamed 
that her son in the invasion forces had died in a burning 
ship attempting to cross the English Channel. The broadcast 
was accompanied by many screams, groans and outcries as a 
background for the account of what would happen if the 
Allies dared to invade Europe. The prosecution charged that 
she got a "sadistic joy" out of the broadcasts.70 Miss 
Gillars asserted that she had tried to help the U.S. by 
broadcasting news of American POWs. The POWs testified at 
the trial that she had approached them as a Red Cross nurse 
and had promised to deliver their messages without 
propaganda J but evidence showed they were laced with 
propaganda from beginning to end.71 It is also worth noting 
that Mildred Gillars had dramatic training, chose to live in 
Nazi Germany before the war, and sought the radio as a means 
of making a living; she was paid three times as much as 
other employees at Radio Berlin, second only to Koischewitz 
himself.72 She had signed an oath of allegiance to Germany, 
and when the Allies invaded Berlin, she fled with 
Koischewitz, rather than trying to return to the United 
States. 
On December 3, 1947, the New York Times carried an 
article headed "Seek Treason Witnesses," which began: 
"Anyone who ever saw Iva Ikuko d'Aquino broadcasting as 
'Tokyo Rose' or recognized her voice coming over the air 
waves, should communicate with the FBI, that agency stated 
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today." A year and a half later, on July 5, 1949, Iva 
Toguri's trial opened in San Francisco. She was charged 
with eight overt acts of treason. Defense Counsel Wayne 
Collins tried to defend her on three grounds: That there 
were 15 or more English-speaking women broadcasting from 
Japan over shortwave to the enemy; that broadcasts were made 
from nine occupied radio stations besides Radio Tokyo; and 
that "Zero Hour" on which Iva Toguri was accused of 
treasonable broadcasts never got beyond the point of playing 
entertainment to build up listener interest among American 
troops.73 But the prosecution had two witnesses, Mitsushio 
and Oki, who said they definitely had seen her write and 
broadcast propaganda. Both men were her supervisors at NHK 
and both were nisei who had joined the Japanese cause. They 
were not prosecuted because they had not kept their 
citizenship. 
Iva Toguri. was found guilty on September 30, 1949, of one 
count of treason; "That on a day during October 1944, the 
exact date being to the Grand Jurors unknown, the defendant 
in the offices of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan did 
speak into a microphone concerning the loss of ships."74 
She was sentenced to ten years in prison and a fine of 
$10,000. Counting her time in Sugamo, she served eight 
years. 
In 1976, the Chicacro Tribune ran a story by Ronald Yates 
under the heading, "Tokyo Rose's accusers claim U.S. forced 
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them to lie," According to the story, which named Mitsushio 
and Oki, one of them, who asked not to be identified, said, 
"U.S. Occupation Army police came and told me I had no 
choice but to testify against Iva, or else. Then, after I 
was flown to San Francisco for the trial along with other 
government witnesses, we were told what to say and what not 
to say two hours every morning for a month before the trial 
started." 75 
Concurrent with the "Tokyo Rose" trial and overshadowing 
it in the press, several other stories grabbed the headlines 
and showed the temper of the times. Alger Hiss and Judith 
Coplon went on trial for spying for Russia. The San 
Francisco War Memorial trustees banned Wagnerian soprano 
Kirsten Flagstad from the Opera House on the grounds that 
her deceased husband had been suspected of collaborating 
with the Nazis in occupied Norway; this threatened the 
cancellation of the entire following opera season. Baritone 
Paul Robeson, a self-declared radical, spoke out against the 
House Un-American Activities Committee, calling them a 
"definite menace"; two veterans' organizations, the Veterans 
of Foreign Wars and the Disabled American Veterans picketed 
his concert in Newark, New Jersey chanting "Go Back to 
Russia."76 In Peekskill, New York, anti-communist 
demonstrators attacked buses leaving a Paul Robeson concert 
and injured 83 people.77 Seen in perspective of the times, 
"Tokyo Rose" had a brief flicker as headline news. 
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But 40 years later, the impact of that trial is still 
hard to dismiss. The "witch hunt" years of American history 
are a reminder that the price tag of repression and 
intolerance, paid in the coin of personal suffering, has yet 
to be written off the ledger. These interviews show that 
the effect of the "Zero Hour" propaganda during the war is 
difficult to assess; those who remember "Tokyo Rose" have no 
way of sorting out which woman said what from which station. 
Part of the enjoyment of enemy programs may have come from 
the group participation which inspired feelings of patriotic 
community; or from memories evoked by the music; or from 
having a chance to relax after a day fraught with 
extraordinary tensions. It can be seen that GIs, concerned 
at first by the accuracy of the information, later enjoyed 
the chance to laugh at the obvious lies. But they always 
enjoyed the music, and Iva Toguri, the "orphan of the 
Pacific," helped them along. 
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WAR OF WORDS AND MUSIC 
Transcript of the Documentary 
March, 1988 
WAR OF WORDS AND MUSIC 
Maybe they were lonely, or maybe they just liked her 
music. Perhaps by 1944 they knew they were winning. But 
the GIs in the South Pacific made her one of the most 
popular disc jockeys ever. 
IVA TOGURI; Hello, you fighting orphans of the Pacific. 
Hows tricks? This is after her weekend Ann, back on the air 
strictly under union hours. Reception OK? Well it better 
be, because this is all-request night, and I've got a pretty 
nice program for my favorite little family, the wandering 
boneheads of the Pacific Islands. The first request is made 
by none other than the boss. And guess what. He wants 
Bonnie Baker and "My Resistance Is Low." Low, what taste 
you have, sir, she said. 
Yet Iva Toguri is an obscure name, ignored by history 
that once burned her with its spotlight. The U.S. 
Government tried her for treason, saying she had attempted 
to demoralize American troops as the legendary propagandist 
the GIs called "Tokyo Rose." 
IVA TOGURI (introduced as "Ann"): This is Monday, 
washday for some, rifle cleaning for some, and for the 
others, just another day to play. Let's all get together 
and forget those washday blues. Here's Kay Kaiser, Sully 
Mason, and the Playmates, so come join the parade, you 
boneheads. (music) 
The legend was far from the truth, but it had strong 
roots in the power of her radio popularity. Iva spent eight 
years in jail for treason. Yet there was no such person as 
Tokyo Rose. The name she used was Orphan Ann, but as many 
as twenty women went on the air for Radio Tokyo to play 
records and try to demoralize the American GIs. The GIs 
called all of them by the generic name "Tokyo Rose." 
IVA TOGURI ("Ann"): I see Betty's getting impatient for 
her request of the evening. Oh, come on, don't hold back, 
Betty. What is it you want to hear? Don't be bashful. 
BETTY: Can you oblige with "My Heart Belongs to Daddy?" 
Bea Wayne doing the vocal of course. 
IVA TOGURI ("Ann"); Well, no sooner said than done, 
(mus ic) 
Robert Anderson served on the USS Half Moon in the South 
Pacific. 
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ROBERT ANDERSON; Tokyo Rose had a beautiful voice. She 
was easy to listen to. And that was kind of appreciated, 
and besides, it was a sexy voice as far as the troops were 
concerned. And they liked that. She could lead into the 
music portion of it beautifully. 
Paul Snyder says she was well-known in the submarine 
force, 
PAUL SNYDER: She was female and there were a lot of 
lonely guys out there in the Pacific and that was about the 
only feminine voice they could hear, so they used to tune 
her in a lot . 
Dick Grant, a former Intelligence Officer, was with the 
Army Air Corps in New Guinea. 
DICK GRANT; She had a real sweet voice. It was a sexy 
voice, whether she was trying to make it sexy or not, we 
were pretty lonesome down there in New Guinea and any 
woman's voice was kind of sexy at the time. But she had 
good delivery, and she evidently had good intelligence, or 
the Japanese Imperial Staff had good intelligence. They 
just fed the propaganda to her. 
The legend grew as Japan beamed broadcasts over short and 
medium-wave transmissions. From Tokyo to Manila, Saigon, 
south to New Guinea, north to the Aleutian Islands, they 
broadcast in English, and used for bait the latest American 
music. 
(Fade up Teddy Wilson's orchestra, "Mean to Me.") 
Iva Toguri was a California girl. She paid her first 
visit to relatives in Japan in the summer of 1941. When war 
broke out she was caught in the alien country of her 
ancestors, unwilling to renounce her U.S. citizenship, but 
unable to return home. 
She got a job as ah English-speaking typist at the 
Japanese Domei News Service. The military government needed 
broadcasters who spoke English. Iva refused. She said she 
had no experience. But the army gave orders at Radio Tokyo. 
Iva went on the air. 
(This is Radio Tokyo calling in the Pacific - voice under 
next segment) (male voices) 
Iva worked with a team of three men, all of them Allied 
prisoners. Major Charles Cousens, called "the Walter 
Cronkite of Australia," wrote her lines. Both he and Iva 
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tried to diminish the effectiveness of the propaganda. They 
exaggerated the facts to make them preposterous. 
But by then, the Japanese broadcasts had become the only 
game in town. The many voices called "Tokyo Rose" told the 
GIs their own troop movements. Dick Grant: 
DICK GRANT; The Tokyo High Command had some kind of 
intelligence net that really produced, because Tokyo Rose 
would get on the air and, for instance, "The 5th Fighter 
Squadron - when you come over Rabaul tomorrow we're going to 
be waiting for you." Specifics like that - she would name 
the targets that had been planned to be hit the very next 
day . 
Leo Rhein was with the Forty-first Quartermaster Company 
in Australia and New Guinea. 
LEO RHEIN: She would address units. She would address 
companies, or regiments, or battalions. And they knew 
exactly what regiments or battalions were there. And it 
even got to the point where she could pinpoint individuals, 
and she'd, say, give somebody's name and a certain unit, and 
say that he was at a certain place, and so you knew pretty 
well that some information was getting through, that they 
knew where people and where units were. 
Les Tucker, on the USS North Carolina, said Tokyo Rose 
had the news first. 
LES TUCKER: I remember when the Chicago was sunk, and we 
took on the survivors, oh, approximately 36 to 48 hours off 
thei Chicago. And I can remember that broadcast, what date I 
can't tell you, one or two or three days after, but the 
Chicago had been sunk. They knew it - they had sunk it. 
And the only way we knew about it at the time was from the 
survivors. 
Paul Snyder: 
PAUL SNYDER; I remember in 1944 that the rumor was that 
Tokyo Rose was really an American spy who was providing 
Naval information to Navy submarines particularly, because 
it was uncanny when we would get a message that the Seattle— 
Maru was at such-and-such a longitude and latitude and we 
would hit that longitude and latitude and there would be the 
Seattle-Maru. 
Gareth Moon, with the Marines, watched an air fight from 
Guadalcanal. 
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GARETH MOON: That evening when we listened to Tokyo Rose 
she told how the Imperial Japanese Forces had made an air 
strike at Guadalcanal, and then she proceeded to tell the 
exact truth. She told how many planes they lost, six or 
seven of their planes were lost and two of ours were lost, 
and she told how the battle hadn't turned out as well as 
they wanted, that the Americans had actually chased off the 
Japanese planes - partly because they had run out of gas and 
had to go back to Munda, I suppose - but she told the truth. 
And we were amazed about that, 
The news was not always reliable. 
GARETH MOON: What we found out afterwards was what she 
told about the other place was absolutely false, there was 
no truth to it at all. But we, having heard about what had 
happened at Guadalcanal in which she told the truth, were 
almost inclined to believe that there had been a terrible 
massacre up on the other island, and that we'd had some bad 
luck back there. 
Les Tucker found some disinformation as well. 
LES TUCKER; The ship I was on, which was the USS North 
Carolina, was consigned to the depths twice. I don't 
remember the exact dates, but there we are just floating 
around, you know, as well as ever, doing our job. 
The men knew the broadcasts exaggerated, but they stayed 
tuned. And sometimes, they worried. Navy men in the New 
Hebrides had to take atabrine tablets to prevent malaria, 
and it turned their skin yellow. Robert Anderson remembers 
Tokyo Rose told them they would become sterile. 
ROBERT ANDERSON: Propaganda goes so far, but that kind 
of worried the young fellows out there and some of them 
planning on getting married...I know an MD on board ship had 
to come on and say, "Don't worry, fellows, that is strictly 
propaganda - there's no research saying that atabrine 
tablets are going to cause sterility." 
They weren't sterile, but they were far from women. And 
the voice on the airwaves tried to play on their fears. 
Paul Snyder; 
PAUL SNYDER: This particular thing about telling us that 
some 4-F was back wining and dining bur sweetheart was 
really almost an every night thing with her. And it was 
very smart, because she did figure out that there were only 
probably four or five really important songs that everybody 
would have some feeling for or relate to some girl. The 
girl that I was going with at the time, I particularly 
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remember "Harbor Lights" was our song. She played a lot of 
"Harbor Lights" - I don't know how effective that was. 
Barry Zorthian, a communications specialist, worked with 
the Voice of America and for Information Vietnam. 
BARRY ZORTHIAN: The basic technique 6f appealing to the 
desire for home, the desire to be with family, the desire to 
be in familiar surroundings and therefore to be less than 
committed to fighting, is standard operating procedure if 
you will. 
Though they laughed, everyone who heard Tokyo Rose 
remembers that part of her message. It's the same technique 
advertisers use for hard sell - to repeat until the listener 
remembers a brand name. Broadcast historian Dr. Kenneth 
Short says you have to be cautious before you dismiss the 
effects of a repeated message. 
DR. SHORT; If you're worrying about what your 
girlfriend's doing back in L.A,, and if Tokyo Rose is 
reminding you about that question, you may on the outside be 
laughing and on the inside you may be crying. 
But the United States never tried to block Japanese 
radio. Instead, they provided their own training films, the 
now classic "Why We Fight" series by Frank Capra. Armed 
Forces Radio slowly got into gear. Author Larry Suid says 
it was started by the servicemen. 
(Glenn Miller softly in background "In the Mood") 
LARRY SUID: And by that I mean military radio stations 
which were created purely to relieve the boredom of the 
troops in the field. And they were spontaneously created by 
the men themselves. General Marshall brought in Capra and 
Tom Lewis, not in response to Tokyo Rose, because when this 
was started the troops with a few exceptions were not 
fighting. I mean, there were troops on Guadalcanal, they 
were fighting on Wake Island, but the idea was domestic. 
Domestic in the sense of whatever they throw at us, this is 
what we're going to do. It wasn't in reaction to Tokyo Rose 
that Armed Forces Radio was created. 
(Bring up Glenn Miller) 
But by 1944, when Iva was on the air, the enemy 
broadcasts still filled a vacuum with entertainment for war-
weary listeners. 
Ken McConnell was with the Signal Corps in the South 
Pacific . 
45 
KEN McCONNELL: The program was very entertaining. We 
used to be able to - when I'd pick it up on the radio - lots 
of times the crew would request that we plug it in through 
the PA system. She played real good records. They had all 
the American records. I recall that when "White Christmas" 
first became available, they had it available within a week 
or so of the time when it came out in the United States. 
And it was a wire recorded version, it was excellent. 
Gareth Moon; 
GARETH MOON; Just like anything else - when we were out 
on the islands anything we had to do was diversion. We did 
things that would be boring as all get-out back home but out 
on the islands it was just something to do. 
Listening to the radio became a daily ritual. Les 
Tucker: 
LES TUCKER; It was a pleasure because we didn't have 
Armed Forces Radio set up at that time and it was 
entertaining. 
Dick Grant; 
DICK GRANT: Every evening around chow time between 6:00 
and 7:00 when everyone had finished the chores was back home 
and everything, the most modern and up-to-date music 
emanated from Tokyo Rose and her evening broadcasts. And 
everyone tuned in to listen to the latest music from home. 
We didn't have Armed Forces Radio like we do now or like we 
did during the Korean War or the Southeast Asian War. 
In April, 1944, the New York Times' s George Home wrote 
from the New Hebrides, saying Armed Forces Radio should try 
a different format to please the GIs, He said they would 
like to hear more dance bands. And he added, "They will 
probably continue to listen to Tokyo Rose, but no-one at 
home need worry about that." Bill Ohrmann: 
BILL OHRMANN; She'd come on and say. Well, you boys 
fighting down there in the jungle, some 4-F back home is 
taking your girl out, and stuff like that. And we'd just 
laugh about it the next morning, and say, "Did you hear 
Tokyo Rose last night?" And the guys that were lucky enough 
to hear her would tell about it, you know. It was just an 
entertaining program for us. Nothing sinister at all. 
Dr. Clifford Uyeda spearheaded the attempt to have Iva 
Toguri pardoned by President Gerald Ford. He says Major 
Cousens, who worked with Iva Toguri, recruited her for her 
obvious American sympathies. 
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DR: UYEDA; As far as he was concerned, Iva would be the 
most unlikely Tokyo Rose. Because of her voice. She does 
not have a soft voice at all. She has a rather sharp voice, 
which is still evident today. So knowing this, he said that 
he was going to have a program in which there'd be nothing 
that would be anti-American. 
Iva did not hide her pro-American sympathies. Sometimes 
that worried the other Americans who were also stranded 
there. 
DR. UYEDA: They didn't like her because they said she 
was just too outspoken. And after all, they said, the war 
was going on,, you're in an enemy country, and you don't 
start saying things against the country where you're living. 
Because Iva would say, "America's going to win the war," and 
you don't say that in Japan during the wartime, that's not a 
very popular thing to do. 
IVA TOGURI ("Ann"); According to union hours we are 
through today. We close up another chapter of sweet 
propaganda in the form of music for you, for my dear little 
orphans wandering in the Pacific. 
The exaggerated announcements from Radio Tokyo became a 
source of entertainment in themselves. Will Clover, in 
the Navy, worked, with radio communications and coded 
signals. 
WILL CLOVER: She had a program there and told us that 
the Japanese forces had invaded the West Coast of the United 
States and had progressed to Oklahoma. 
Leo Rhein; 
LEO RHEIN: The claims that were made over the radio were 
so outrageous that they were unbelievable. The claim that 
they made in the Philippines was that there was so many 
American ships sunk in the Philippines that the water... the 
water rose a foot around the islands. You know, just 
unb e 1 i evab 1 e . 
It was easy to laugh when the truth was clear. But truth 
is sometimes hard to come by. Americans in the South 
Pacific listened for news of their prisoners of war, who 
went on the air, but said what they were told. Ken 
McConnell monitored the speeches, 
KEN McCONNELL: She didn't interview them - they would 
just perfunctorily read and you assumed or you felt certain 
that that's all they were doing. They were talking in a 
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very monotonous voice and "I'm so-and-so and I belong to 
such-and-such outfit and I come from so-and-so. I've been 
taken prisoner on so-and-so, and I'm receiving the Red Cross 
packages and they're treating me well and everything is 
fine." It was just a canned speech. 
Mariano Villarin was captured in the Philippines and 
brought to visit Radio Tokyo as part of an indoctrination 
plan. Drawn to the sound of American music, he watched Iva 
Toguri speak into the microphone, and talked to the Allied 
prisoners who wrote her scripts. 
MARIANO VILLARIN: They were on a starvation diet. But 
they were better treated than regular American POWs in 
prison camps, because they were there to broadcast, they 
were employed by Radio Tokyo so they got better treatment. 
But they were undernourished, of course, because there was a 
rationing system in Tokyo at that time. We were hungry too, 
though, we were hostages, but we were given better treatment 
than the American POWs. 
Iva smuggled oranges from the countryside, and blankets 
for the men who shivered with malaria. Dr. Uyeda; 
DR. UYEDA; So what Iva did was, she said she used to buy 
the things, and then would hand it over to Captain Ince or 
Major Cousens. Or Norman Reyes. And what they would do then 
is that they would put it under their coats, and when they 
visited, then they would go ahead and give it to the 
prisoners at the POW camp. 
Many of the prisoners were from Bataan and Corregidor in 
the Philippines. They waited for liberation under appalling 
conditions of starvation and maltreatment. They waited 
until the battle of Leyte, in October 1944. 
(Actuality; Gen. MacArthur) This is the Voice of 
Freedom, General MacArthur speaking. People of the 
Philippines, I have returned. By the grace of the Almighty 
God our forces stand again on Philippine soil, soil 
consecrated in the blood of our two people, (fade out) (NA 
200-174) 
Dick Grant ; 
DICK GRANT; How can you beat success? MacArthur was on>e 
of the most brilliant men in military history, in my 
estimation. He could have gone against every island on the 
way up, but he didn't - he left entire Japanese armies, like 
the 18th Japanese Army in Wewak, on the north coast of New 
Guinea - he left it there, bypassed it, went on up to the 
Philippines. You can't beat success. 
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Max Kraus, who fought with the 84th Infantry Division in 
Europe, used propaganda from a mobile loudspeaker across the 
front lines from the Rhine to the Elbe to urge the Germans 
to surrender. 2500 Axis troops turned themselves in. 
MAX KRAUS: The effect of any propaganda depends on 
whether you are winning or losing. If you are losing there 
is no way in which you can ...talk the enemy into 
surrendering. And if you are winning it's relatively easy 
because there is already the tactical and strategic 
pressure. 
Oxford University's Dr. Kenneth Short has published a 
book about radio and film propaganda. 
KEN SHORT: Propaganda neither wins nor loses wars. It's 
simply a contributory factor towards the winning or losing. 
You could argue that a country that had the most effective 
propaganda could still lose the war because it had the 
smaller army. 
They could create a mood with music and nostalgia, but 
the Tokyo Rose broadcasts will be remembered for not 
succeeding. Dick Grant: 
DICK GRANT; I don't think they had any clear 
understanding of the Americans' psyche. This would make us 
want to hurry up and get the job over with and get 
home...Maybe the Japanese thought we were not a warlike 
race, or warlike people, I should say, and something like 
this would intimidate us. But I think it just got our 
dander up, 
WILL CLOVER: I know we all got a big laugh out of it. 
In fact, it kept our morale kind of high. 
BILL OHRMANN: When you feel like you're winning, your 
morale is pretty good and that's the way we felt. Because 
we could see our troops and ourselves moving up the coast by 
jumps and we felt confident the war would end some day. 
At the end of the war, a mood of retribution pervaded 
society. In 1945 the U.S. Government jailed Iva Toguri in 
Japan on suspicion of treason. They released her a year 
later for lack of evidence. But when she tried to return 
home, the legend of a provocative spy created by the media 
met the young woman who smuggled medicine to prisoners. War 
crime trials filled the news. The FBI subpoenaed witnesses 
to try to put Iva Toguri, the typist and part-time 
announcer, behind bars. Mariano Villarin: 
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MARIANO VILLARIN: Question by the prosecutor: "Will you 
tell His Honor and the ladies and gentlemen of the jury what 
the defendant said on that occasion over the microphone, in 
substance, according to the best of your recollection?" So 
I said, she said, according to the best of my recollection, 
"Hello, hohorable enemy, what do you have to say in the 
foxholes in New Guinea? Your girlfriends are back home 
running around with other men. It's about time you fellows 
went back home." 
Dr>, Uyeda ; 
DR. UYEDA; The interesting thing at the trial was that 
many of the persons, the American soldiers who testified 
saying that they pinpointed certain Sundays that they heard 
her, she was not, it would have had to be somebody else 
because she was not even broadcasting. 
The trial took three months and cost half a million 
dollars. Out of eight counts of treason, the jury could 
only find grounds for one. Overt Act Six, that some time in 
October, 1944, she did speak into a microphone concerning 
the loss of ships. Mariano Villarin; 
MARIANO VILLARIN: She said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you 
really are orphans now. How will you get home, now that all 
your ships are sunk?" But they were not, on the qontrary, 
it was the Japanese ships that were sunk. 
Iva Toguri received her pardon from President Ford 
on his last day in office, January 20, 1977. But the vets 
who remember her thought her trial was a mistake to begin 
with. Georgana Egeland's husband, Roy, fought in the 
Philippines on the USS Santee. 
GEORGANA EGELAND; When Tokyo Roses's trial hit the front 
pages of all the newspapers, they were going to put her in 
prison for hurting the military and the naval boys morale so 
much, Roy says, "What a shame. What a shame." He said, 
"They should give her a medal." He said, "She was the only 
connection we had with what was happening at home." And he 
said, "She had all the latest records, all the best music, 
and all the latest news." And he said that he couldn't wait 
for her to come on so they could go and listen. 
Leo Rhein; 
LEO RHEIN; As the songs were played, and as they came 
out, we got them, or she got them, and she played them for 
us. And it was terrific. This was the bright spot of each 
day, was to gather round the radio and listen to her. 
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Gareth Moon: 
GARETH MOON: We would listen to the music and instead of 
it making us homesick it made us feel better, because we 
were comfortable with it. That was the stuff we knew in 
high school and at home, and we enjoyed it. I don't think 
that Tokyo Rose as such ever made us homesick or upset. It 
was just kind of fun to listen to her. As I say, she was 
kind of an idol for a lot of the fellows. 
Paul Snyder; 
PAUL SNYDER: My organization, the Submarine Veterans of 
the United States of America, would like to have her back at 
a reunion some time. She's a.lmost an affectionate friend in 
a way . 
(bring up Billie Holiday: "Mean to Me") 
"War of Words and Music" was produced by Clover Koopman 
and recorded at the Recording Center at Missoula, Montana. 
Engineered by Richard H. Kuschel. Executive Producer, Jane 
B. Koopman. 
Special thanks to all the veterans and their wives who 
gave their time and help. Thanks also to the following 
organizations: The National Archives. The Japanese American 
Citizens League. The Missoulian. The Mansfield Library. 
And the Western Montana Military Officers Association. 
March, 1988. 
IVA TOGURI'S WITNESSES 
Dr. Clifford Uyeda spearheaded the movement by the Japanese 
American Citizen's League to have Iva Toguri pardoned by 
President Gerald Ford. He published a summary of the 
process, A Final Report and Review. 
Mariano Villarin fought with the Philippine Army and was in 
the Bataan death march. Because he spoke both English and 
Japanese, he was brought to Japan for an indoctrination 
program by the military government. As part of this program 
he was brought to Radio Tokyo and saw Iva Toguri as she 
broadcast. He kept a diary, and for this reason was 
subpoenaed as a witness by the U.S. Government for Iva 
Toguri's trial. His book. We Remember. Bataan and 
Correaidor. is due for publication. 
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Interview with Dr. Clifford Uyeda 
February 19, 1988 
Dr. Uyeda spearheaded the movement with the Japanese 
American Citizen's League to have Iva Toguri pardoned by 
President Gerald Ford. He lives in San Francisco. I 
interviewed him by telephone from Missoula, MT. 
(I start by asking him if I can interview Iva Toguri. He 
explains that she has many requests for interviews, but 
doesn't give them, as she is working under contract with one 
person to record her story. So she turned down my request 
because she thought it would be unfair to the person to whom 
she is already committed.) 
CK: I see. Well, thank you for asking her anyway. And I 
wondered if I could ask you a couple of questions yourself, 
about how you got started on the drive to restore her 
citizenship. 
CU: That was - although I was born on the West Coast, I 
was born in the state of Washington, but I left the West 
Coast way back in 1936. And so I was in Boston during her 
trial, (apologizes for his voice, as he has the flu now.) 
So I was in Boston, and I really knew very little about 
Tokyo Rose. But once I came to the West Coast in the 1950s, 
I heard about it and I was still in practice then, so I 
decide that, gee, this is something that I should look into. 
So what I did was after work, I used to go to the library, 
the public library here, and go through the entire trial in 
the three San Francisco newspapers. The trial was in 1949 
from July through September. 
So when I went through all that, then I start to ask 
around to see if anything was being done for her, and when I 
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heard that nothing was being done I decided that I'll get 
two people that are interested and see what I can do. At 
the very beginning, I still remember the first meeting we 
had, we didn't know what to do. We just - it was an 
exploratory meeting. And we asked some attorneys, and their 
advice was that because Wayne Collins and Ted Tamba, who 
were her attorneys, had also tried to get a pardon for her, 
a presidential pardon, maybe this would be the most simple 
thing to do, because that would restore her American 
citizenship. However, to try to bring the thing back and 
redo the trial would be impossible, they said, unless you 
have new evidence, which we didn't have at that time, 
nothing new, so because of that statement we decided that 
OK, we would go for the Presidential pardon, just the way 
Wayne Collins had tried to get and failed earlier. So 
therefore we went that route. 
CK; Was she still in jail when you tried? 
CU: Oh no. She was - she went to jail in 1949, and then 
she came out in 50 - gosh, I've forgotten - she was let out 
for good behavior without serving ten years. I think she 
was — she served —however, all told, she served more than 
eight years of her life. Because she was kept in jail here 
in San Francisco for almost a year, she was kept in jail in 
Japan for almost two years before she - so if you put all 
that together, she served almost ten years of jail. 
CK: That's amazing. That's so cruel. I'm wondering, did 
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she talk to you about doing the broadcasts under duress? 
CU: Actually, what she said was that - the way it was 
told to her, she really trusted Major Cousens, you know, the 
Australian. Major Cousens was a well-known Australian 
broadcaster. They even - I don't know how true this is, but 
they used to call him "the Walter Cronkite of Australia." 
It was he that recruited Iva. And also, that was frequently 
justified at the trial, saying that as far as he was 
concerned, Iva would be the most unlikely Tokyo Rose. 
Because ..because of her voice. She does not have a soft 
voice at all. She has a rather sharp voice, which is still 
evident today. Sp knowing this, he said that he was going 
to have a program in which there'd be nothing that would be 
in the program that would be anti-American. He felt that it 
would be safe, and because he was the one that was given the 
authority to put up the programs, and he said "I would do 
all the writing," and the script was written by him and also 
there was an American chap by the name of Ted Ince who also 
did script-writing, 
CK: Did she ever ad lib, or did she just read? 
CU: No, she went strictly by the script, because it was 
written for her. Actually when you listen to her speech, 
almost all of it is really like a disc jockey. All she does 
is introduce the musical numbers, the recording that she is 
going to play. And -
CK: Were there many other women -
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CU: Oh, there were many others, yes. In fact I've met 
some of the women, who have said "If anyone should be tried 
for being Tokyo Rose it would be me." I've talked to a 
woman - this particular person, she could not be tried, 
because although she was born in Japan, therefore she was 
not an American citizen, she had come to Los Angeles when 
she was a little girl, very young, I think a baby. She grew 
up and went to school in the United States so for all 
practical - the way she talked, she was like an American. 
Her English was very good. She had gone back to Japan, and 
was in Japan when the war started, so therefore they 
recruited her as one of the broadcasters. And she said she 
- her script was quite different. She was much more of the 
type that people had...accused Tokyo Rose of saying. 
But of course the problem, the real problem was that 
nobody knew who Tokyo Rose was, People in Tokyo never knew 
that the Americans had named anybody Tokyo Rose. Because 
that name was used for almost any female broadcaster. There 
is a statement broadcast as early as December, 1941, in 
which a Navy submarine log states that they were listening 
to Tokyo Rose. Now that was about three years before Iva 
even went on the radio. 
CK: I wonder if the other women were also more or less 
under duress, 
CU: Well - except that there was one who was very much -
her statements were much more anti-American, (she) was a 
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woman broadcasting from Manila. She was ... apparently she 
was a nightclub singer. Very - a beautiful woman, from what 
I heard. And her statement was much more anti-American in 
tone, and she was saying a lot of the things from ( ) and 
she also had a very seductive voice, a very good voice, and 
so many people would say that, hearing her would give all 
the impression of what the press calls Tokyo Rose. 
But...she was also up for trial, but what happened right 
after the war was that she married an American colonel, 
after the Americans took over in the Philippines. She 
married an American colonel and immediately all the 
investigations stopped right there. 
CK: For heavens sake. What was her name? 
CU; I think her name was - gosh, I have it in that green 
book, it's Lipton, or something like that. You have that 
green book (refers to a booklet he sent me.) Myrtle Lipton. 
Something like that. 
CK: OK. 
CU: She was, from what we hear, her statement was much 
more like what people have accused Tokyo Rose of saying. 
Also there were other - the person who was on what they 
called the German Hour was also more anti-America. But 
there were many, many women broadcasting. 
CK: I heard stories that Iva smuggled supplies and 
provisions. 
CU: Well the way she did it was, because - she could not 
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go into the American POW camps at all. Because they 
wouldn't allow her to go there, obviously. There were 
American military personnel, like Captain Ince was one, and 
also the Australian Major Cousens, they, being former 
military people, they were POWs. And they could go and see 
the prisoners of war. So what Iva did was, she said she 
used to buy the things, and then would hand it over to 
Captain Ince or Major Cousens, Or Norman Reyes. And what 
they would do then is that they would put it under their 
coats, and when they visited, then they would go ahead and 
give it to the prisoners at the POW camp. Because she 
herself, they would not let her go ahead. She was the only 
person that could go out. She said that at one time she 
became pretty good at - in black market, because she would 
go out into the country to buy things which ordinary people 
could not get because of.,.she was able to get around. And 
she was able to buy a lot of the things that the ordinary 
...you could not get. She could smuggle the things in to 
her work and then have her co-workers there smuggle it into 
the POW camp. And they said they were able to do that. 
She was .,,the amazing thing to me is that, of all the 
people that were broadcasting in Radio Tokyo, she had been 
the most unlikely Tokyo Rose. Yet she was the only one ever 
arrested or charged or tried.- No one else was ever even 
t ouched. 
CK: Do you think they wanted her because she was 
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popular? 
CU: No,... 
CK: Or do you think... 
CU: I think it was just the circumstance of the time. 
When she was first chosen as Tokyo Rose there was sort of a 
scramble for recognition. Because after the war, when the 
country was defeated, it was in shambles, everybody was 
starving , and to be suddenly, to become a celebrity in this 
mess, and to be offered money, you know that was a fortune 
really in those days, $2,000 in American money. You 
couldn't get that much money in several years of work. So 
some of the people at the radio station had hoped that ...1 
know one person that was also working there, he wanted his 
wife to be recognized as Tokyo Rose. And he was very miffed 
when Iva was chosen. And Iva was chosen only because there 
was - also this is in the green book - the person that was a 
close friend of the American journalist said "I do know 
somebody who works in Radio Tokyo," and he introduced her to 
them as someone from Radio Tokyo. Of course as soon as he 
introduced her he immediately named her as Tokyo Rose. But 
I don't think she ever at that time realized what that name 
really meant. 
CK: But she did call herself Orphan Ann and she was 
popular. 
CU: Yes, Orphan Ann. She called herself Orphan Ann, 
right. 
59 
CK: But did she have any idea how popular she had 
become? 
CU: No, I don't think she had any idea. Because she was 
on, I think, gosh, I've forgotten how often she was on. I 
know that she never worked on weekends, So that the 
interesting thing at the trial was that many of the persons, 
the American sold,iers who testified saying that they 
pinpointed certain Sundays that they heard her, she was not, 
it would have to be somebody else because she wasn't even 
broadcasting. 
CK: Did she care that - did she want the Americans to 
win? 
CU: Oh yes, she had always said - in fact, she got into 
a lot of trouble in Japan. One of the reasons why she 
couldn't live with her aunt and uncle was that she was too 
pro-American, and the aunt and uncle felt very uneasy about 
that, and also the neighbors didn't like the idea because 
they said there was an American spy living among them. And 
so finally she had to leave the place. Then she was alone, 
she had to go out and find work, and she had a difficult 
time trying to find work, at that time. And then she 
obtained work at the Danish legation - the consul - and 
that's where she was working until she found a typist job at 
Radio Tokyo. 
CK: Did she ever tell you how much she was paid? 
CU: At where? 
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CK: As an announcer. 
CU: I think it was something like - oh, I think it was 
around 80 or 100 something in that area. (Does not specify 
whether this means dollars - other sources have said as 
little as $18.00 a month.) 
CK: Was she afraid to - how did she feel? Did she ever 
tell you at all? How she felt about being chosen? 
CU; Well she first refused to, she said that she didn't 
want to do it because she felt that first of ail, she was 
not a radio personality, she doesn't ...she just went there 
as a typist. But Major Cousens said that he wanted somebody 
to work. Since the Japanese workers instructed Cousens to 
find an English-speaking woman to also be on the program, he 
said he had to find someone, and he said that there was only 
one person he could trust at Radio Tokyo at that time, and 
that was Iva. Because the rest of them, he said he wasn't 
quite sure. Because Iva had always been anti-Japan and pro-
America, this is why, outspoken to all other people who were 
in Radio Tokyo, also broadcasting. You know Iva was not 
very popular among those people. Especially Americans who 
were also stranded there and were working for the Radio 
Tokyo broadcasting. They didn't like her because they said 
she was just too outspoken. And after all, they said, the 
war was going on, you're in an enemy country, and you don't 
start saying things against the country where you're living. 
Because Iva would say, "America's going to win the war," and 
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you don't say that in Japan during the wartime, that's not a 
very popular thing to do. Even if she thought so, they said 
they thought she should keep quiet because they would be 
treated better. But she was very outspoken, even then. 
CK; When did she make the remark about the loss of 
ships? 
CU: Well that was in October, 1944. 
. CK: Was that during the campaign in the Philippines? 
CU: 1944 was the battle of Leyte Gulf. In October '44. 
CK: Yes. Her remark - was it during that battle, or 
before it? 
CU: It must have been afterward. 
CK: It just seems such an odd thing to -
CU: The thing is there's no tape - the funny thing is 
that the American government had all the tapes of all her 
broadcasts. And this is what was gone over in detail, in 
Japan, and they let her go, saying that there's absolutely 
no evidence at all. And then when they tried to get the 
same tape back at the time of the trial, the government said 
the tapes were no longer available. So...they said that 
either it was destroyed, or it was lost, but they never got 
hold of the tape. Because the tape they sought, Wayne 
Collins (Iva's attorney) had said that you could listen to 
all the tapes and you could tell what the tapes were about, 
there's nothing treasonous in the tape. And what they said 
that she said...she states that she never said such a thing 
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that was stated in the charges. But there's no evidence to 
ever show that she said anything of that sort . Because the 
tape is not available. It still is not available today. 
CK: That's amazing. One more question. What was the 
hardest part about getting her free? Was it speaking to 
President Ford? I mean getting her pardoned, excuse me. 
CU: No, I think the most important thing was to get the 
American public to realize the story. And once they 
realized it, then I think the pressure was already on the 
President. Because the San Francisco Chronicle was the first 
paper to - not the first, because the New York Times in 
February,... a person by the name of McDowell, who was...who 
knew about the Tokyo Rose trial even in those days, he came 
out with an article in the New York Times. I think it was in 
February 1975, '76. Followed by the Denver Post and all the 
others. All the editorials that I've seen, I do not recall a 
single editorial, much as I've collected editorials, almost 
100 per cent supported pardon for Iva. I think that was the 
big thing. And also a lot of statements by many people all 
say that Iva should be pardoned. So I think the President 
already had a lot of messages, that came to him before he 
made his decision. I think the one thing with President 
Ford was that it was difficult for him to make any decision. 
He had the Nixon pardon still in his mind, apparently. So 
for him to go ahead and give another pardon, I suppose he 
had to be careful, I suppose this is why he waited until the 
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last day to announce the pardon. Because it was announced 
on the 19th of January, the 19th was the last day that he 
was in office officially. 
# 
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Interview With Mariano Villarin 
February 18, 1988 
I have exchanged several letters and phone calls with 
Mariano Villarin. He met Iva Toguri when he was a Japanese 
prisoner of war, a hostage, and was summoned to testify - as 
it turned out, against her - at her trial. His diary was 
subpoenaed by the U.S. Government, and he has never seen it 
since. I traced the possible whereabouts of the diary, and 
called to discuss it. He sent me some information from his 
book, which is due to be published in a few weeks. 
CK: (I talk about the possible location of the diary.) 
MV: There are 4 or 5 entries stating that I was present 
and that I talked to Iva Toguri d'Aquino. That was enough 
information, that's why I didn't bother to go to the 
archives to dig out all the other information that I was 
looking for. So I thought that the information that I have 
on hand served the purpose, 
CK: I guess it's more personal interest, I think its 
interesting, diaries are always interesting. And especially 
in an unusual situation. 
(I talk about the thesis I am writing.) I think she 
should get some credit for having been a good entertainer. 
MV: Yes, right. There was a 50-50 deal there. The GI's 
that listened to her broadcasts, some of them were in favor 
of her broadcasts. And the other half claimed that she was 
a traitor. So it's a half and half deal. I put that in my 
book and I justify that, I put everything, the pros and 
cons, to show that she had been a victim of racial hysteria, 
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war hysteria, after the war. So that's why President Ford 
pardoned her. And that is explained, and also the 
propaganda broadcasts that she made, and the GI's that 
listened to her broadcasts thought she was being cheerful 
and she seemed to be all right, they thought. There was no 
propaganda there, they were merely interested in the 
entertaining feature of that ... broadcast. 
CK; But when I read books, people say that she said 
they'd be boiled in oil and that - (I'm referring to an 
anecdote in Admiral Halsey's Story.) 
MV: Yeah, that's malarkey. 
CK: Do you think she said that? 
MV: To be boiled in oil? The people that were against 
her? I don't know, the people that were against her - it 
was the fact that she was Japanese. And that more or less -
there was a racial tone there. 
CK; When you were at Radio Tokyo, did you have the 
impression that she was friendly? 
MV: Yes. 
CK: Actually I would like to ask your permission if I 
could just use a home tape recorder and ask you to just talk 
about her a little bit? 
MV: Well... 
CK; Is that not OK? 
MV: Well, what can I say... 
CK: Well, just tell me about meeting her? 
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NV: Yeah, I can write it down, or I can,.,mail you the 
. . .what ever. . . 
CK: When you were there at Radio Tokyo, you said that 
you met her in the hallway.,. 
MV: Yes, yes. A POW introduced me to her. And then,.. 
1 didn't realize that she was going to be tried years later. 
She seemed to be friendly and American-born and of course 
she spoke good English. No accent . 
CK; And you were all against the Japanese? 
MV: Well...we were against the Japanese because we were 
taken prisoner) we were captured by the Japanese during the 
atrocities in the Philippines. 
CK: And was she - did you get the impression that she 
was acting - you know, being made to act the way she was, 
being made to broadcast -
MV: That part I am not sure right now, because all I 
could tell was that I enjoyed listening to her American 
music, she was playing American music. 
CK: Uh huh. 
MV: And I wrote it down in my diary. That was the most 
important thing that impressed me was the music that I had 
been missing because of the war, and about her being tried 
later, years later, I never foresaw that, that she would be 
tried, I never could tell. So it's neither here nor there 
but we - I thought she was being neutral. 
CK: Didn't some - did she smuggle - what was it that she 
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smuggled -
MV: Oh yeah . Citrus fruit for the POWs. And then of 
course she had access to the - she could leave as she 
pleased while working at Radio Tokyo, she was living in an 
apartment. So she took advantage of that free time by 
getting some citrus fruit - fruit which she gave to the POWs 
in Radio Tokyo, there was just a handful of them. And that 
was shown in the book too. 
CK: So she was sympathetic. I guess it was like 
everybody was pretty much - well, under the wartime 
situation, you weren't really free to come and go -
MV: Yeah, being a Japanese, being that she looked 
Japanese, they never really bothered her, she went to the 
countryside to get some citrus fruit which she smuggled, 
secretly gave to the POWs in Radio Tokyo -
CK: How about news? Because one thing I read was during 
the battle of Leyte, the Japanese announced a victory, they 
had a public holiday -
MV; The Japanese had a public holiday? 
CK: And, I actually can't remember which source, but 
they said it was a public holiday and in fact it was a loss 
for the Japanese, and it was really a victory for the -
MV; Well it wasn't a victory for Japan, because the 
victory at Leyte Gulf, that I don't know, I haven't read 
anything about a celebration in Tokyo over the victory that 
they had in Leyte gulf. On the contrary. The Americans 
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scored a decisive victory in Leyte Gulf. That was the 
grounds for holding her, that they were charging her - let 
me see, there were eight counts, she was convicted only for 
one count. Broadcasting count number six, there were eight 
counts of treason against her, only one held. The others 
were eliminated. That was the charge that found her guilty, 
that count number six, when she broadcast that, let me see, 
what did she say, oh, to the American soldiers, now that 
your navy was defeated in Leyte Gulf how will you ever 
return home - how will you — something like that, which the 
jury considered treason. 
CK: I see. I guess I understood that the Japanese 
didn't dare to announce their losses so they pretended it 
was a victory. 
MV: Yeah. 
CK: But she herself knew because she could listen to the 
real news -
MV; That's right, she knew. But I don't know what - in 
spite of that she made that broadcast saying that. Listen, 
you American soldiers, how will you return home, now that 
your - that your navy was defeated, you have no 
transportation, to get home, something like that. 
CK: Something like that. Now that your ships are sunk -
MV: Yeah, it's in my book but I don't remember now, 
CK: I've seen the remark, but I wish I had the recording 
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of her, I don't know - that must be in San F,rancisco also. 
MV; Yeah. 
CK: Because none of those recordings - the ones in 
Washington were just funny, you know, they were light, 
pleasant, cheerful, she sounded like a nice person -
MV: Yes, yes. 
CK; And that's why I want to say I think she was a 
really good entertainer -
MV: : Yes, the GIs enjoyed that. The broadcasts of 
American music. She was playing American music. The GIs 
loved that. In between she would have some - she would mak 
some remarks. Sometimes they were reprehensible, some of 
them were in a joking manner, I don't know, but other peopl 
found it — like treason. It's handy here, my chapter of 
Tokyo Rose is handy here. Can I read that to you -
CK; Sure. 
MV: OK, I'll get them, just a moment, a few minutes. 
(Reads aloud.) We missed the big band boys like Glenn 
Miller and the rest. It was also good to meet some of the 
allied POWs working at Radio Tokyo and to chat with them, 
(etc., see document.) The prisoners had been carefully 
screened for those who had radio broadcast experience. 
CK: (I interrupt) Had you had radio broadcast 
experience? 
MV; Yeah, the prisoners were screened for radio 
broadcasting experience and were taken to Radio Tokyo. 
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CK: Were you one of them? 
MV; No, no, I was not one of them. Those were the 
Allied prisoners of war, I was considered a Filipino, they 
were trying to win us over so they made hostages of us. 
Here's the continuation. (Reads.) Under penalty of death 
the POWs were now working on Japanese propaganda projects. 
They were being held at the Bunka prison camp. During next 
half dozen or so times that I visited Radio Tokyo in 1944 I 
always heard a female American voice over the loudspeaker. 
Hearing such a voice for the first time since I left Manila 
for Bataan in 1941 naturally aroused my curiosity. I 
thought it was an American woman formerly interned at Santo 
Dommagio University in Manila or an American woman stranded 
in Japan when war broke out who was now forced to work at 
Radio Tokyo with the other POWs there. (etc.) 
CK: Just a second. How did you get to Radio Tokyo? Did 
they - did the Japanese want you to work there? 
MV: Yes. Our Japanese honcho thought that it was part 
of our indoctrination so they took us to Radio Tokyo, to see 
how things were, and probably to show us how the ...how, 
well, I don't know, just to see how the operations were 
going on. They had no idea that we went there to enjoy 
talking with the POWs. It was just one of those propaganda 
...reasons for showing us around. 
CK: So you were free to come and go? 
MV; Yeah. Later. Well, our supervisor, our Japanese 
supervisor took a group of Filipinos through Radio Tokyo 
just to show us around, including war plans and aircraft 
factories. To show us how strong Japan was. Back to the 
propaganda. 
CK; I see. 
MV; But they didn't realize that we were keeping our 
eyes wide open for intelligence reasons. Which we later 
transmitted to the Allied Forces when they arrived, 
: So did you - did - you got to see the inside of 
Radio Tokyo -
MV; Yeah, Yeah, 
CK; And did you see the other guys who were on the set? 
MV; Yeah, There were three or four of them that we met. 
CK: Uh huh. 
MV; One American, one Australian, there were Allied POWs 
working there who had radio experience. 
Were they Charles Cousens -
What? 
Do you remember their names? 
Uh - one Australian, Major Cousens -
Yes 1 
C,0,U,S,E,N,S, 
You met Charles Cousens. 
Charles Cousens -
Uh huh, 
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MV: I forgot the first name. 
CK: Maybe he was called Bill. They wrote Charles and 
then "Bill" -
MV: In the book I didn't mention the names because I 
just wanted to avoid further embarrassment, when they read 
the names, oh, this guy is a traitor, he collaborated, but 
they didn't know he was under penalty of death. If they 
refused to - that's why I don't want to mention by name -
they were hurt by being assigned there. 
CK: Was she under penalty? 
MV; Yeah, penalty of death. They were forced to work 
for Radio Tokyo. 
CK; And do you think - Iva Toguri was also forced. I 
gues s. 
MV; Yeah. Yeah, But there was no proof of that. In the 
trial the prosecutor succeeded in convincing the jury that 
she was not forced, coerced, so she lost that part there. 
That's why the jury held her accountable for one count out 
of the eight. 
CK 
MV 
CK 
MV 
CK 
Kind of silly, but -
Yeah . 
It's just the temper of the times. 
Uh huh. Yeah. 
But it's a tragedy, too. I mean, it's too bad for 
her . 
MV: Yeah, that's right. 
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CK: Because I think she was a nice - from what I hear -
she sounds like a decent person. 
MV: Yeah, Right. She was pro-American. Even when she was 
there she hated the way of - the lifestyle in Japan. 
Because she couldn't speak the language. That particular 
count out of the eight, it's not in this chapter, but it's 
in another chapter. Would you like me to .. 
CK; No, you told me about that. It's very interesting, 
because -
MV; It's in another chapter, it's very handy, it takes 
only about a minute. 
CK: OK. 
MV: I'll pull that out. OK. I'll read these paragraphs 
to you. (Reads.) My one way trip to the United States 
(tells how he was subpoenaed in 1949 to come to the U.S.) 
They were looking for the hostage who kept a diary. I never 
thought that the diary, which was used as an exhibit in 
court, would make me a witness for the prosecution five 
years later in the trial of Iva Toguri d'Aquino, a Los 
Angeles-born Nisei better known as Tokyo Rose. The charges 
were that she had betrayed the land of her birth to the land 
of her ancestors by her radio broadcasts beamed to the 
American forces in the South Pacific to undermine their 
morale (etc. ) 
CK: Now - tell me about the diary. How did they find 
out that you had a diary? 
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MV: (faint, almost inaudible) Oh, the other fellows 
with me. There were about 30 or 40 hostages from the 
Philippines and we would get together at the International 
School for the Japanese Language. They knew that I was 
keeping a diary. So when the FBI went around asking them, 
"Do you have any particular information about Tokyo Rose? 
Do you know anything about Radio Tokyo during the war?" and 
they said, no, they didn't, "Oh, wait a minute! That fellow 
Mariano used to go to Radio Tokyo. I think he maintained a 
diary." That's how they got ahold of me and they subpoenaed 
me. Say, where's that particular quote I want to read to 
you, about you lost your ships, you have no more 
transportation - let me find that. Oh yes, here. Guilty on 
only one of the eight charges, Overt Act Six, which was that 
Iva did speak into a microphone concerning the loss of 
ships. She said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you are really 
orphans now. How will you get home, now that your ships are 
sunk?" To the government this was treason, since the 
American forces had scored a decisive victory at Leyte gulf. 
So that's how they found her guilty. 
CK; I see. But I'd love to — But when she said that 
MacArthur was winning, 
MV: Yes. Right. Right. 
CK: So I guess maybe it was - before, but it was 
sometime in October. 
MV: Yes, October. When the Americans landed in the 
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Philippines, landed on Leyte Island. 
CK; Uh huh. 
MV; And they defeated the Japanese Navy there. That's 
when they had a decisive victory. , 
CK: Well when -
MV: when she said, "Orphans of the Pacific, you really 
are orphans now. How will you get home, now that all your 
ships are sunk?" But they were not, on the contrary, it was 
the Japanese ships that were sunk. 
(break in tape) for the U. S. Government..That's why she 
was charged with Overt Act Six. 
CK: When they subpoenaed your diary, you said they had 
no idea that -
MV; That's right, I had no idea that would be used in 
court. 
CK: Did you feel badly about that? That must have been 
kind of -
MV: No, I don't think 1 did. I had my diary with me, 
and I 
CK; So it was just facts that they asked you, you were 
there on this date -
MV: Yes, it was just an incidental event, a deal there, 
so I never had any idea that...so I volunteered -
CK: Did you hear her make the remarks about the -
MV; Did I hear what? 
CK; The remarks, the quote that you just read. Did you 
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hear her say that? 
MV : Yes, I precisely mentioned here in court when they 
were asking me, let's see, oh yeah. The prosecutor asked me 
...he asked me, let me see, I'm reading that question by the 
prosecutor, "Will you tell His Honor and the ladies and 
gentlemen of the jury what the defendant said on that 
occasion over the microphone, in substance, according to the 
best of your recollection?" So I said, she said, to the 
best of my recollection, "Hello, honorable enemy, what do 
you have to say in the foxholes in New Guinea? Your 
girlfriends are back home running around with other men. 
It's about time you fellows went back home," That's what I 
heard. During the testimony, then the second 
question..."What other occasion was that you heard 
similar...and I wrote it down .,.yeah, Mr. De Wolfe. And my 
answer was, "Yes, I remember the second instance, she said 
in substance, "You are wasting your time in the South 
Pacific when you could have fun back home." That was all 
the direct examination. So that was my statement. 
CK: Oh, so that's not really going to -
MV; Yeah, that did not hold any weight. The whole thing 
was her broadcast about the loss of the ships. That's what 
really got her. Overt Act Six. The rest of the testimony 
by the prosecutor, prosecution witnesses, I think there were 
about 40 or something, did not hold weight except that one. 
Orphans of the Pacific, that's what really -
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CK: Did you hear her say that? 
MV: No, no. Yes, that's too bad. It was monitored and 
it was shown on the record, that's what she broadcast. But 
I didn't hear her say that, 
CK: I see. That seems so trivial - you know. But it's 
very hard to look at history from - it's like being a Monday 
morning ball player. It's very hard. It's hard to know, was 
anybody really concerned about these remarks, because -
MV: Yeah, that's right, at that time nobody paid any 
attention to them. She said, "How will you get home, now 
that your ships are sunk?" So apparently she didn't mean 
it, or maybe she was directed by the military in Radio Tokyo 
to make that broadcast. Without realizing that she was 
incriminating herself. So the trial, the jury, convicted her 
on that charge. Overt Act Six. So that's the only one that 
counted. 
CK: I see. Well, that's really interesting, because 
that was - what I'm hearing - all the veterans are saying 
that she was fun, you know, they enjoyed it. Nobody was 
scared. 
MV; That's right, yes. Especially when she was playing 
American music, it made the guys nostalgic, 
CK: Do you remember the songs you heard? 
MV: Oh, all kinds of American songs, played by Glenn 
Miller and Tommy Dorsey. I was sitting there in the hall 
and I heard those songs. Now on the other hand, the 
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prosecution witnesses - OK, I'll read this part to you. 
(Reads.) Similar chatter by the Zero Hour personnel were 
told in court (etc.) "Wouldn't this be a nice night to go to 
the corner drug store and have an ice cream soda?" 
Another one, "Wouldn't you California boys like to be at 
Coconut Grove tonight with your best girl? You have plenty 
of coconut groves, but no girl." "The island of Saipan is 
mined with high explosives. You're given 48 hours to clear 
the island or you will be blown sky high." Another one: 
"Why don't you stop fighting and listen to good music?" 
Another one; "Greetings, everyone. How are my vi^ctims this 
evening? All ready for a vicious assault on your morale?" 
"Radio Tokyo calling you in the person of your sworn enemy 
and playmate. What's come over you, Aussies? Have you lost 
your robe playing poker with those bad, wicked Americans?" 
"Joe Brown, a rejectee, is out with Sally Smith. He's 
getting the cream of the crop while you're out there 
knocking yourselves out." Those are the kinds of broadcasts 
that the prosecution witnesses among the GIs mentioned in 
I 
court that they had heard her broadcasting. 
CK: Where would she get information about Joe Brown and 
Sally Smith? 
MV: Yeah, and also Saipan, you'll be blown sky-high. 
From the intelligence, I guess, they furnished that 
information to Radio Tokyo. And then a military man 
apparently gave her this information. Here, you can 
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broadcast this. That's why people were wondering how come 
that she knew about the movements of certain troops and 
American ships in and out of certain locations. Well the 
intelligence furnished all that information to her, through 
the military at Radio Tokyo. 
CK: Tell me about the three guys that you met, the ones 
who were under pain of death, 
MV; Oh yeah. There was Cousens, of course, one 
American, and one from the Philippines, who spoke good 
English, his mother was an American so he was used to it. 
He was broadcasting on Corregidor Island, he was speaking 
into a microphone, they call it the Voice of Freedom. He 
was one of those. Norman Reyes. 
CK: Did he do the skits? 
MV: One American who used to be a radio announcer in 
Manila before the war, he was commissioned in the army, he 
was a captain, and he was with the Voice of Freedom too. So 
they were screened and they were found to have broadcasting 
experience and they were sent to Radio Tokyo. 
CK: That must have been Wallace Ince. 
MV; Yeah. Yeah, right. Wallace Ince. 
CK: It's amazing, it makes them come to life. You know, 
these are just people that I've read about in books, and 
it's amazing to meet somebody who's actually net them, 
MV: Yeah, right. He was called Ted Wallace as a radio 
announcer before the war. In peacetime. Then his real name 
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is Wallace Ince. And he was a Captain in the U.S. Army. 
CK; Did you hear the skits that they did? Did you hear 
any of those -
MV: No. No. 
CK: Did they look healthy? 
MV: No, no, they were undernourished, that's why. They 
were on a starvation diet. But they were treated better 
than regular American POWs in prison camps, because they 
were there to broadcast, they were employed by Radio Tokyo, 
so they got better treatment. But they were undernourished, 
of course, because there was a rationing system in Tokyo at 
that time. We were hungry too, though, we were hostages, 
but we were given better treatment than the American POWs. 
Because they claimed Ve were from the Orient, so. they were 
trying to be nice to us. 
CK: So they were racist too. 
MV: Yeah. 
CK: Was she undernourished? 
MV: Yeah, yeah. She was very thin. Practically 
everybody there in Tokyo, even the civilians were 
undernourished, because there was a strict rationing system. 
Everything went to the army. To the military. So with the 
rationing system there in Tokyo everything was limited. Not 
enough food. So that was the story. 
CK: That's interesting. That's really something. I -
you know - it's so interesting to hear it from somebody who 
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was there. 
MV : Yeah. I couldn't believe it myself. (laughs) 
(Talks about his book. The final page proofs will be done 
in a few days and will be forwarded from New York for 
corrections, and will be out in about a month. It will be 
called We Remember Bataan and Corregidor. the story of the 
American and Filipino defenders of Bataan and Corregidor in 
their captivity. It has a sketch of the starving American 
POWs on the cover, drawn by one of the POWs.) 
CK: (I thank him for his help, tell him I will use a 
couple of lines from his taped conversation along with many 
others in a script.) 
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MEDIA HISTORIANS 
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MEDIA HISTORIANS 
Dr. K.R.M. Short is Senior Lecturer in History at 
Westminster College, Oxford, and Secretary General of the 
International Association for Audio-Visual Media in 
Historical Research and Education. He is the Editor of the 
Historical Journal of Film. Radio and Television. At the 
time of this interview he was teaching at the -University of 
Houston School of Communication. 
Lawrence H. Suid has written a hisory of the Armed Forces 
Radio and Television Service for the Armed Forces 
Information. He has published a history of the image of the 
Armed Forces in Hollywood movies. Guts and Glory, and at the 
time of this interview is writing a book on the image of 
manned space flight in literature and film. 
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Interview with Dr. K.R.M.Short 
December 3, 1987 
Dr. Short is Senior Lecturer in History at Westminster 
College, Oxford, and Secretary General of the International 
Association for Audio-Visual Media in Historical Research 
and Education. He is the Editor of the Historical Journal 
of Film. Radio and Television. At the time of this 
interview he was teaching at University of Houston School of 
Communication. 
(I introduce myself, tell him I've read his book, ask how 
to get in touch with Namikawa Ryo, who wrote the chapter 
about NHK. He talks about the Bellagio conference that led 
to the book, says Namikawa Ryo was 85 at the time and may 
not still be living; says his son is the best cameraman in 
Japan. Recommends I talk to Gordon Daniels at Leeds. Says 
NHK is publishing material with information about the war 
but it's in Japanese.) 
CK: About your book, in the preface you talked about 
latent propaganda in films, in other words escapist fantasy 
that helped a repressed people to forget their repressions. 
Do you think radio can serve that purpose? 
KS; Well I think it depends. Radio is a rather more 
diffuse medium. First of all it's something that happened 
in the marketplace, as readily as it could, within the 
confines of one's home. The difficulty is that whereas the 
movies provide you with a document which is almost timeless, 
there are very very few radio broadcast recordings left, 
particularly in things such as news. One does have the old 
85 
recordings of things like the Jack Benny Show, but radio is 
P 
- ray own feeling is that radio had...a potentially greater 
impact on morale than the movies. 
For example if you look at the Time magazine in 1940... 
George Schaeffer of RKO had, through George Gallup, a series 
of polls done by a new Gallup organization called the 
Audience Research Institute. And Schaeffer at RKO wanted to 
know what Hollywood audiences actually were, so obviously he 
could tailor his product to tap the market more effectively, 
which was very avant garde considering the fact that most 
Hollywood moguls guessed by the seats of their pants or 
whatever. 
CK; This is audience research? That's the first time -
KS; Yes, that's right. It was actually run by a young 
Scot by the name of Ogilvie. And Ogilvie, as soon as the 
war begins, goes to work for the British Ministry of 
Information, so he goes from one form of propaganda to 
another. But what the Audience Research Institute did was 
to do a very very thorough (survey)... It was never 
published since it was a job being done for RKO, and it 
wasn't something for public consumption. But you do get the 
sort of general, overall import, statistics being published 
in Time Magazine, as to what American audiences were really 
doing. 
But I think the point that I'm slowly getting around to 
making is that what is so startling is that first of all 
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(they found) the American cinema audience was probably 
closer to 50 million attendances a week, as opposed to much 
higher figures that had formerly been quoted. On a given 
Sunday evening their estimate was that you would probably 
have 10 million people at the movies, but there were 
probably 16 million people sitting home listening to Jack 
Benny, So that the radio audiences, from the standpoint of 
entertainment, were probably anywhere from 30-40 percent 
higher than the movie audiences at the same period. When 
you're talking about the heyday of movies, you're talking 
about an even greater heyday from the standpoint of radio 
entertainment, 
Now I don't know of anyone who has done a serious study 
of the way in which wartime radio entertainment reflected 
the needs of national defense. The Office of War 
Information certainly had a division which was concerned 
with the planting of what one would call positive images 
into the radio scripts. In other words if you look at soap 
opera scripts I think you'd probably find - I know that I've 
seen evidence of key wartime issues being planted in soap 
operas to create positive views on a wide range of subjects, 
everything from recycling tin cans to thinking better of the 
Chinese people, 
CK: Right, They still do. There's still plenty of that 
on television. 
KS; Well sure there is. But during the war it becomes a 
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matter of policy. And it happened only within a very 
limited period of time, that's one thing you have to keep in 
mind, which makes it more accessible in the sense that the 
Office of War Information's Domestic Division really was 
only in gear for the period of summer of '42 to summer of 
'43. Because by then Congress has cut their appropriations 
to the bone, because they don't want a domestic propaganda 
branch keeping the New Deal in office for another four 
years. But during that period of '42 to '43, I think 
there's an excellent field for research looking at the way 
in which the Office of War Information used radio to promote 
the general and specific goals which were being devised 
within the OWI for the purposes of raising American morale 
as well as improving American perceptions of its allies. 
CK: What do you think that it takes to be successful at 
doing this? I mean some propaganda is successful and some 
isn't. 
KS: (Laughs.) What it takes to be successful I think 
basically is to first of all, one has to know the - one must 
have a very clear idea of the target audience. I mean first 
of all you have to know what the problems are. And one of 
the things that people from Harold Lasswell onwards did was 
to create the concept that there was such a thing as public 
opinion, that public opinion was measurable, quantifiable. 
And once it was quantifiable then you were in a position to 
modify it by what people in the Office of War Information 
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called programs. So during this period there was a very 
heavy poll taken by a variety of means in the Bureau of 
/ 
Intelligence in the Office of War Information. They had 
three levels of information gathering, running from 
traditional Gallup poll sweeps down to individual in-depth 
interviews, in which they determined what - they decided 
what the questions were that they wanted answers on. Those 
seemed to be the crucial questions. They sent the questions 
out, they determined what the American people felt about 
these questions, and then they determined whether or not 
they had a problem. If people were positive, they didn't 
have a problem, they could maintain what they called a low 
supportive propaganda profile. If the people were thinking 
the wrong thing, let's say they were anti-Russian or anti-
British, or anti-Chinese or anti-rationing, or anti- paying 
your income tax, then they realized they had to go about 
changing those attitudes. And they would change those 
attitudes by...a fairly intelligently conceived grasp of the 
fact that you've got to attack on a broad front. So they 
would create programs that would go into the press, into the 
weekly press, that would then be supplemented in the weekly 
magazines, as opposed to the daily press. Issues - things 
that would appear in the news reels, that would appear in 
the Office of War Information short subjects which were 
showing in the cinema, things that would then appear in 
radio programs. 
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In other words the secret of propaganda is that you are 
telling people something that they are prepared to accept, 
which is to say you are looking for gradual modification of 
attitudes rather than a volte-face. And you are telling it 
to them again and again from a variety of means, of media. 
So that it's very much a question of coming at them with the 
same thing from every conceivable angle, but in such a way 
that they are - they do not feel threatened or 
propagandized. And one really does have to examine the 
Office of War Information intelligence reports and see the 
programs that they then create, because it's by looking at 
the programs that you see the sort of breadth of the attack 
that they then mount to correct these opinions that they see 
as being detrimental to the war effort. And...1 can 
document it through the cinema, I can document it in the 
press, I've seen enough to believe that if you look in the 
right places you'11 be able to document it in the use of 
radio, particularly through network programming. You did 
not have direct censorship, but ...you didn't have censors 
in the studios, but I mean it's quite clear that network 
executives took (it) almost as seriously as they took the 
sponsor's pressure. 
For a period of time they also took pressure from being 
patriotic Americans, from the Office of War Information, to 
help them pursue certain of these programs. If one got 
into...the production records and scripts for a series of 
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programs like the Kate Smith show, I imagine since that was 
always more of a variety show... you'd find a very clear 
input going into .every week's or every day's shows. I forget 
how Kate Smith actually ran, I think she ran it daily, five 
days a week, for 15 minutes, of patriotic stuff designed to 
support the home front as well as improving views of one's 
allies that you were actually out there fighting for. 
CK; You see that stuff in old Bing Crosby films, too. 
KS; You see it in the movies. 
CK: It's everywhere. 
KS: Sure, but the very important point that you're 
raising is that it's also in radio, and the only reason that 
not enough has been made out of radio is because radio has 
not left very obvious documentation. I mean if it weren't 
for the insatiable appetite of American television, which 
demands the rerunning of old movies, one would not even have 
that as a source. The fact is that old radio programs don't 
have a market ... unless you're just an old radio program nut. 
Old movies fill air time. Radio can fill air time by 
playing records, it doesn't ha\;e to play old radio programs. 
So that what happens is that whereas we can quite readily 
see the extent to which the movies were used for wartime 
propaganda purpose, we are only impressionably aware of what 
the radio was doing. And my own view was that radio made a 
greater impact, greater impression, than the movies did. 
And I would love to see somebody prepared to get in there 
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and prove it. CK: Why do you think radio - well, you've 
given me the answer pretty well -
KS: Look at the statistics, that radio entertainment, as 
entertainment, was more important to Americans in the '40s 
than the movies were. The movies of the people had the 
press agents; radio did not. If you look at the reality, 
people listened to the radio. They sat home, they didn't go 
out to the movies, particularly if they had small children. 
If one actually had access to the Audience Research 
Institute findings, you'd learn a great deal more about 
America's habits. See, you didn't go to the movies to get 
your news. You got your news from 1937 on by listening to 
any one of a dozen top-flight news broadcasters who in their 
15-minute programs gave their very very strong opinions, 
some so strong like Beau(?) Carter that he got yanked off 
the air. But they provided the opinion-making for 
Americans, and the fact that you were hearing on the night's 
news what you were going to read in the morning's newspaper 
put radio in the forefront of opinion-making in the United 
States. So that from that standpoint the straight news, 
news commentators, the commentary programs made the sort of 
political side of opinion-making very much the province of 
radio. Movies could not touch it, not even "The March of 
Time." "March of Time" is extremely important in opinion-
making in this period. But I see it as something that's 
complementary to radio, because newsreels were not doing it, 
92 
newsreels couldn't do it, they were basically an 8-minute 
entertainment filler. However if you then look at current 
event programs, the sort of town meeting of the air -
CK: Now this is on radio -
KS: On radio. You have radio programs which were facing 
major critical issues. You have all sorts of cultural 
programming that the FCC demanded and that certainly makes 
an important contribution, and I think you would find 
through the entertainment side of radio programming, a very 
clear effort to influence American public opinion. And you 
have to realize that in a period when you didn't have 
television, people were turning their radios on when they 
got up for breakfast, they were hearing the news, the kids 
were coming home at lunchtime, and their mother is going to 
have been doing the wash with the radio on virtually all day 
long, they are going to suffer through Kate Smith and Our 
Gal Sunday, and whatever during their lunch hour, and Ma 
Perkins, and what have you, and I think you would find that 
the basic pattern of American home life, particularly from a 
woman's point of view, was non-stop radio listening 
throughout the day. There's 50% of your population. Except 
of course during war time you get large numbers of American 
women going out to work in industry, but even there you had 
radio, you didn't have piped music, you didn't have musak, 
you had the real thing in the work place, 
CK: Now, was this the same — What was the audience of 
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Mildred Gillars? She was called Axis Sally,..She was an 
American, are you familiar with her? 
KS: (Laughs) Yeah, I know about - You see you've got 
four fascinating characters. You've got Axis Sally. You've 
got Tokyo Rose. You've got Lord Haw Haw, William Joyce. 
And of course you've got Ezra Pound, who was the American 
poet who broadcast for the Fascist Italians, So you've got 
these people. I don't know - William Joyce, Lord Haw Haw, 
has been fairly well written up, largely because they hung 
the poor bloke, though he was actually an Irish citizen. 
Axis Sally I've not actually seen much on. 
CK; Well, I've heard - I went to the National Archives 
in the summer, and listened to some of her (broadcasts), and 
it's quite different from Tokyo Rose, because as you were 
describing, some of it was aimed at the housewife who was 
home washing the dishes, and had very active talk about the 
situation. But with Tokyo Rose, I don't know if you've 
heard her -
KS: I have heard her -
CK: - And I'd like to talk about her for a minute. I'm 
wondering, what was the Japanese government trying to 
accomplish? 
KS: Well they were trying to in fact undermine the 
morale of the GI in the mud-filled foxholes. I mean this 
sort of typical one about Hello, GI's, what are your 
girlfriends doing tonight on the heights overlooking the 
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Pacific in the convertibles with those 4Fs...The scripts 
that I've seen of Tokyo Rose suggest that it was basically, 
" We will provide you with music and a bit of fairly 
predictable undermining morale" sort of stuff. One of the 
things that you have to always keep in mind is that it's 
very easy to do propaganda when you're winning, it's more 
difficult to do it when you're losing. Because what really 
makes an impact is being able to announce your victories and 
the other guys' defeats. So long as Haw Haw was doing that 
he had an easy time; he had a very difficult time actually 
making his points after the war began to swing in the other 
direction. But it would be very interesting to look at the 
Axis Sally programming, keeping in mind that one of the 
problems always is where you're dealing with radio, is that 
I would say for the most part you could pretty well write 
off the impact of short wave broadcasting, 
CK: And most of Tokyo Rose was on short wave? 
KS: No, most of Tokyo Rose, if I remember, was actually 
on medium wave. That was because they were broadcasting to 
the front lines. And of course Haw Haw was broadcasting 
medium and long wave programs primarily out of Hamburg, 
which made his target area of Great Britain a very easy one 
to zero in on. But somebody like Dorothy Thompson, for 
example, who was doing short wave CBS propaganda for the 
United States, back in '39, 40, '41, of course was having to 
use short wave because that was the only way they could 
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actually get a signal into Germany. There's a fascinating 
book that Dorothy Thompson published I think in about 1941, 
which contains the text of her short wave broadcasts, which 
if I remember correctly, was entitled, Listen , Hans. 
CK; Now I'm not sure who she was. 
KS: Dorothy Thompson was one of those absolutely 
marvelous '30s women who was a political columnist, and 
CK; -An American? 
KS: A very tough American lady. I think by '40 she had 
- I don't actually know enough of the story of Dorothy 
Thompson except to recognize that she's a fascinating 
person, a person who was an influential opinion-maker and 
unique in being a woman at that time. 
CK: Why do you think the Japanese used prisoners of war 
for their propaganda? I mean it seems to me as though that 
would be the worst population to pick from. 
KS; I don't know. It may simply have been a matter of 
availability. 
CK: And they're English-speaking. 
KS; That's right. If you were able to use a nisei , 
obviously you've got somebody who could actually speak 
English. They were second generation. 
CK: I've interviewed a number of veterans who can 
remember being in the foxholes and being in their ships 
listening to Tokyo Rose. And it's totally clear that the 
propaganda didn't work in lowering their morale. They loved 
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it, they looked forward to it. 
KS: But the interesting question there, however, is 
whether or not it was in fact in some way succeeding. I 
mean the - you see, you may in fact turn it on, and you may 
laugh, and you may say isn't th^t funny. But I think that 
what you have to ask is whether or not Tokyo Rose and her 
compatriots were not actually raising questions that in a 
sense lay in the back of people's minds anyway. And if 
you're worrying about what your girlfriend's doing back in 
L.A., and if Tokyo Rose is reminding you about that 
question, you may on the outside be laughing, and on the 
inside you may be crying. So the one thing that I would 
suggest is that you have to be very cautious. I mean if you 
lose the war clearly propaganda didn't win it for you. 
But then again, I don't - it's one of the things that you 
always have to be very clear on, is what you actually expect 
that propaganda to have done. Propaganda neither wins nor 
loses wars. It's simply a contributory factor towards the 
winning or the losing. You could argue that a country that 
had the most effective propaganda could still lose the war 
because it had a smaller army. What you'd have to be is 
fairly well—versed in both the theory and the practice of 
propaganda to be able to judge whether your expectations are 
in line with the sort of realities of it all. I know the 
British Government did a study of the potential impact of 
Lord Haw Haw's broadcasting. Just because you turn the guy 
97 
on and laugh at him doesn'-t mean that you're not taking him 
seriously. He may still have some sort of influence, some 
sort of negative influence on you. I can't prove a thing, 
but I'm saying you have to be cautious. 
CK: I'm wondering, about that myself. Because I'm 
hearing from vets who said, "Did you hear her last night? 
She was in great form." And everyone kind of looked forward 
to it. And it became this social hour and this coin that 
they talked - I mean that was the entertainment for a lot of 
them. For a lot of them it wasn't -
KS: Which is interesting in that in a sense you see -
Somebody who you ought to talk to if you possibly can at 
some point is Eric Barnouw. 
CK: I did, he was the one who told me about you. 
KS: I see. But my guess is that the United States did 
not effectively produce a radio personality that could 
effectively, say, provide a substitute for Tokyo Rose. Now 
you'd actually have to do a very careful look at Armed 
Forces broadcasting. And Eric, of course, having had 
experience in that area, would be able to tell you if 
there's somebody who's actually written extensively on Armed 
Forces broadcasting in the Pacific theatre, to see exactly 
what they were doing, and the sort of programming that they 
were running. Because they were clearly going to be running 
primarily rebroadcasts of things like Bob Hope, and what 
have you, Lux Radio Theatre and -
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CK: Did he study - did Eric Barnouw study the -
KS: Eric worked for them. I don't know, you see 
somebody like Mike Kitross... Michael Kitross at Emerson 
College in Boston (I ask him to spell it) He's professor of 
broadcasting at Emerson College in Boston, and co-author of 
the basic text for the history of broadcasting. Mike, who 
also was the editor of the Journal of Broadcasting would 
probably be the person who would be able to tell you if 
there are any competent studies of Armed Forces broadcasting 
in either or both theatres of war, because it would be 
important to look at what AFN's broadcasting policy was in 
trying to deal with Tokyo Rose. Because the one thing you 
have to remember was that it was easily within the 
capability of the American Armed Forces to jam Tokyo Rose, 
I mean there would have been no problem at all, if they 
felt...There was a policy decision that clearly had to have 
been made not to jam her, on the grounds that she clearly 
was doing no harm. 
CK: I wonder how we'd find out, if there -
KS: Ah well, how do we find out 1 I'll tell you somebody 
else to talk to...(mentions David Culbert of Louisiana State 
University as a broadcast historian.) And David may be able 
to help you particularly because David is perhaps the most 
knowledgeable person in terms of U.S. Government 
documentation. David would probably be the person who would 
point you more directly to where the sources would be for 
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within - you see, in the Pacific theatre you've got two 
commands, you've got a Naval and an Army Command. 
C'K; Now I've spoken to both...not commands but to 
historians in the Naval Archives of Washington, and to 
historians at the Army Archives at Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania. The army has absolutely nothing about Tokyo 
Rose, Now I don't know what they have about their own 
policy -
KS: What they would have at Carlisle at the Army War 
College would be not a great deal anyway. I mean where you 
are going to find it will be in the War Department Archives 
at Suitland. 
CK: Where is that? 
KS: Suitland, Maryland. It's the Washington National 
Records Center. In other words it's the National Archives 
Outstation. And there is a shuttle bus that runs between 
the two...What you need to do is to find out where the Armed 
Forces Radio policy making was going on, and what documents, 
what files, they are going to be in. Because I think it's 
there you'll probably find discussions about Tokyo Rose, for 
example, and other broadcasting of that sort, and questions 
as to what sort of programming they'd have to put on in 
order to draw listeners away from her, and whether or not 
she ought to be jammed or what. 
CK: Another thing, just to finish with, I'm curious from 
your point of view, you wrote the article about film-making 
100 
in Hollywood and the attitudes toward Jews. I'm wondering 
if anyone has done a study about the effects of the 
blacklist in the 1950s and '40s, the communist blacklist, on 
film-making in Hollywood, and on the content. 
KS; Well, I think there's probably been a lot ...the 
Cetlair Englund book on Inquisition in Hollywood is the 
basic book on that issue, on the impact of HUAC on the 
American film industry. How the film industry basically 
pulls back on all fronts. But in terms of films, you have 
to recognize that as soon as you get the Divorce Act, the 
divorce proceeding which breaks distribution from production 
in Hollywood through anti-trust legislation, Hollywood as a 
viable restrictor of content begins to collapse, and the 
influence of the Motion Picture Production Association and 
its production code begins to collapse with it. So that by 
1954 Otto Preminger's quite prepared to not have a 
production code certificate with "The Moon Is Blue." And 
from that point on basically distributors were prepared to 
put anything on the screen they could get past local 
censors. So that in one sense the anti-communist thing 
comes almost at the end of Hollywood's being able to 
influence movie product as severely as it had done 
previously. 
101 
Interview with Larry Suid 
Feb. 10, 1988 
Lawrence H. Suid is the author of a history of the Armed 
Forces Radio and Television Network. He also wrote Guts and 
G1ory. a book about the image of the Armed Forces in 
Hollywood movies. He lives in Washington, D.C. 
(I introduce myself before recording, and tell him about 
my project; tell him he was referred to me by someone at 
the Library of Congress when I asked for information about 
the Armed Forces Radio, and government policy about dealing 
with the Tokyo Rose broadcasts.) 
LS: To be honest the book was written, the manuscript 
was completed two years ago, and that part was written 
almost three years ago. So I'm just, as you're asking, I'm 
trying to think back. Because they had the same issue in 
Germany, in the European war, a little bit more because 
Germany would sometimes imitate Armed Forces Network, and 
give false information, etc. etc. And if there was jamming 
it would not have been done through Armed Forces Radio, it 
would have been done through the Signal Corps, through the 
Office of War Information, or the OSS. My inclination is to 
say, and I'd have to go back and look a little bit, that the 
Armed Forces Radio in its mission was simply concerned to 
provide information for the troops, and entertainment, and 
it was not their role whatsoever to get involved with the 
propaganda part. 
CK; Who was involved with the propaganda part? 
LS: That would be the OSS and Donovan's group, plus I 
would think Army Intelligence, or of course Navy 
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Intelligence, and in the Pacific the Marines. I am almost 
certain that Armed Forces radio itself had no involvement in 
those kinds of decisions, they did not have jamming 
equipment whatsoever. They were limited to very small 
portable transmitters in most places except in Europe where 
Armed Forces Network and the BBC had rather large generators 
coming out of England right after the invasion. And so 
,,.Armed Forces radio itself would not have gotten involved 
with that and Tom Lewis, who ran Armed Forces Radio 
operations out of Los Angeles, had as his mandate simply to 
provide the material. He was not a military person and in 
fact was not listened to in any sense, he had wanted to set 
up American Forces Network to go onto the Continent, right 
after the invasion, and Eisenhower overruled him and made it 
a joint operation with the BBC. So he had no military 
standing and was not consulted in any way. 
CK: What kinds of programming did he have? 
LS; Well, OK, I'm sorry, I keep assuming people know. 
(Laughs.) I don't know if you heard (discusses NPR show on 
Armed Forces propaganda in Vietnam. We talk about that for 
a wh i1e .) 
In all honesty I have grave reservations about what they 
said vis a vis Armed Forces radio and television and 
censorship. They claim that Armed Forces radio and 
television in Vietnam was heavily censored. To the extent 
that...the military command and even the embassy did try to 
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do this I'm not going to question it. Armed Forces radio 
and television itself did not censor its programs. It was 
from the outside. To the layman that may be a very 
insignificant distinction. But if I'm writing a history of 
Armed Forces radio and television and I say they never have 
censored their own programs except for military needs, 
that's not the same thing as to say the U.S. Government may 
not have insisted. The U.S. Government owns it. You go 
back - Edward R. Murrow, who everyone thinks is a good 
liberal, when he ran the USIA, got President Kennedy and 
MacNamara to approve five-minute propaganda broadcasts every 
day on Armed Forces radio and television. Propaganda is 
certainly against the 40-year-old mission of Armed Forces 
radio and television, but if the President of the United 
States says you do it, you do it. 
Back to your question however. From the very beginning, 
this is in June, July, August of '42, Armed Forces Radio 
broadcast without advertisements, they put in their own, 
ultimately, their own spot announcements. Broadcast all the 
leading American radio shows from the networks, they had 
arrangements with each of the networks. Took the top shows 
off, took the ads out, put in spot announcements, for help, 
whatever, information, and then these were put on discs and 
sent overseas to wherever there was a station. There were 
ultimately two to three hundred, something like that. They 
also, and this is I suppose an anomaly, produced five or six 
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or seven or eight of their own programs out of their own 
headquarters using the top Hollywood and New York radio 
entertainers. They had writers who would write the scripts 
and then they would call up and get entertainers, Bob Hope, 
Bing Crosby, whatever, they'd come in and do the shows, and 
these would be sent out also. 
I say it's an anomaly because the mission was to provide 
troops overseas with, and it still is, the same information, 
entertainment, as they get back home. And since these 
programs that they produced were not available at all to the 
domestic audience, they - it goes against their prime 
mission, but since they could get 'em at all they decided to 
produce these shows. But these were standard entertainment 
shows, they were not ..,I would say they were not 
propaganda. 
Some of the shows they did put together were education, 
information, you know, "know your enemy" sort of thing. 
Which I suppose you could argue border on propaganda. But 
it was General George Marshall who set up Armed Forces 
Radio, same thing that set up the Frank Capra film unit, to 
provide education and information. Capra's films are 
clearly propaganda. There were undoubtedly shows saying the 
enemy is bad, you gotta fight, etc. etc. But whatever 
jamming is done, and I really have no information about 
that, the point of Marshall is to provide your own version 
of events, and your own things, and that will take care of 
105 
itself. And to the extent that it was, I always say a 
necessary war rather than a good war, there wasn't much need 
to present out and out propaganda. There were very few 
people that were going to be at all susceptible to Tokyo 
Rose and Axis Sally. We think that's a primary thing. By 
first showing them the "Why We Fight" series in basic 
training, and then giving them the programming over Armed 
Forces radio, I don't think there was ever much need to jam. 
CK; A lot of jamming would be - well, not jamming, but 
there would be a lot of contradictory news, because the 
Japanese would be telling them about military losses at sea, 
and...in fact there was one ship...I interviewed a veteran 
who said his ship was sunk three times by the Japanese 
according to the radio. 
LS: Well, on this Vietnam program, for what it's worth, 
they... even the soldiers who knew that the war was wrong, 
said that Hanoi Hannah had very little impact on them 
despite her very extensive propaganda. 
CK: (I ask for a lead for a historian or a source for 
Signal Corps.) (He tells me the Signal Corps has probably 
been defunct since the 1960s.) 
LS: During the war the Signal Corps did on occasion 
provide equipment and set up generators for Armed Forces 
Radio, they did that particularly in England in '43. They 
set up the original transmitters because initially Armed 
Forces Radio did not have that expertise. By '43, early '44 
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they started to train their own people to take little 
stations out in the Pacific. 
I think, my empirical conclusion, is that they never 
really worried about Axis Sally or Tokyo Rose, particularly 
Tokyo Rose, that.., it wasn't like in Europe or even in 
Vietnam where there was an opportunity for the soldiers to 
desert, you know, you landed on an island and you took the 
island and the Japanese were gone. And so there was really 
no concern about that. And if they - to the extent that 
they listened to her, it was one, to laugh, and two, simply 
for the music. The more Armed Forces radio went on, with 
all the stars that they had, and the baseball games and 
whatever else they could do with short wave broadcast, that 
Axis Sally and Tokyo Rose had rather a small audience. My 
guess is they didn't even think it was worth the effort. 
CK: (I ask him how he came to write the book) 
LS: I had a contract with the Armed Forces Radio and 
Television to write their history. Armed Forces Radio and 
Television Service is one of the components of American 
Forces Information Service, which also does "Yank" and 
"Stars and Stripes." There is an overall head for each of 
these organizations and I was essentially contracted to the 
deputy director of Armed Forces Information. 
CK: Is that part of USIA? 
LS: Armed Forces Information has never been involved 
with Voice of America or USIA, except in Europe they use 
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some of the same transmitter towers. Conversely VOA and 
USIA were very anxious to get on Armed Forces Radio and 
Television because of what they call their shadow audience, 
eastern Europe, and they had a very large audience. The 
USIA and Edward R. Murrow had this idea that since no one 
was listening to the Voice of America, because it was 
propaganda, they could put in their two five-minute programs 
a day which they did for three or four or five years. 
CK: Is it still propaganda? 
LS: No, when Nixon came in one of the first things he 
did was eliminate these two programs. What was happening 
was USIA was writing the...writing...I don't remember, it's 
not a secret, I just don't remember how the material was 
delivered, I believe it was delivered in script to the short 
wave people who had to then put it on the air. And the 
gentleman who ran the Armed Forces Information Service at 
the time said it was sometimes so badly written they had to 
rewrite it to make it even understandable, and they were 
adamantly opposed to these programs. But as I said, if the 
President and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of 
the USIA mandate it, you do it. But it was taken off the 
air I think in '69, something like that, not any sooner, I 
think it was under Nixon. The Armed Forces Radio and 
Television Service as far as possible sees itself as a 
broadcast network, world-wide, totally free of propaganda, 
and there were always, controversies in Vietna.m about the 
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news. If you see "Good Morning Vietnam" there was an 
indication of censorship -
CK: There certainly was. It was stated. 
LS: They were wrong. That movie bears no resemblance to 
Armed Forces Radio and Television in Vietnam. 
CK: I'm glad to hear it. 
LS: I've written a book on the image of the military in 
Hollywood war movies. From that point of view, it is a bad 
movie, it is inaccurate, etc. etc. But there were 
contentions by young troops - the current director of Armed 
Forces Information on one of these tapes said he never heard 
of one of the major incidents where a broadcaster got on and 
said he was censored. 
(Talks about today's Armed Forces R-TV programming - that 
it's exactly what you get here and that it's pre-recorded 
with their own spot announcements.) 
(Talks about Tom Lewis's group of writers not being 
connected with Armed Forces policy, but writing because they 
were drafted to do so. Said Tom Lewis was made the 
Commander of Armed Forces Radio and reported to General 
Osborne, same as Frank Capra.) 
The military believe they win the war with bullets, I 
will always argue that it's the support agencies that win or 
lose a war. Now Tom Lewis himself and his boys often 
implied they won the war because they boosted morale. 
Well, we would have won the war without them, to be sure, 
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and probably won it at exactly the same time, however it 
made the conditions of the men more enjoyable to the extent 
that they heard music and entertainment from home. Their 
biggest job was right after the war, the transition from war 
to peace, where they had special programming that they'd 
already put together, one to help prepare the troops for 
occupation and two, to explain to them how they would be 
rotated back home and what their benefits would be and all 
that. That was the information side of it. And I've always 
indicated that if Edward R. Murrow, for example, had been 
given control of the Armed Forces Radio at the beginning of 
the war, it would have been purely education, information 
and news. It happened that they brought in Tom Lewis who 
was an advertising man, who decided that the way to create 
an audience was to bribe them with entertainment and then 
you will slip in the message. So that was a basic policy 
and philosophic decision. 
(Talks about before the war, when all the radio programs 
were put together by ad agencies and then sold to the 
networks.) Armed Forces Radio had its beginnings in 
Kodiak, Alaska at the end of 1941, In fact it was 
unofficial but it became part of Armed Forces Radio in the 
middle of 1942, In fact the first station was in Panama in 
1940. And by that I mean military radio stations which were 
created purely to relieve the boredom of troops in the 
field. And they were spontaneously created by the men 
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themselves. General Marshall brought in Capra and Tom 
Lewis, not in response to Tokyo Rose, because when this was 
started the troops with a few exceptions were not fighting. 
There were troops in Guadalcanal, and they were fighting in 
Wake Island. But the idea was domestic. Domestic in the 
sense of "whatever they throw at us this is what were going 
to do." It wasn't a reaction to Tokyo Ros-e that Armed 
Forces Radio was created. If you - see you go back, and ... 
there had been studies during and after World War I, about 
the morale of the troops. And the bottom line conclusion 
was that in the next war the United States Army should 
provide its own entertainment-recreation internally, not 
rely on the Red Cross, the neighboring Knights of Columbus, 
Salvation Army, whatever. So that this idea of providing 
your own entertainment...was not in reaction to the efforts 
of Tokyo Rose. That's another reason why I say that Lewis 
would have nothing to do with jamming. Besides they were 
probably arrogant enough to believe that their programs were 
so much better no one would listen to anyone else. 
CK: Right, 
LS: And they were. Command Performance, which was their 
weekly program, which started before Armed Forces Radio and 
Television, in March of '42 before it was taken over in 
August, was probably the greatest radio program ever put 
together. 
CK; Command Performance? 
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LS: Command Performance. Because they had access to 
every entertainer, no advertiser could afford all the stars 
that they brought in, and besides, the individual 
advertisers tied up - one would have Bob Hope and one would 
have Bing Crosby, so you couldn't put them on the air at the 
same time. 
CK: Who produced it? 
LS: It was Armed Forces Radio. 
# 
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THE EXPERTS 
Barry Zorthian is a communications specialist who worked as 
a program manager with the Voice of America from 1948-61, 
and a public affairs officer from 1961-64. He served as a 
counselor for Information Vietnam from 1954-58. He?' became 
a vice president for Time, Inc., from 1969 - 1979, and now 
works as an executive with a communications firm in 
Washington, D.C. 
Max Kraus is a retired Foreign Intelligence Officer with the 
USIA. During World War II he was with the U.S. Army 84th 
Infantry Division and used a mobile loudspeaker to speak 
across enemy lines in German to urge the soldiers to 
surrender. His broadcasts are credited with the surrender 
of 2500 enemy troops. 
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Interview with Barry Zorthian, November 25, 1987 
CK; (I introduce myself and tell him I'm looking for ah 
expert in propaganda during World War II.) I noticed in 
reading about your background that you were in the Marines 
during World War II. 
BZ: Yeah, World War II I am hardly the expert, I was in 
the Marines, a young second lieutenant in field artilleries. 
We had nothing to do with any of the propaganda aspects of 
World War II, 
CK: Did you hear Tokyo Rose? 
BZ; Oh, yeah, but so did a million other people, 
CK; Can you tell me, as propaganda, is that type of 
transmission with music and patter, or chatter, is that an 
effective method of propaganda? 
BZ: Well, it certainly got an audience to a certain 
extent,simply because of the content. But I don't know that 
it had any great effect. People listened to it for the music 
and not much more. 
CK: That's what I found when I interviewed - I've 
interviewed a couple of dozen veterans who did hear it, and 
all of them said they laughed at it, they didn't take it— 
BZ: The substance, sure. You know it may have hit one 
or two individuals here or there, but as a general thing—I 
don't think it had any effect, 
CK: Did they use the same kind of propaganda in Vietnam? 
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BZ: We used very often, there were all forms of it in 
Vietnam, but we used very often the Vietnamese equivalent of 
it, in other words messages from Vietnam to the other side 
emphasizing home and family and the harm in fighting, etc. 
etc. So in a different sense we used the same 
technique...the basic technique of appealing to the desire 
for home, the desire to be with family, the desire to be in 
familiar surroundings and therefore to be less than 
committed to fighting, is standard operating procedure if 
you will. 
CK: Do you think it has an effect to make soldiers less 
c ommitt ed? 
BZ: To some extent less committed, less aggressive if 
you will. In Vietnam we put a great deal of emphasis and 
with some success on getting people to surrender, our so-
called Chu Lai program. And a lot of that was based on the 
appeal of wanting to leave the harsh conditions of combat or 
front line duty and return to your home. By- raising 
questions as to the validity of the effort, the futility of 
fighting etc. etc. 
CK: Do you think—isn't that the same as what the 
Japanese were trying to do? 
BZ: Oh sure. Sure, in a very real sense. 
CK; Why do you think the Japanese (propaganda) didn't 
work, then? 
BZ: Well I think for one thing the impact, the reason 
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for the Americans fighting was much more clear. And that 
the countereffect on American promotion, if you will, of the 
war, is a very profound one. There'd been an awful lot of 
material put out in the U.S. to these troops up to, leading 
to the war, and beyond it, after the war started. So that 
there was a very ingrained resistance to anything from the 
Japanese. Furthermore the Japanese communicating with the 
Americans, the whole culture, the means of communications, 
the methods of communication, were very alien. Whereas in a 
place like Vietnam we tried to use Vietnamese to talk to the 
Vietnamese. 
CK: I see. Did any of the North Vietnamese do the same 
to our men? 
BZ: They certainly tried to do it to the South 
Vietnamese, They had very little or no effect on the 
Americans I think. Hold on please a minute. 
CK: Certainly. 
BZ; I have a call on the other line. As I say, the man 
who knows most about World War II that I'm aware of, who 
served in the European side is a fellow named Max Kraus, 
(spells it) and he should be in the Washington phone book. 
CK; Do you know what office he works— 
BZ: Well, no, he's retired now, he's writing a book 
about that APSE, that Unity Europe that undertook 
propaganda. 
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CK: OK. Well, thanks for the reference. And thanks for 
your time. 
BZ: You're very welcome. 
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MAX KRAUS 
I served during World War II with a psychological warfare 
unit which did combat propaganda ... so I can present some 
expertise on the subject. 
(I explain what I'm doing, ask permission to record) 
First of all, with radio. Dr. Short from England talks about 
latent propaganda - (What kind?) Latent, meaning subtle, 
it's the kind of propaganda that doesn't have a direct 
message, but it has more of a subtle psychological effect, 
to lay down your arms and go home, and what are you fighting 
for, this kind of thing. Escapist fantasy. Is that a 
technique that was used a lot in World War II? 
MK; Well, um, in part yes, in part, also, in Europe, and 
I'm not acquainted with Tokyo Rose's broadcasts since my 
service was in Europe, I think our messages were somewhat 
less subtle and latent,.,.1 mean they were definitely aimed 
at inducing surrender in enemy troops and undermining 
civilian morale by pointing out that the war was really lost 
and people shouldn't be foolish and lose their lives at the 
last moment when they could surrender to the Allied armies 
and survive the war and be reunited with their families. 
CK: Do you think it had any effect? 
MK: Yes, very definitely. 
CK: How could you tell? 
MK: Well in addition to using the radio broadcasts, we 
also, and I did a good deal of it myself during the war, 
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used mobile loudspeaker systems to talk directly across the 
front lines to the enemy troops when they were nearly cut 
off, and ...so...and.. for instance during the final drive 
from the Rhine to the Elbe I worked mainly with a mobile 
1oudspeaker-system with the 84th Infantry Division and they 
credited my surrender appeals with the surrender of about 
2500 Germ.an troops. And there was a very well documented 
radio operation targeted at the city of Lorient during the 
war in Brittany ...where we...some... due to I think 
Austrian or German-born psycological warriors, broadcast 
into the fortress which was pretty much cut off, at regular 
intervals, and they talked enough of the German troops into 
coming out of Lorient and surrendering to us so that we 
never had to actually take Lorient by assault. It held out 
until the end of the war but had become militarily 
insignificant. 
CK: I see. (ask for spelling of Lorient) 
MK: It's one of the towns on the coast of Brittany, just 
south of the English Channel. 
CK: I see. 
MK! It was one of the main German U-boat bases together 
with St. Lazare, and Brest. 
CK; Do you think that the messages from the radio were 
effective because they were true? 
MK: Yes. I mean this was our cardinal rule. Don't 
..always ... always tell the truth, don't lie. At least in 
120 
our ...in what we called white propaganda. Because for 
instance we had also a black propaganda station in Europe 
during World War II that operated out of Luxembourg, the 
British had several which pretended to be underground 
stations inside of Germany which were operated by anti-
Nazi .mainly officers. And as long as you ...these black 
propaganda stations could take liberties with the truth, 
because they did not avow their true origin. In all white 
propaganda, where it obviously came from Allied sources, we 
had a very firm rule of always speaking the truth because 
... if the enemy could check up on what we were telling them 
and found out that it wasn't so, we would have been 
discredited. 
CK! I see. Can you...OK, you would define white 
propaganda as being.., 
MK: White propaganda is propaganda which does not hide 
its origin. Black propaganda pretends to originate from a 
different source, there's sort of an area in between which 
is called grey propaganda which leaves it's origin kind of 
in doubt. But black propaganda and white propaganda are the 
principle categories which we differentiate it. 
CK; I see. I've read the definitions but somehow I 
understood that one was more obvious in its message and the 
other was -
MK: No. No. 
CK: I see. 
121 
MK: The...Tokyo Rose obviously came from Japan and 
therefore was white propaganda. 
CK: Yes, she did, the broadcasts were obvious, in their 
message as well. 
MK: Yes. 
CK: Is this a standard kind of format, to play music or 
something that is part of the culture of the enemy? In 
other words she played American music and gave them the 
message, what's the use in fighting, your ships are being 
sunk, and so on. Is this an effective kind of broadcast, or 
does the effectiveness depend on -
MK; The effect of any propaganda depends on whether you 
,.. during the war, whether you are winning or losing. If 
you are losing there is no way in which you can talk the 
enemy into surrendering. And if you are winning it's 
relatively easy because there is already the tactical and 
strategic pressure. This is why the propaganda... our 
propaganda broadcasts, leaflets, loudspeaker operations in 
Gerrmany during the final phase of the war were very 
effective. Because the German troops really knew that there 
was no way that they could win, and therefore it was 
frequently enough, especially during loudspeaker broadcasts, 
to talk to them in their own language, to tell them that if 
they surrendered they would be treated well, in conformance 
with the Geneva convention, and give them instructions in 
how to surrender. Because there is always a risk involved 
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in surrendering during a battle, because the enemy may not 
know - may not be sure whether you are trying to surrender 
or trying to charge their positions. 
CK: Uh huh. 
NK: By having somebody speak to them in their own 
language and say if you throw away your weapons, walk slowly 
with your hands up in the air toward our lines, we will take 
you prisoners and we will treat you in conformance with the 
Geneva convention and you will survive the war. 
CK: Has it ever happened that the message was false, and 
that they were shot trying to surrender? 
MK: Not that I know of. I don't know of any incident 
when that was deliberately done. 
CK: I see. What branch of the government were you 
working for, when you were doing this kind of dangerous 
work? 
MK: I was with the U. S. Army, with the Psychological 
Warfare Detachment of the 9th U.S. Army, in Europe. 
Note: Max Kraus is listed in the 1956 Who's Who in 
America as a Foreign Intelligence Officer with the U.S 
Information Agency. 
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VETERANS 
(in alphabetical order) 
Robert Anderson, Storekeeper 2nd Class SK2C USNR. Served on 
the USS Half Moon, a sea plane tender, in the South Pacific 
for 15 months. 
Will Clover, US Navy. Saw action at Pearl Harbor, Midway. 
Sunk on a destroyer in the South Pacific, 1942, was 
hospitalized in Fiji. 
Georgana Egeland, widow of Roy Egeland, USN, who served on 
the USS Santee, the first CVE to be hit by a kamikaze pilot. 
Dick Grant, 5th Fighter Squadron, Army Air Corps, served in 
New Guinea and Port Moresby, Australia. 
Ken McConnell, Signal Corps, South Pacific, 1942-45. Worked 
with radar and radio repair. 
Gareth Moon, 2nd Battalion, Ninth Marines, 3rd Division. 
Served in Guadalcanal, Guam, Iwo Jima. 
Bill Ohrmann, Army Air Corps, Crew Chief of C-47 plane, New 
Gliinss., 1943~44 
Paul Snyder, Navy Submarines, served in Manila and 
Australia. 
Lester B. Tucker, U.S. Navy, Chief Warrant Officer. Served 
aboard USS North Carolina, Guadalcanal and Solomon Islands, 
1942-43. 
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INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT ANDERSON 
October 26, 1987 
R: As a Navy veteran in the Asiatic-Pacific area during 
WWII we had occasion to listen to broadcasts by Tokyo 
Rose. It was announced and we looked forward to 
listening, usually in the evening wherever we might 
have been, usually down in the New Hebrides, New 
Guinea, as l recall down in there. Knowing very well 
that it was a propaganda broadcast on short-wave, we 
would stop everything actually and listen to it on the 
small ship I was on because it was interspersed with 
the music of the big time bands of the 1930s and '40s 
and we liked to listen to Harry James and some of those 
boys, but then she always had a message, a propaganda 
message. And I can recall one in particular—she hit 
upon attabrine tablets, which was a drug tablet that we 
all had to take and at that time was the only known—it 
, wasn't a "cure", it was a deterrent of getting malaria. 
And the tablet was real yellow in color and it affected 
your body so your complexion was almost yellow. And 
after a month or so of taking these, one tablet a day 
and it was kind of mandatory and we didn't want malaria 
so we took this tablet, and she came on and the solo 
broadcast was that we that had taken attabrine tablets 
to the point of discoloring our skin was causing us to 
become sterile. And propaganda goes so far, but that 
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kind of worried some of the young married fellas out 
there and some of them planning on getting married. it 
didn't bother me because, heck, that was the furthest 
from my mind at that time. I know an M.D. aboard ship 
had to come on and say, "Don't worry, fellas, that is 
strictly propaganda—there's no research that attabrine 
tablets were going to cause sterility." 
But another thing, as I recall, is--she came on 
trying to, I guess as I understood, get everybody 
homesick. And she came on several times with all the 
"Dear John" letters we were getting, it was an effort 
in our futility, and our government, and our knowing 
that we would never get back to the States because of 
the Imperialists' superiority over the area, the folks 
back home (especially the women) were not going to 
wait. So we'd get "Dear John" letters and rightfully 
so. 
C: Did she read any of them over the air? 
R: No. Naturally it was a devastating moment for some of 
these people that were getting "Dear John" letters, and 
I hope you understand what I mean by a "Dear John" 
letter—the relationship is through in a letter. And 
friends, sweethearts, young wives—and that was a 
devastating effect in itself. And she promoted, 
increased the anxiety of these "Dear John" letters. 
This was the two main things that I remember about 
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Tokyo Rose. 
C: Did you have any friends or buddies who did receive 
"Dear John" letters who were depressed by this? 
R: Well, we by and large were very amused by it. It got 
to a point where we were wondering what was going to 
come out next. I was on a back echelon—the ship was 
on a back echelon--most of the islands had been 
secured, so then to hear her say how we were outmanned, 
outgunned, and the superiority of the Imperial Forces 
was like a comedy to us at that time. This was 1944 
and the spring of 1945. And fleet commanders let us 
listen to it. They would record the short-wave and 
play it to us at a certain time on the ship because it 
was amusement and you didn't have movies or anything 
like that, except old movies, so it was just a lighter 
section of our day after chow in the evening. 
C: Did you say they were recorded? 
R; Evidently, because as we went from time zone to time 
zone on the ship on movement we got it a certain time 
each day, so I knew it wasn't coming direct. Now maybe 
the fleet censored some of it out, I don't know. I'm 
not aware of it. It was after evening chow, as I 
recall, which was around 6:00 - 1800 as Navy time. So 
that was an ongoing thing. But it could have been 
censored, I don't know. But the thing about the 
attabrine tablets and the "Dear John" letters—if it 
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had been censored before we heard it, they let that go, 
for whatever reason. 
C: What kind of voice did she have? 
R: Tokyo Rose had a beautiful voice. She was easy to 
listen to. And that was kind of appreciated, and 
besides, it was a sexy voice as far as the troops were 
concerned. And they liked that. She could lead in to 
the music portion of it beautifully, you know, about 
Glenn Miller, which was very popular at that time. And 
I think it was about the time when he had disappeared 
or was killed in the Service, so his music was more 
than relevant to us at that time. And, Harry 
James . . . but most of the big name bands, she had a 
piece of music —not complete recording and I don't 
remember how long Tokyo Rose . . . You see we weren't 
allowed radios, it had to come over the ship's intercom 
system to us, so I'm sure it was censored, a lot of it, 
but they didn't censor out the "Dear John" and the 
attabrine tablets. 
C: How did the music make you feel? 
R: Great! Great! She had us there, because then we were 
attentive. Then we would laugh and "ha, ha" at her 
when she would come out with some of the propaganda 
statements and so forth because we knew they were wild 
and out of context, especially when our fleet was 
chasing the Japanese fleet all over the Pacific and she 
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was telling us how superior the Imperial Navy was and 
all that, and that we would all be in Davy Jones' 
locker and all of this business. I think our service 
personnel and commanders looked at it as kind of an 
ego-boosting thing. You know, "Hey, see what she's 
saying? and where we are? It's all false anyway." So 
that's probably why they let it go. 
C: Did you have an idea what she looked like? 
R: No. In fact, with her soft voice I guess most of us, 
and I for one, had envisioned her as not a Nisei but 
she could be in Hollywood in the movies—you know, 
beautiful gal, that's the way we envisioned her. And 
she was saying how well she was treated in Japan and 
was so glad that she wasn't in America anymore, and all 
of that. So we knew that her background was from the 
States. 
C: Did she refer to the States? To California? 
R: Not specifically that I recall. Like I said before, I 
don't know how long her broadcasts were—10 minutes, 
15, half hour or whatever. 
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INTERVIEW WITH WILL CLOVER 
October 25, 1987 
W: (Talked about spending 3 days on a raft and their 
rescue. ) 
We listened to Tokyo Rose for amusement when we 
were at sea. She would say things to encourage the 
American forces to give up because the Japanese forces 
had invaded the United States. And there was one time 
something to the effect that the Japanese had invaded 
the West Coast and had progressed as far as Kansas or 
Oklahoma or something in their progress of going across 
the United States. 
C: Did you believe it? 
W: Oh, no. We had reports and everything—we had other 
reports of our own and I was in Communications so I was 
in direct contact with the latest news items and stuff. 
C: So you knew it wasn't true? 
W: Yeah. 
C: Was this news announcements in a male voice or was it 
Tokyo Rose? 
W: She would announce it. She started and concluded her 
programs—they would play American music that they knew 
the Americans liked, like Glenn Miller and different 
big-name bands at that time. 
C: Do you remember which ones she would end with or start 
with? Did she have any special theme song? 
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W: I don't remember quite that well — it's been some time, 
I do remember at times I might lend an ear to the radio 
when she was on, just long enough to get a chuckle or 
two and then go on about my business. 
C: Can you tell me what division or what branch of the 
service you were in? 
W: I was in the Navy and was in radio communications. I 
had a security clearance that was top secret and used 
to be involved with coded messages and that, and when 
coded messages came in I would have to take them down 
and set up the code machines and decode messages or 
encode messages for transmittal. 
C: Where were you stationed when you were doing this work? 
W: I was at sea. Most of my service was at sea. I was at 
Pearl Harbor when Pearl Harbor was attacked and I was 
on a light cruiser named the USS Detroit, later 
transferred to a destroyer, the USS Meredith. It was 
on the USS Meredith that I went down into the New 
Hebrides area on a mission that we were assigned from 
there. We were escorting—two destroyers were 
escorting a sea-going tug that was towing a great big 
tank raft—they called them lighters—that was towing 
gasoline for the planes on Guadalcanal and when we were 
about 90 miles from our destination some Japanese air-
carrier based planes attacked us and sunk us. 
132 
C: How long—was that when you were in the water for 72 
hours? 
W: About 2 to 4 hours longer than 3 days—76 hours. 
C: What did you hang on to? 
W: I got to a raft. The first raft I started to go to I 
changed my mind because the Japanese planes stayed 
around the vicinity an'd as the sunken sailors of the 
U.S. destroyer were gathering around the raft the Japs 
would peel off and come down and strafe them. So I 
made my way on the waves to one off to itself and 
that's the one I went to. When I got to it there was 
an-estimated 25 or so on it. When we were rescued 3 
days later there was only 9 of us left. 
C; What did you do with the ones who died? Did they stay 
on the raft with you? 
W: Well, you know, during the war we wore dog tags or 
identification tags around their neck. As they would 
either die or--some of them we didn't get their dog 
tags because some of them had illusions and would see 
islands and ships that weren't there and they'd start 
swimming for them and of course get away from the raft. 
We had no control over them. On the raft the first 
night or first afternoon of the first day we had the 
executive officer of the ship that was with us but 
being in Communications and everything and as quickly 
as we were attacked and sunk—we were sunk in probably 
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about 7 minutes—when I got to this raft the executive 
officer asked me if I was ever able to get a contact 
with a shore station about our contact with the enemy 
and of course it was,negative because the Japanese knew 
our frequencies and they used to block them. If we 
tried to send a message out they had transmitters on 
the same frequencies "and send a bunch of gibberish to 
block them. So we had no way of knowing whether our 
contact message--! sent it out 2 or 3 times in what we 
called "sending it in the blind"—but we didn't know 
for sure whether there was any contact. So anyways 
this executive officer explained that we were, by the 
currents of the waters as he knew them and by our last 
known location and so forth, if anyone of us felt 
strong enough or wanted to just wait for the currents 
to carry us we would eventually end up next to a 
certain island—I can't remember. But by morning he 
was gone, so we don't know whether he tried to take off 
or not. But as different ones passed away or died we 
just had about a 15-man raft and there were 25 of us on 
it to begin with, approximately, there was fellas that 
couldn't hack it or they'd lose their minds or have 
hallucinations—^and we had no food or water because 
this raft had been blown from the ship during the 
bombing when we were sunk—we were hit with several 
torpedoes and bombs and strafing, so as near as we 
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could recall we were sunk within . . . there was 
probably about 30 aircraft and our one ship because the 
skipper of our ship had been placed in command of our 
task force of 3 ships. He had ordered the sea-going 
tug to abandon ship and be prepared and we went 
alongside and we took the personnel off. Then we swung 
away—the other destroyer that was with us—our 
commanding officer ordered the other destroyer to high­
speed run on into Guadalcanal, a distance estimated 
around 90 miles, so we were all alone when the planes 
showed up. We had radar that picked them up. But as 
we swung away from the sea-going tug our skipper slowed 
our ship down and ordered a torpedo fired into the sea­
going tug and light our gasoline so the Japs wouldn't 
be able to salvage it. But as we slowed down, the Japs 
made their first appearances and came straight down at 
us and dive-bombed us and we never did get to fire a 
torpedo into the sea-going tug. It was later thought 
when we were on the raft that—'cause we could see the 
tug and the lider quite a distance away from us when we 
raised up on the waves. At .that time the executive 
officer was with us and he warned us against trying to 
make for it because he said the Japs probably had 
submarines alerted and they were probably watching it 
and if we got on it they would probably sink us again. 
So we left it alone and stayed away from it. We lost 
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sight of it overnight the first night. We finally 
ended up--well, overnight and after what the executive 
officer said about our contact with the enemy he 
decided to, apparently, try it on his own to get to 
this island and we never did hear from him. It was 
later learned after we were rescued--those of us that 
did survive used to make contact with the Commander of 
the Southwest Pacific Forces whose headquarters were in 
Australia—and we learned of the survivorsnames but 
his never showed up, so he apparently didn't make it. 
The lighter of gasoline and the sea-going tug 
later they were . . . When I was rescued, a Navy PBY 
spotted us and he flew over us a few times—we'd seen 
him several times making passes but he never did spot 
us—it was quite some time later of the day that they 
did find us—and when they did find us they dropped us 
what they call a smoke bomb and then he flew up the 
horizon and he'd come back and eventually there was two 
or three masts showed and they were sea-going tugs and 
destroyers and they came over and the sea-going tug 
came alongside and there was only 9 of us left. They 
came alongside of us and they tried to get us to come 
aboard and we didn't have the strength to climb the sea 
ladder to board even a small tug, so they had to use a 
boatswain's chair to lower over the side and bring us 
aboard one at a time that way. 
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I recall as I got on board the sea-going tug a 
couple of guys helping me to sick bay—I heard a lot of 
machine gun fire and I asked these guys, in my rather 
adverse condition, if we were under attack. They said 
no, those guys were having machine gun practice on all 
the sharks that were in the vicinity of our raft--he 
said there must have been 50 to 100 out there. Then I 
was taken to sick bay. (Told about all the rations 
normally tied to the raft having been blown from the 
raft so they had no food or water.) 
(Talked about tying himself onto the raft so that 
if he fell asleep his head wouldn't go into the water.. 
Saw an article in the water and swam for it—it was a 
big piece of bark. Chewed pieces of bark and spit it 
out after it was pulp. Several did it—those who did 
survived. ) 
C: Was it exposure or thirst or hunger that . . .? 
W: (Talked about being rescued and taken into Guadalcanal 
and a destroyer going to make a high-speed run to the 
hospital ship USS Solace to transfer these men to it. 
Submerged in salt water from neck on down for the 
entire time on the raft. The destroyer found the sea­
going tug. put a skeleton crew on the tug and finally 
got it on into Guadal- canal, so the Japanese never did 
anything with it.) (Talked about seeing a submarine 
about 400 - 500 yards away on the morning of the second 
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day, and the fact that subs had to surface to recharge 
batteries then. Turned and moved toward them. Talked 
about swimming away, and sub then submerged before it 
got to the raft. Saw shark fins in the water.) 
(Talked about bodies being taken by sharks. Also 
talked about some of the men being attacked by sharks.) 
C: That must have been the hardest part--not knowing 
whether you were going to be there forever. 
W: (Talked about fate—not being a Christian, etc. 
Remembered the saying "Through the power of a living 
God I will live through this." Thinks that saw him 
through it.) 
Re Tokyo Rose--they listened to her quite 
frequently. Turned the programs on for amusement and 
entertainment but they never believed anything because 
they had access to all the information themselves. 
Received it with a big laugh as they knew it was 
propaganda. 
C: Did you ever compare the intelligence you received with 
what you heard on the broadcasts? 
W: Not really. (Talked about his security clearance—was 
the only one on board ship including officers who had 
the rating.) Knew that Tokyo Rose was just propaganda 
and was a way for the Japanese to get the Americans to 
give up. 
C: How about music? 
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W: Well, she used to, in between her announcements and her 
little statements about trying to encourage us to 
forget about fighting for the United States and to turn 
ourselves in to the Japanese forces, she would play 
popular music at that time like Glenn Miller, Tommy 
Dorsey and all those big bands that played jitterbug 
music. She had some records from the Andrews Sisters— 
but her program consisted of playing popular music that 
the American forces enjoyed along with her little comments. 
C: Did the music make you homesick? 
W; Any time away from home—especially like myself^I had 
been at Pearl Harbor and when I was finally rescued I 
ended up on the USS Solace at New Hebrides, then they 
took me and others to Suva Fiji and there they had an 
Army base hospital there (Johns Hopkins) with very 
reliable and highly-trained doctors and nurses there 
and they took real good care of us. 
(Told the story about a nurse waking him up every 
night and taking him into the office for hot chocolate. 
He thought she had a thing for him but when he asked 
her she said he had such bad nightmares she had to wake 
him up so he wouldn't wake up all the rest of her 
patients.) 
(Talked about not selling his story because he 
felt he would be selling his buddies' lives for the 
story and the money.) 
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C: (Said you would be putting together a story about Tokyo 
Rose.) 
W: Well, I think that's about all I can tell you about 
her. We used to turn on the radio--we knew her 
schedules—and we'd turn on the radio just to hear what 
she had to say that we knew wasn't true. She did try 
to impress in her programs that the American forces 
should just give up because the Japanese—like I say, 
she had one time she had a program that the Japanese 
forces had invaded the West Coast of the United States 
and had progressed to Oklahoma. 
C: Did anyone around you appear to be affected by hearing 
this? 
W: I don't believe so. I know we all got a big laugh out 
of it. In fact, it kept our morale kind of high 
because we knew she was making statements to the effect 
that the Japanese forces were doing this and that and 
the other and were winning the war, so the speak, and 
we . . . I remember when the Midway battle was on she 
had a program about that and she told how badly we had 
been beaten in that battle. Well, that was actually 
the turning point of the war because that was when the 
Japanese didn't know exactly how many carriers we had 
left to operate and they were making preparations to 
attack and destroy Midway and they had a diversion 
action up there in the Aleutians where they attacked 
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them and bombed Dutch Harbor, hoping to divert any 
American forces away from Midway. But the American 
forces had decoded some of the Japanese messages and 
they were aware of what their plans were, so in trying 
to outwit the Japanese they put the three remaining 
carriers that we had at the time in a position where 
they could either help Midway or, if they did make an 
attack on the West Coast, they would be able to get 
there in short order. They were in a position where 
they could get there in short order and yet they were 
in a position where they could help at Midway. It's 
all military strategy. 
(Talk 
said it wa 
ed about the movie "The Battle of Midway"--
s fairly accurate.) 
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INTERVIEW WITH GEORGANA EGELAND 
October 27, 1987 
C: (Discussing the history of the ship that her husband 
was on.) 
G: He was a Seaman 2nd Class on the USS Santee. Enlisted 
when he was 17. 
He didn't talk about the things, the actual 
happenings during the war because it hurt him. The 
things that he did talk about were the good things that 
he remembered. When Tokyo Rose's trial hit the front 
pages of all the newspapers, they were going to put her 
in prison for hurting the military and the Naval boys' 
morale and everything so much, Roy says, "What a shame. 
What a shame. They should give her a medal." He said, 
"She was the only connection we had with what was 
happening at home." And he said, "She had all the 
latest records, all the best music, and all the latest 
news." And he said that he couldn't wait for her to 
come on so they could go and listen. Sometimes she'd 
say, "Well, I know where you boys are." And she'd name 
a position, a navigational position. And he said, 
"Sometimes she'd be right and sometimes she'd be 
wrong." Or she'd tell them, "I know what's going to 
happen on such-and-such a day," And sometimes she'd be 
right and sometimes she'd be wrong. She did do 
propaganda and I suppose it was demoralizing for a 
142 
certain percentage of the men, but Roy said the greater 
percentage of them just enjoyed the music because it 
was something from home and they couldn't get it 
anywhere else. 
C; Who were the ones who were demoralized? 
G: Well, if they were demoralized it was because they 
listened to the propaganda part about "Do you know what 
your wives are doing? Do you know what your 
girlfriends are doing?" and some of them were very 
young and very attached and were torn away from their 
families, so to speak, and it bothered them a great 
deal. But by and large he said it was a bigger morale 
builder than anything else, at least as far as he was 
concerned. 
C: Did she ever play on family . . . were there men who 
had children, to be missing their children—did she 
ever play on that? 
G: He never said much about that. The only thing he ever 
said was the good things about her, and as I said--he 
said "She should have had a medal" for bringing the 
boys the things that they couldn't get out there in the 
middle of the ocean. The Navy didn't supply them with 
the latest music or the best records, but she did. 
C: He must have been out there for long stretches. 
G: He was out there for 3 years. They were at shore 
sometimes but he was in 3 years. 
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C: And she knew what they liked? 
G: Oh, yes! You know, the 40s' music was marvelous. I 
should have made a list. I have all the records in 
there. The Big Band era--Glenn Miller—all the songs. 
And she played them all. She had them all. And she 
knev.' some of the names. She'd dedicate a song to a 
certain person. I suppose in her thinking this was 
supposed to make him feel bad, because here's this 
beautiful lonesome song, you're gone to the war, you 
know, and it's dedicated to so-and-so. But Roy said 
they just loved the music because it was something from 
home and she actually did them a service. 
C: So they looked forward to . . . 
G: They looked forward to her broadcasts. And he said if 
it got too sticky with propaganda and such, they just 
shut it off. He said you didn't have to listen to it. 
C: How about the news value? Was the news correct, or 
didn't they care? 
G: He said a great deal of the time she was very, very 
right about what ship was where. Some of the times she 
was wrong, but he said a lot of the time her 
information was very, very good. And correct. 
C: Did he remember any particular song that he was fond of? 
G: Oh, yes. He said she used to play Margaret Whiting's 
"Old Cape Cod." He loved that. There was another one 
too—I can't think of the name of it. I'd have to look 
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it up. 
C: {Unintell.--something about a lot of them not getting 
letters.) 
G: A lot of them didn't get letters, or get letters 
regularly from home. Some didn't get letters at all. 
And this was a tie with home. The music, the latest 
records, and a lot of times the news. 
C: Would she have personal news about individuals? 
G: As I remember, Roy said yes, sometimes she would 
actually mention someone's name and this—I almost 
forgot this, I don't know how I could forget this--Judy 
Garland was from our home town. Grand Rapids, 
Minnesota. And she played it, a song of Judy's, one 
night for the boys from Grand Rapids, Minnesota. 
Nobody on the ship believed that Roy actually came from 
•Judy's home town or was part of that, and she actually 
played it. And it came over the radio that way. He 
said he was big-time on the ship after that. Yeah, she 
did. She'd say, "This is for the boys on the USS 
Santee," or whatever. She knew most of the time where 
they were, or that they were within distance of her 
radio. And where she was ever located I don't know. He 
never said, and I don't think he knew. I don't know if 
she had pre-recorded broadcasts or if she was a live 
entity on the radio waves. I think he said she came on 
live. I'm almost sure of that. 
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INTERVIEW WITH DICK GRANT 
October 28, 1987 
C: Dick, could you tell me your rank and what branch of 
the service you were in. 
D: I was in the old Army Air Corps, WWII, '47—of course, 
it became the Air Force. in my 20 1/2 years I served 3 
years with the Navy, 15 years with the Army Special 
Forces I was in unconventional warfare, which now seems 
to be the common thing—Green Berets and everything. 
During the period we're talking about here, I used to 
listen to Tokyo Rose down in New Guinea at Port 
Moresby—Spring '43 until I came home after two years. 
I remember specifically every evening around chow time 
between 6:00 and 7:00 when everybody had finished the 
chores and back home and everything, the most up-to-
date and most modern music emanated from Tokyo Rose and 
her evening broadcasts. And everyone tuned in to 
listen to the latest music from home. We didn't have 
Armed Forces Radio like we do now or like we did during 
the Korean War or the Southeast Asian War. And not 
only the music but what we all marveled at—the Tokyo 
High Command had some kind of an intelligence net that 
really produced, because Tokyo Rose would get on the 
air and, for instance, "The 5th Fighter Squadron—when 
you come over Rabaul tomorrow we're going to be waiting 
for you." Specifics like that—she would name the 
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targets that had been planned to be hit the very next 
day. And of course the guys laughed it off but they 
still wondered how in the devil she could get this 
information, because as you know, New Guinea was just 
above caveman status. They were aboriginals and there 
was no chance of any of them even, any native peoples, 
working in any of the offices or working around in the 
camps. But I still marvel at how they used to get that 
information. 
Of the two years I was over there, 18 months, my 
squadron was assigned to the Australian 7th and 9th 
Infantry Divisions to re-supply them by parachuting in 
the jungles and isolated patrols and everything, and 
just before I came home in early Spring of 1945 I was 
in the Dutch East Indies and I went to pay my respects 
to the senior Australian general who was on the same 
island in the Dutch East Indies on which I was 
stationed and I wanted to tell him good-bye because I 
had worked with him 18 months out of the previous 2 
years—his name was Sir Leslie Moreshead. When I went 
to say good-bye to him, he said, "Come on up, Grantie." 
I said, "Sir, I just wanted to say good-bye before I go 
back to the States. And, sir, there's a question I 
want to ask you--Is it true that Goebbels, Hitler's 
propaganda minister, called you Ali Baba Moreshead and 
Your Twenty Thousand Thieves?" The general roared [he 
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was a 3-star general], short, chubby, but a real man. 
(Story about Rommel and North Africa—going through a 
mine field. Turning poi-nt for Rommel.) 
I was born and raised in Washington, D.C. and was 
in government 5 1/2 years before the war started. 
(Talked about his going into the service.) (Talked 
about the unit being sent to Port Moresby and getting 
in on the last Japanese bombings of Port Moresby. 
History shows that the Japanese got within 5-7 miles of 
Port Moresby and if it had been taken, Australia was 
wide open.) 
It was at Moresby that I first heard the 
propaganda of Tokyo Rose because it was the only radio 
station we could get over there. New Guinea itself is 
a very mountainous area, like Montana is, and the-music 
was up-to-date, modern, it seemed like it was piped 
right from the United States via Tokyo into our tents 
over there. That, and the fact that she interspersed 
her music with taunts, threats, call it what you want— 
for instance, she would say, "You fellows in the 5th 
Fighter Squadron, we'll be waiting for you over Rabaul 
tomorrow." Rabaul, of course, was the main Japanese 
base in the South Pacific. And, sure enough, they'd be 
waiting for the guys. She'd do this with the units 
every night--fighter squadrons, bomber squadrons. We 
made the first parachute drop into New Guinea a couple 
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of months after I got there and this caught her by 
surprise, and that night she was very vindictive 
towards us because of what had happened. But it was a 
good program—we enjoyed it. Everybody listened to it. 
I shouldn't say "everybody" because I know Glen 
Parmeter said he didn't. 
C: What was the quality of her voice like? 
D: She had a real sweet voice. It was a sexy voice, 
whether she was trying to make it sexy or not, we were 
pretty lonesome down there in New Guinea and any 
woman's voice was kind of sexy at the time. But she 
had good delivery and she evidently had good 
intelligence, or the Japanese Imperial Staff had good 
intelligence-^they just fed the propaganda to her. But 
I never forgot Tokyo Rose. 
C: How did the music make you feel? 
D: Well, the old-tiipers will remember the Mills Brothers 
singing "Paper Doll" and some of the old quartets they 
had and some of the singers, very melancholy, would 
make you think of home. And that's what she wanted you 
to do and probably tear down your resistance, but the 
Japanese I don't think really had any clear 
understanding of the Americans' psyche. This would 
make us want to hurry up and get the job over with and 
get home. That's the way all of us took it, I thought. 
C: Did you listen to the news when you were there? 
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We listened to her news, yeah. It was very 
interesting. Oh, they know we're coming tomorrow--
that's interesting. But we were just as alert then. 
This didn't scare us at all. i imagine it was meant to 
make you apprehensive because maybe the Japanese 
thought we were not a war-like race, or war-like 
people, I should say. And something like this would 
intimidate us. But I think it just got our dander up. 
We took it, not as a joke but . . . 
Do you think these programs were the product of a 
thought-out plan, or do you think it was a group of 
people ad-libbing? 
I'm convinced in my own mind because they did seem to 
know the places we were going to hit—maybe just by 
deduction that they knew that, Rabaul for instance was 
the thing she used over and over, but that was the main 
shipping center, both surface shipping and aerial 
shipping—it supplied the Solomons, Dutch East Indies, 
all over the South Pacific. I'm convinced it had to be 
a planned operation. 
Did her broadcasts have an emotional effect on the guys 
you were with where you were stationed? Did she 
depress you or anger you or . . .? 
I don't know anybody that she angered or depressed. I 
k*now a lot of fellows that wouldn't miss her for the 
world because she was entertaining. And even though 
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she had these innuendoes and threats and kind of cast 
aspersions on your family life back home, they took it 
with a grain of salt. 
C: Do you think she liked you? 
D: After reading about Tokyo Rose and the fact that she 
had been an American citizen, supposedly went home and 
got caught there by the war, I think she was just a 
young girl who got caught up in the spirit of things 
and the Japanese used her. 
C: At the time when you were listening did you have any 
idea what her psyche was like? 
D: No. It was a Japanese mentality. I think they bit off 
more than they could chew and they realized it after 
Pearl Harbor when we struck back. It was those few 
seconds those B-25 bombers spent over Tokyo—that 
really must have surprised them. And from then on—and 
even with your best propaganda how can you beat 
success? MacArthur was one of the most brilliant men 
in military history, in my estimation* He could have 
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gone against every island on the way up, but he didn't-
-he left entire Japanese armies, like the 18th Japanese 
Army in New Guinea—he left it there, bypassed it, went 
on up to the Philippines. You can't beat success 
regardless of how much propaganda. Of course, we knew 
we were having the success. We had our own bulletin 
boards and everything, telling what happened. (Talked 
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about the newspaper "Guinea Gold.") 
C: Was there anything that she said in these broadcasts or 
that the news announcer said that you could identify 
clearly as being lies? 
D: No. We took most of it with a grain of salt, about our 
sweethearts back home off with somebody else. That 
happens during wartime—wartime separation makes the 
heart beat greater for somebody else. It was just one 
of the facts of life. I don't know of anybody that was 
really affected by that. 
C: So, in general you're saying that everyone looked 
forward to hearing her and . . .? 
D: Yes. I'll make a flat statement that everybody looked 
forward to hearing the good music and listening to her 
forecast what was going to come up the next day, 
whether she was right or not. She had a pretty voice. 
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INTERVIEW WITH KEN McCONNELL 
October 26, 1987 
C: When did you join the service and what branch of the 
service were you in? 
K: I joined the service in August of 1942. I joined the 
Signal Corps and subsequently took training at the 
University of North Dakota in radar and radio repair. 
After that I went into active service. We trained at 
Camp Kohler, California, Western Signal Corps 
Replacement Training Center, and was assigned in 
November of 1943 to the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation 
in the transportation full ships complement ship radio 
operator. From there I made a number of trips from the 
fall of 1943 through November 1945—all of my trips 
were in the South Pacific. Especially in 1944, we used 
to constantly listen to Tokyo Rose. We were able to 
get Japanese Domei news and she had regular broadcasts. 
I don't recall the days, but it was a regular, 
consistent broadcast. During that time she would 
reference to particular soldiers, had them by names and 
by units, and the islands that they were serving on. 
Another thing, she used to have prisoners of war—that 
they had already captured. Most of them came from the 
Philippines and they would be . . . she would have 
three or four of them every few nights and they would 
give just a radio report stating the same things in a 
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very perfunctory, uninformative and unenlightened tone, 
about they were receiving the Red Cross packages and 
all was well and that everything was going fine. From 
listening to them it was quite obvious that it was 
reading nothing more than what was written for them to 
say. The program was very entertaining--we used to be 
able to, when I'd pick it up on the radio—lots of time 
the crew would request that we plug it in through the 
PA system. She played real, real good records. They 
had all of the American records.- I recall that when 
"White Christmas" first became available, they had it 
available within a week or so of the time when it came 
out in the United States. And it was a wire-recorded 
version, it was excellent. So, instead of being kind 
of a depressing thing, it didn't seem to depress 
anybody--everybody was kind of amused by it. They 
looked forward to listening to it, and the only thing 
that seemed odd was how she was able to actually get 
people's names and the units they belonged to and the 
fact that they were on Kwajalein, maybe they were on 
Guam, might have been in New Guinea, Bougainville—some 
of those places. But she knew units, and she knew 
their names. And of course she would tell them about 
the fact that they should quit and that their 
girlfriends or their wives back home were running 
around with somebody else, and in that means she was 
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trying to depress the morale. But it really ... I 
don't think it actually ever served that kind of 
purpose. So from the time that ... I used to listen 
to it with the intent of writing letters to the parents 
of the servicemen that were prisoners. But after 
listening to about three or four it became quite 
obvious that there wasn't anything that the parents 
would be interested in because, outside of the fact 
that the person was still living and you weren't-even 
sure of that, there just wasn't anything worth 
mentioning or worth doing anything about. 
C: Did you listen when you heard the names of the 
prisoners of war? 
K: Oh, yeah. You bet. When I first started doing that, I 
thought it might be interesting to take the information 
down because they would tell their home address, who 
their parents were, and I thought, well, I'll take this 
information and drop them a letter and tell them I 
heard from their son or their husband or whatever, and 
that everything was fine and everything was . . . But 
after listening to about, oh, two or three months of 
that, every single particular one was exactly the same 
and then you became totally uncertain whether they were 
just having somebody do this or whether they actually 
had anybody, because they were not receiving the Red 
Cross packages as they maintained they were. Everybody 
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knew that. They were not being distributed by the 
Japanese. Prisoners that were re-captured, I mean 
prisoners that were taken back again after the United 
States forces consolidated position, told them that 
there was never any distribution of Red Cross packages. 
Whether they even received them or not, I mean whether 
the Japanese received them or whether they went to the 
Japanese mainland, they just stayed wherever they 
were—they never got anyplace. 
C: Were you monitoring the radio? Did you say (unintell.) 
K: Oh, yeah. That was my job on board ship. I was the 
ship's radio operator. And we had regular schedules 
and I would listen to what is called BAMS--it's 
Broadcast Allied Merchant Shipping. So four times 
during the day I'd have to turn the radio on and go 
into that schedule and during the off-times we could 
just tune in on Radio Tokyo. We could pick up her 
broadcast, just a regular . . . the same as it would be 
in the United States--it was a regular set scheduled 
broadcast. 
C: Did you like it? 
K: It was interesting. They had good music on. She went 
on and on about things we knew were not true, but it 
was information fed to her by the Japanese propaganda 
department, telling about how badly beaten the 
Americans were ii) such-and-such a place and what a 
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beating they were taking and all the things that were 
happening, which similar to, whose was it. Lord Haw Haw 
did the same thing and unfortunately, neither of them 
seemed to have the proper and correct information. But 
it worked very good as far as propaganda was concerned. 
Did you look forward to hearing the music? 
Sure. Sure. It was interesting, and they played all 
the big time bands. They had records of Jimmy Dorsey 
and Tommy Dorsey, Glenn Miller, Benny Goodman— 
everything. Everything they did was tape-recorded off 
American stations. 
Did it make you homesick? 
No. Not that. I don't think that had any effect. It 
was just something different that you could kind of 
look forward to. I suppose it was one of those 
sessions where you could vent your frustrations 
listening to it, knowing that it was a bunch of just 
junk, it really was. But nevertheless nobody took any 
terrible offense to it or nobody put any big personal 
feelings towards it that this is gospel or anything 
like that, because about the time—the early part there 
in '43 and '44 and '45--American forces were moving so 
fast through the Pacific that actually most of the 
troops in the Pacific had a fairly good knowledge 
really about what things were, and so when they would 
relate to the fact that she was saying "the terrific 
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beating they took on Guadalcanal" or something like 
that, they already knew it was not true. So it was 
just something different, something interesting to 
listen to. 
C: So you had access to news, and you knew by the . . . 
K: Yes, that it was not true, right. 
C: Do you think if you didn't have access to news it might 
have been different? 
K: Yeah, I would imagine that if you were on an island 
someplace ... Of course, we didn't make the habits 
that the Japanese did. I mean, we created situations 
there by island-hopping and leaving various islands 
totally—just by-passing them, left them there. So I 
would imagine that they still had radio equipment there 
and those Japanese that were still there listening to 
that, they must have felt terribly elated about it. It 
must have given them a big charge, to think that 
everything was going great. But the United States 
didn't do that. We didn't leave anybody alone 
anyplace; we took a place, we consolidated it, left 
what was there that was necessary to manage it, and 
moved on, so that the Americans for their part were 
pretty well up to date with what was happening. 
C: Did she seem attractive to the men? 
K: Oh, I don't think so. You know, you couldn't tell 
anything—I don't recall any pictures of her until 
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after the war. Then it seems like Life Magazine, after 
she was charged with prisoner-of-war and she had a 
trial—she was trained in the United States, lived in 
the United States for a long, long time and then went 
back to Japan shortly before the start of the war. She 
had just a normal voice. I mean, nothing . . . 
anything about it. She had a good radio voice. But I 
can't say anything else about it. She was just like on 
radio—it's different with television—but with radio 
you can't really tell anything from the voice anyhow. 
C; Did people feel that she was pleasant or on, their side 
or anything? 
K: She was definitely against the United States. There 
was no question what her broadcasts were beamed for. 
Her broadcasts were essentially—that was the whole 
idea of it—was to lower morale. Because she would 
spread all this aboutall the things that were 
happening back home and "Think about your girlfriend or 
your wife," or somebody back there is running around 
with the fellows that are back home on furlough, and 
"Don't you think you should get out of the service and 
go back home." Her motive was definitely to decrease 
morale. But at the same time, the fellows were 
receiving letters from their family and their friends 
and their girlfriends, so it kind of knocked that 
position out of the way a little bit. I think by and 
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large there may have been a few that felt something to 
it, but, especially the guys on the islands--lots of 
them looked forward to it. They used to get a big kick 
about it, listening to where they were supposed to be 
and where they were going to be, and how badly they 
were being beaten—when they weren't. So they got a 
kick out of it. 
I know on board ship every time we'd get it in we 
always plugged it in to the PA system so everybody 
could listen to it and hear what she had to say. 
C: So you felt safe, you didn't feel like . . . 
K: Right. Everybody looked forward to it. Every time 
we'd get the broadcasts we'd just plug it through the 
PA system and . . . her broadcasts used to last 
somewhere from around one-half hour to 40 minutes, 
depending on how many prisoners of war that she had. 
And usually she didn't have more than five of those. I 
don't know what the ... I guess that was basically 
time, but she would interview each one of them. She 
didn't interview them—they would just perfunctorily 
read and you assumed or you felt certain that that's 
all they were doing. They were talking in a very 
monotonous voice and "I'm so-and-so and I belong to 
such-and-such outfit and I come from so-and-so. I've 
been taken prisoner on so-and-so, and receiving the Red 
Cross packages and they're treating me well and 
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everything is fine." It was just a canned speech. 
Did you know they were being treated . . . Could you 
tell . . .? 
No, you couldn't tell from that, but from seeing places 
that were re-taken that the Japanese had prisoners you 
knew darn well how they were being treated, and it 
wasn't like they were talking about. Especially when 
they recovered the prisoners that had been taken on the 
Philippines, and Corregidor and Bataan, when they took 
those guys back again—you knew darn well the kind of 
treatment ... If they had the available food and 
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medicines, they never made it available to the American 
prisoners. Medicines, medical treatment, anything like 
that--they just didn't make it available, if they had 
it—I don't know if they had it or not. But 
nevertheless it was not a thing that was made readily 
available. 
But you didn't regard this announcer with hostility? 
No, never did. I always thought it was kind of 
interesting. 
And you knew it was being done for your benefit. 
Oh, yes, you bet. 
So, when she named the different ships in different 
ports . . . 
Well, she didn't name ships but she knew islands. For 
instance, some of the—I'm trying to think in 
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particular—she knew that--I came in to Kwajalein not 
for the invasion but after Kwajalein was taken—but 
several months before I came in there when the 
engagement was still on we heard her broadcast where 
she was addressing something to a particular sergeant 
who was stationed or who was involved in the invasion 
of Kwajalein. And she would really use that because 
the invasion of Kwajalein was mainly 100% naval and air 
engagement, but she used it for people in Guadalcanal 
and she used it again in Guam and Saipan, where she 
actually had the names of particular servicemen and 
units that they belonged to. That was always wonder— 
somehow she got it, I don't know, but she did have it. 
C: Or spooky. 
K: I imagine they wondered how she got it, and we spent 
some time trying to figure out how they could have done 
it and I'm sure that the government knew how they were 
doing it. I'm sure that our military intelligence knew 
what was being done and how it was being gotten. But 
she didn't have a massive amount of that, but she would 
pick every once in a while when she would address 
something to somebody, in such-and-such a unit on 
. . . that he was in, and then she would mention to 
him about didn't he worry about what was happening back 
home in the United States with his wife or his girl­
friend or whatever the matter happened to be, and . . . 
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C: She named . . . 
K: She named the person, right. 
C: And she knew what unit . . . 
K: Yes. She knew units that he belonged to, what unit he 
belonged to. And knew he was on a particular island. 
So, that's what I say--it was ... I would imagine 
that somebody in the intelligence in the United States 
so it was done. I never really bothered far enough to 
try and check that but that's what I mean, it was 
interesting listening. 
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INTERVIEW WITH GARETH MOON 
October 25, 1987 
G: We left San Diego and went to Auckland, New Zealand. 
From Auckland we went up through Caledonia to 
Guadalcanal. From Guadalcanal we went up and made the 
invasion of Bougainville but before that we went to New 
Hebrides. After the attack at Bougainville, back to 
Guadalcanal, then after a while we went up to 
Kwajalein, went over--while they made the invasion of 
Saipan we were a floating reserve—then we went to 
Eniwetok. When we landed there we had been aboard ship 
for weeks so they took us ashore to get our sea legs 
back. There was a big rotary snowplow on the end of 
the runway at Eniwetok. How a snowplow ever came to be 
in the South Pacific I'll never know. From Eniwetok we 
went to Guam and from Guam to Iwo Jima, back to Guam, 
then home. That was about 28 - 29 months. I was in 
the 2nd Battalion, Ninth Marines, which is in the Third 
Marine Division. 
To talk specifically about Tokyo Rose, I got out 
another map. When we listened to what the fellows 
called "Tokyo Rose"—it was a lady talking—and they 
kept saying, "That's Tokyo Rose." I had no way of 
knowing whether it was Tokyo Rose or not. And later I 
read where there were several Tokyo Roses. This was 
at night and I suppose in the early 1940s that was the 
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best radio reception. I don't remember it in the 
daytime at all, but we were busy in the daytime too. I 
can remember sitting around the radio in Guadal- canal, 
particularly, and listening to this woman talking and I 
can remember the music they played. That was what we 
liked, the music. The music she played was all the 
music that we heard in high school in the early '40s 
and it was what we liked and remembered. It was good 
music. I can remember the fellows talking about her 
and talking about the radio; for example, they would 
say, "Today, she said something about our particular 
unit." She was supposed to say, "I see where the 2nd 
Battal. 9th Marines has left New Zealand and they're 
now in Guadalcanal." These were the kind of things 
that I suppose made her good at her business because 
she—they knew where we were at just as well as we knew 
where they were at. I think that was the kind of thing 
that got through to the fellows, although I think 
sometimes it was the just the fellows talking because 
rumors started easy. I know just for the fun other 
fellows and I would start rumors to see how far they 
would go, and it was real interesting to start one and 
see how it would end up 3 months later. Some of those 
fellows, I'm sure, gave Tokyo Rose credit for saying 
things. On the other hand, I know from my own personal 
experience on one occasion. We arrived in Guadalcanal 
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in July of 1943, then we left there in October and went 
to the Hebrides. Then we went directly to the island 
of Bougainville and made a landing there. After the 
campaign was over with—they lasted about 3 months—we 
came back down to Guadalcanal right after Christmas in 
1943. We stayed at Guadalcanal until June and left and 
went up to Guam. So l don't really know whether we 
were listening to the radio in that period from July 6, 
1943 until October 1943, or whether it was after we 
returned about the 1st of January in 1944 until we left 
in June of 1944. So it's either one of those two 
periods and I don't know which, but the thing that was 
interesting was that I remember one night we had a real 
heavy air raid and about two days later we had a heavy 
daytime air raid. The sky was full of airplanes. I 
remember there was a bunch, Joe Foss and that bunch, 
was just about 12 miles from where we were at at 
Henderson Field. And I was originally from Sioux 
Falls, South Dakota, and that was where Joe Foss and 
several of them in that squadron were from and we got 
to see each other and visit at that time. They took 
off from Henderson Field and met these Japs—I think 
they were coming down from Munda—in the sky and we 
just watched the fight. We didn't know if it was ours 
or theirs that were shot down, but the only thing we 
did know was that it went on for a while. But after it 
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happened the planes came down and came back in 
formation to land at Henderson Field and as I remember 
now there was only 1 or 2 missing. The rest of the 
planes we saw shot down were Japanese. That evening as 
we listened to Tokyo Rose she told how the Imperial 
Japanese forces had made an airstrike at Guadalcanal, 
and then she proceeded to tell the exact truth. She 
told how many planes they lost, 6 or 7 of their planes 
were lost and 2 of ours were lost, and she told how the 
battle hadn't turned out as well as they wanted, that 
the Americans had actually chased off the Japanese 
planes—^partly because they had run out of gas and had 
to go back to Munda, I suppose—but she told the truth. 
And we were amazed about that. And we talked about 
that. But at the same time she was talking about 
another battle they had made somewhere up the line (and 
up the line was somewhere near New Georgia or Vella 
Vella, on up toward New Britain) but somewhere in there 
she talked about another battle they'd made the same 
day and wiped out a whole bunch of Americans and they'd 
sunk a bunch of ships and dropped a bunch of American 
planes. Well, afterwards, when we were able to put the 
thing together and talk about it—several weeks 
afterwards--we found it real interesting in this 
respect. On Guadalcanal there were thousands of men. 
Literally thousands of men. The place she talked about 
there were maybe a couple hundred. What we found out 
afterwards was that what she told about the other place 
was absolutely false, there was no truth to it at all. 
But we, having heard her talk about what happened at 
Guadalcanal in which she told the truth, were almost 
inclined to believe that there had been a terrible 
massacre up on the other island and that we'd had some 
bad luck up there. This was my first real experience 
in what I'd call the use of public relations or 
whatever to fool people—what did they call it? They 
had a term for it—but throughout the war the Americans 
and the Japanese and others would use stunts of this 
nature to confuse the troops that were fighting and get 
them upset and worried and so forth, but it always 
interested me how she would tell the truth where there 
were thousands of people listening and then when it was 
a little island somewhere with only a couple hundred 
she would make up a whole bunch of stuff. But it 
confused the fellas and the fellas really thought that 
it happened for that reason. 
C: How did it make you feel to hear the music when you 
were so far from home? 
G: Just like anything else—when we were out on the 
islands anything we had to do was diversion. We did 
things that would be boring as hell back home but out 
on the islands it was just something to do. (Talked 
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about hearing music on records as there were no tape 
recorders or whatever. And reading magazines that were 
quite up-to-date, only about 2 months old.) (Talked 
about every battalion having men whose job it was to 
improve morale.) 
C: Did it scare you to hear her predict where your troops 
were, where the Americans (unintell.) 
G: Not particularly. When we were out there—of course, 
the unknown always scared anybody, but that type of 
thing didn't bother us. As far as her being effectual 
in getting the troops unnerved, I don't think she was. 
I think they had fun, listening to the music, and I 
think they enjoyed it. I think she was well-liked from 
the standpoint that she brought a lot of good music to 
us. The other part, you know "What are your wives and 
girlfriends doing back there?" nobody paid an awful lot 
of attention to that. They just kind of laughed about 
it and joked about it. And those of us who were single 
out there had a lot of fun teasing those who were 
married out there and we would give them a bad time 
about the same things she would. So it wasn't anything 
new, just the same old stuff between a bunch of fellas 
particularly in the typical Marine corps. 
(Discussion about battles and the fact that it was 
45 years ago. Said it was the first battle against the 
enemy. Didn't remember if Coral Sea was before 
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Guadalcanal or not.) Said he wasn't homesick for the 
entire time of 4 years until the last 2 hours coming 
home on the train. 
With Tokyo Rose, we were listening to the music 
and instead of making us homesick it was real 
comfortable. That was the stuff in high school and we 
enjoyed it. I don't think that Tokyo Rose as such 
every made us—certainly never made me feel homesick or 
upset. As I say, she was kind of an idol of a lot of 
the fellas. 
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INTERVIEW WITH BILL OHRMANN 
October 28, 1987 
B: Well, it was in New Guinea, and northern Australia part 
of the time. Like I told you, that's been a long time 
ago, you know, 
(Discussion about being in the plane and guarding 
them.) 
Well, we'd just spend our time there writing 
letters and listening to Tokyo Rose. 
C: You said the planes were very far apart. 
B: Yes. They were in little clearings in the jungle that 
they dozed out and made revetments, if you know what 
that is—they're horseshoe-shaped banks of earth that 
the planes were in so that a bomb would have to hit 
them direct to hurt them because if it hit outside that 
revetment it would just go against that dirt. And they 
were scattered half a mile to a mile apart in the 
jungle. Just on account of air raids. 
C: This 
B: Yes. 
C: What 
B: 1943 
C: Did 
B: Well 
She might have thought she influenced us. They'd play 
that American music and she'd come on and say, "Well, 
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to you boys fighting there in the jungles, some 4-F 
back home is taking your girl out," and stuff like 
that. And we'd just laugh about it the next morning, 
and say, "Did you hear Tokyo Rose last night?" And the 
guys that were lucky enough to hear her they would tell 
about it, you know. it was just an entertaining 
program for us. Nothing sinister at all. 
C: So, when you said "lucky enough" . . . 
B: Well, we were on guard duty those nights. The ones 
that weren't on guard duty. There was no radios that 
could pick up short-wave. I don't know of anybody that 
had any radios. There was no rule against it that I 
know of, but we just didn't have them—we had to travel 
light. 
G: Did you look forward to doing guard duty? 
B: Kind of for that one reason, yes, that we could listen 
to mainly Tokyo Rose because I can't think of any other 
stations that anybody listened to. They were hard to 
pick up anyway, the short-wave radio. 
C: Did you hear that she was called "Tokyo Rose" or did 
she call herself something else? 
B: No, she'd say, "This is Tokyo Rose." And she talked 
real nice, you know. She was far-removed from the war, 
you know, and I suppose her propaganda was written by 
other people, but she could put it over pretty good. 
But nobody took her serious. 
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C: Did you like her music, was that what it was? 
B: The music, yes. It was American music. They had all 
the modern American songs, and singers and bands. 
C: What about the news, did she give news on her program? 
B: Yes, I think she did. Yes, I think she did give news, 
if there was any good news from her side. About that 
time, though, we were creeping up the coast, taking one 
place after another, and the news wasn't too good for 
them. Of course we knew that. 
C: Do you think she slanted it? 
B: Oh, yes, sure. Sure, she'd slant the news. And she'd 
tell us things—probably news from their side that we'd 
never hear about either. 
(Talked about "Guinea Gold" newspaper.) 
That was really the only news we got, from her and 
that little "Guinea Gold" paper. Lots of rumors, you 
know, but . . . 
C: Did you have any idea what she looked like? 
B: No idea whatsoever. No. 
C: How did it make you feel to listen to her? 
B: Oh, about like I feel now, listening to you. Just 
interested. It was no . . . there was nothing sinister 
about it, it was just a radio program. Of course we 
knew she was on the other side, but . . . 
C: So she did not succeed in demoralizing you. 
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B: Oh, no. Heavens no. Not in the least. If anything, 
she was kind of a bright spot. 
C: You looked forward to hearing her? 
B: Yes, sure! 
C: (Question re his describing verbally for the radio 
program the image of his sitting in the cockpit of the 
plane on guard duty and writing and listening to Tokyo 
Rose. ) 
B: (Talked about listening through earphones to Tokyo Rose 
as much as they could.) 
C: Were you engaged to be married at the time? 
B : No , uh , uh . 
C: I think what she did was she tried to work on people 
who left their wives at home. 
B: Definitely she did that, yes. Yes, she tried to make 
the boys feel sorry for themselves, but I don't think 
anybody did. 
C: Did you know anybody else who was depressed by her? 
B: Can't think of a single person who ever was depressed 
by it at all, because, like I say, in the mornings we'd 
compare notes as to what we'd heard and just laugh 
about it and say, "Well, she was in good form last 
night," and things like that. Those kind of programs 
really didn't bother us at all. 
C: Did you have any idea why she was doing it? 
B: Oh, yes. Propaganda. We figured she was trying to 
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make us dissatisfied, break down morale. But you know 
when you feel like you're winning, your morale is 
pretty good and that's the way we felt. Because we 
could see our troops and ourselves moving up the coast 
by jumps and we felt confident the war would end some 
day. 
So really, your morale had nothing to do with 
homesickness. 
No, not really, except it seemed like a long time, 
that's the only thing that I think—to soldiers, that' 
always the thing. Because there's nothing sure about 
when it's going to end. 
(Discussion about his duties—troop carrier— 
dropped supplies to the forces.) 
Did you hear any other propaganda aside from her? 
I can't think of any, no. 
I guess you've pretty well answered what I'm curious 
about, but I just wondered—were you aware of the 
treason trial—what happened afterwards? 
In Chicago? 
I'm not sure where it was—I think it was San 
Francisco. 
Oh yes. I followed that closely. I couldn't figure 
why she came back to the United States. Maybe she was 
forced to. She lives in Chicago now, as far as I know 
Yes, I'm sure she does. 
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C: I've heard that she does. i don't know if it's 
true . . . 
B: After the trial I read that; that's going to be her 
home. 
C: Did you feel that she should have been treated that 
way? 
B: No, not at all. Not a bit. I would have thought they 
would have just written that off, because she never 
hurt anybody's morale. Not a bit. She might have if 
we were really losing the war and having lots of 
setbacks, but we didn't feel like we were. 
C: Well, that's interesting, because I'm hearing a lot of 
people saying the same thing—that they looked forward 
to listening to her, or that they enjoyed the music and 
they just threw away the news part. 
B: Yes, uh huh. 
C: Some people have said that she was very accurate, that 
her newscasts were incredibly accurate. 
B: Yes, they might have been. I can't really remember. 
Our side didn't slant the news too bad. You know, when 
we had setbacks we heard about them. So I can't say 
that hers were slanted too much one way or the other, 
nor ours either. 
C: That's interesting. So she didn't hurt your morale at 
all. 
B: No. 
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INTERVIEW WITH PAUL SNYDER 
October 26, 1987 
C: I'd.like you to tell me about when you joined the 
service—how old you were and what you were doing. 
P: I joined the Navy in 1940, a year before the war 
started, and went out to the, Asiatic Fleet. I was in 
Manila when the war started on the morning of December 
7 and from that point on 5 months or 6 months later I 
ended up in Australia. It was not until 1943 that I 
went aboard submarines. 
I had never heard of Tokyo Rose in the first two 
or three years of the war, but as I went aboard 
submarines it was really the first time I had heard of 
her. She was well-known in the submarine force in the 
United States for a couple of reasons, the most 
important of which wais that she played the best music 
that you could pick up anywhere, and the second reason 
was that submarines generally were only on the surface 
at night and the only thing we could get was Tokyo Rose 
and we could pick her up at night. She would play the 
best music that you could imagine and her whole idea in 
playing it was that she assumed that all of us were in 
love with somebody back in the United States and that 
all of us must have a favorite song, like "Stardust" or 
"Harbor Lights", "Don't Get Around Much Anymore," 
"Missed the Saturday Dance," and so Tokyo Rose would 
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start out by telling us that we were fighting a dumb 
war against a brave enemy and that we were the victims 
of a system and that she really wasn't mad at but 
that she felt we ought to know that back in the United 
States our sweetheart was now being wined and dined by 
some 4-F. And I can remember her saying a thing about, 
"Your girlfriend tonight is sitting on the sofa and 
he's got his arms around her and now we're going to 
play your song while you think of her in the arms of 
someone else." And then she would play probably one of 
those four songs. Usually she stayed with "Stardust" a 
lot; she really liked that. She had a really beautiful 
voice. In later years I talked to a lot of submariners 
about how they felt about Tokyo Rose. I think all of 
us have a lot of affection for her, strangely enough. 
We never really looked on her as a traitor. Some of 
the reasons, I think, for that was the fact that she 
was so outrageous in what she said and so outlandish 
and most of us were closer to the truth about what was 
going on in the war than she was, so we never really 
took some of the things that she said seriously. I 
think the thing about propaganda, you have to be 
reasonably close to the truth to be effective. Tokyo 
Rose was never close to the truth. One effect—I can 
remember a program that came on ahead of Tokyo Rose in 
which there were two men, one I remember had a 
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distinctly English accent and they talked more about 
the East Asian Co-prosperity Alliance and why the 
Chinese and the Japanese and the middle Indonesian 
people should support Japan more, and they put out some 
news but they were never really outrageous—they were 
more political. I never remember that Tokyo Rose was 
political. She only was on, as I can remember, about 2 
hours a night. I would talk to other people that would 
tell me that she was on in the daytime, but I never 
heard her any other time than at night. I think 
another reason why we were never really upset with 
Tokyo Rose was, when one thinks about Lord Haw Haw they 
realize that he was a British citizen, he was despised 
by the British people. Tokyo Rose, while she was an 
American and she graduated from UCLA--people in those 
days had a deep dislike for the Japanese, even the 
American Japanese we never really accepted because we 
always felt that they were very loyal to the Emperor, 
so even though Tokyo Rose may have been an American I 
don't think the American servicemen ever looked on her 
as anything but a Japanese who was trying to do 
something to win the war for Japan. Besides, the 
really other real reason was that she was female, and 
there were a lot of lonely guys out in the Pacific and 
that was about the only feminine voice they could hear 
there, so they used to tune in to her a lot. 
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Did you have any idea what she looked like? 
No. I saw a picture of her after the war was over. 
(Unintell.—something about the voice and the picture) 
She was very articulate but you could recognize the 
Oriental expressions in her voice. But I never really 
had a picture of her, never had the fantasy of her. 
Like I said a little earlier, she was . . . really, her 
propaganda was outrageous. However, we did get scared 
a lot on submarines because every once in a while she 
would mention the name of your submarine and I remember 
when we left Brisbane, Australia, and we got out on our 
way to ... up in the northern coast of Australia 
when we first picked her up—and she mentioned in this 
broadcast that the USS Guardfish had just left Brisbane 
and that our patrol area was going to be around Truk 
Island and that the brave and honorable Japanese were 
waiting for us in Truk. I have a friend of mine who 
was a fella by the name of Ed Hall who was on the 
Sunfish. The Sunfish fought a heavy battle with four 
ships and sank all 4 ships, but they were heavily 
depth-charged and got away, and later on surfaced and 
heard Tokyo Rose tell everyone that the USS Sunfish had 
been sunk by Japanese destroyers. There was a favorite 
submarine, the USS Wahoo, which had a lot of fame 
during the war and the first instance that anyone ever 
knew that the Wahoo was sunk was when Tokyo Rose made 
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the announcement that the Japanese had just sunk the 
USS Wahoo. I can remember the mention of an aircraft 
carrier—she liked to use the names of ships that she 
knew were in a particular area. I heard her in about 
1944--l've been trying to get somebody else who 
remembers but I can't. But I remember in 1944 that the 
rumor was that Tokyo Rose was really an American spy 
who was providing Naval information to Naval submarines 
particularly, because it was uncanny when we would get 
a message that the Seattle-Maru was at a such-and-such 
longitude and latitude and we would hit that longitude 
and latitude and there would be the Seattle-Maru. I do 
believe, though, after the war was over we discovered, 
or I discovered, that they had broken the code—the 
United States had broken Japanese code. Nothing was 
ever mentioned in her trial about this, but there was 
quite a prominent rumor about her then. 
C: You said sh-e was a smart person for making you feel 
homesick. 
P: Oh, yes, she'd just . . . she had a sexy voice and, 
after all, we were guys in the Pacific. Many of us 
were months and months without seeing women. Her 
voice—and she played on that a lot. This particular 
thing about telling us that some 4-F was back wining 
and dining our sweetheart was really almost an every 
night thing with her. And it was very smart, because 
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she did figure out that there were only probably 4 or 5 
really important songs that everybody would have some 
feeling for, or relate to some girl. The girl that I 
was going with at the time, I particularly remember 
"Harbor Lights" was our song. She played a lot of 
"Harbor Lights" and—I don't know how effective that 
was. It didn't seem to bother us. As I say, Tokyo 
Rose was never really very close to the truth. She 
exaggerated a lot and, other than the naming of names 
of ships that were sunk, she never really had much 
chilling effect on anyone. We really sort of felt more 
affectionate toward her. 
C; Did that have a chilling effect? 
P: Yeah, that did. Particularly the Wahoo. And being on 
the Guardfish when she told us that we had just left 
Brisbane and that--no one knew that our patrol area was 
around Truk Island--! don't know how she knew that. 
I'm sure I know how she knew that some submarines were 
in the area. We used to dump garbage at night and we 
tried to weigh it so that it would sink. But I'm 
certain that some of that information would float to 
the surface and eventually get back to her, because she 
would very often tell you what ships were in what area 
and they were always waiting for us with a whole bunch 
of ships to sink us. She also at one time offered a 
reward for the capture of any American submariner. I 
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remember those things that she said. 
C: There's something I've forgotten. 
P: There were other propaganda shows around. But I don't 
think—Lord Haw Haw betrayed his country, Axis Sally to 
a certain extent betrayed hers—I don't think Tokyo 
Rose ever betrayed the United States because we never 
really accepted her as a United States citizen and we 
looked at her as a Japanese. And even after the fact 
that she was a citizen or at least a graduate from 
UCLA, we never considered her a traitor. I can 
remember when she was first tried, we really didn't 
care — I didn't — I didn't care if she was tried or not. 
I never felt any anger about it. I don't think any of 
the fellas that I've ever talked to felt anger about 
her. 
This past week-end we had a submarine reunion in 
Great Falls and I asked all the guys there how they 
felt about Tokyo Rose and they had a lot of good 
stories about her and how they really thought she was 
neat and kept them from being too lonely, and all 
mentioned her great choice of music. It was the only 
music that we could get in the Pacific. I think if she 
would have been more subtle with the propaganda she 
would have been more effective, but she . . . the brave 
Japanese forces were always winning great battles and 
we knew they weren't. We just never were really angry. 
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My organization—Submarine Veterans of the United 
States--America would like to have her back at a 
reunion some time. She's almost an affectionate friend 
in a way. 
C: Do you remember when she was tried? 
P: If I remember correctly, wasn't there some discussion 
about whether they were going to try her at all or not? 
I think in the beginning they were not going to. I 
can't remember exactly, but it seems to me it was quite 
a while after the war before they really did try her. 
And I don't think she got very long. I'm kind of vague 
about that, but it seems to me that she was not 
sentenced—was it 25 years and 10 years? But I think 
she was let out earlier than that. There never seemed 
to be any harshness about her trial. I can remember 
reading about ... at least that I read ... in the 
paper, and I really didn't care whether she got tried 
or not. There was nothing ... I mean, I didn't like 
Lord Haw Haw, I can tell you that, and I was glad that 
anything bad would happen to them, but I never felt the 
same about Tokyo Rose. She was kind of a friend on a 
lonely night in the Pacific. 
(Discussion about Lord Haw Haw and Jane Fonda 
being true traitors in his mind. Discussion about 
Jeanette Rankin voting against WWII and the fact that 
she was a woman, not a man. Talked about Jane Fonda 
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being a woman and if a man had gone over it would have 
been different -- macho society.) 
It was the same with Tokyo Rose. She was a female 
in a macho society, and I think that we had sort of an 
ambivalent cross-over feeling because she was female, 
where I doubt that they had that same feeling with Lord 
Haw Haw. They probably did with Axis Sally more. This 
is only my own idea, but it just seems to me that the 
female would get away with it easier in a male world 
like a war than another male would. I think that may 
have had some bearing. Certainly, if this would have 
been Tokyo Joe broadcasting propaganda, the American 
sailor wouldn't have had the same feeling for him. Not 
in any way would we have had the same feeling. The 
fact that she was female and with the ambivalence of a 
male-female sort of emotional relationship anyway, I 
think there was a better feeling about Tokyo Rose. 
I've wondered what we would have done if it had been 
Tokyo Joe. 
C: But there were male commentators. 
P: Yes. And I listened to some of them. But I can't name 
any. These two English guys that came on ahead of 
Tokyo Rose, at least at night, I couldn't tell you 
their names. I used to think of them as sort of . . . 
well I couldn't have because there was no Jerry Lewis-
Dean Martin sort of thing . . . but Abbott-Costello, 
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yeah, I used to think of them in that way. And they 
were more political. I don't remember that Tokyo Rose 
was ever political. She was political in the sense 
that she was trying to get you to love Japan more, or 
understand Japan more, or . . . Tokyo Rose was m.ore 
sexy, her propaganda, at least her approach, was more 
sexual as far as getting to the American serviceman. 
She gave a lot of historical document about what was, 
like the Battle of Midway and the various battles, 
particularly around Guadalcanal. I can remember 
those. And her claims were outrageous. We were just 
losing more ships than anyone can imagine. Well, 
the truth of the matter was that we weren't. But her 
music was super. 
C: You said you didn't think of her as an American. 
P: No, we never did. Well, at that time we didn't know 
she was an American. I didn't really know until after 
the war that she was a graduate of UCLA. We didn't 
know that then. 
C: Didn't she refer to night spots, nightclubs? 
P: In the States? 
C: In California. 
P: I can't remember that. She sure might have. The thing 
that I mainly remember about her was the 4-F that was 
taking over my nest back home. You're probably right 
about those nightclubs. I just don't remember them. 
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C: Did you feel homesick or did you feel . . .? 
P: Oh she'd make you feel homesick, boy would she ever. 
Particularly music. It wasn't so much Tokyo Rose as it 
was the music she played. We didn't have access to 
that kind of music. We didn't have VCRs. We had some 
old record on a machine and that was about it. 
I think, though, if we did know that she had come 
from the United States, yeah, I know we did know that, 
but I didn't look on her as a traitor. 
(Remarks about fear—living with fear makes you 
lose sexual feelings.) 
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INTERVIEW WITH LES TUCKER 
October 28, 1987 
C: You can give your rank and serial number when you were 
in the Navy. 
L: My name is Lester B. Tucker. I'm a retired Chief 
Warrant Officer from the U.S. Navy, having retired in 
1967, entering the service in 1939. I served aboard 
the USS North Carolina during WWII in the Guadalcanal 
area, Solomons, from August 7, 1942 until September 1, 
1943. 
C: Tell me about what you did in the Navy. Tell me how 
old you were when you first enlisted. 
L: I was 19 years old. I enlisted November 9, 1939, 
having completed high school and was serving in the CCC 
in California. 
(Discussion of what made him enlist. Discussion 
also about his employment situation at the time, since 
it was Depression time.) 
(Discussion about his duties and responsibilities 
while in the service—about his ranks and interests, 
etc. Talked about when the war started and where he 
was when Pearl Harbor was attacked—in New York City.) 
C: Do you remember while you were out on ship ever hearing 
broadcasts from the enemy? 
L: I know that you are referring to Tokyo Rose, having 
been in quite a bit of action in the South Pacific. I 
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cannot remember specific broadcasts but I do remember 
very well generally several broadcasts. I should say 
that we thoroughly enjoyed most of her broadcasts from 
the viewpoint of the entertainment. She always had the 
best records—Glenn Miller, Benny Goodman, Artie Shaw 
and many others—and it was a break for us to listen to 
the music. 
C: Did you look forward to hearing it? 
L: Yes, it seemed to me that the broadcasts we would 
receive would be in the early evening, around 1800-1900 
hours (that would be 6:00 - 7:00 PM). It was a 
pleasure because we didn't have Armed Forces Radio set 
up at that time and it was entertaining. 
C: Did the men talk about it? 
L: All of the men, or the majority of them, enjoyed. Of 
course, we soon realized that she was a propagandist. 
But that didn't seem to deter us from listening to her. 
C: What kinds of things did she say? 
L: It would seem like she would go ahead and hit on 
homesickness. "And what are you American troops doing 
out here?" The only demoralizing effect that she 
seemed to have on us at the time was when she had rapid 
information, and we knew that we had lost a ship or a 
certain battle had raged in the area and it seemed like 
her intelligence was exceptionally rapid and good. And 
we would often wonder how come she got the word so 
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fast. So we would listen to that and, if we knew the 
ship had not been sunk or so forth and maybe just hit 
by one or two bombs or a projectile, we knew right then 
and there that she would elaborate that the ship had 
been sunk, or that so many people had been killed, like 
the Marines at Guadalcanal or Talage. And we were nip-
and-tuck during the whole Solomons campaign. We were 
almost defeated and it was depressing when she would 
immediately, within 48 hours, say, "You Americans•lost 
such-and-such ships and so forth. What are you doing 
here? Why don't you go back?" This was a little 
disheartening. But we teased and braved it and enjoyed 
the music. And we let that bypass our thoughts. 
C: Was there anything you could identify as lies that you 
heard? 
L: Oh, absolutely. The ship I was on, which was the USS 
North Carolina, was consigned to the depths twice. I 
don't remember the exact dates, but there we are just 
floating around, you know, as well as ever, doing our 
job, and so we knew that this must apply also to other 
ships, that she was absolutely exaggerating which, of 
course, later proved to be the truth. She was 
exaggerating. 
C: So you heard her say that you'd been sunk? 
L: Yes. I couldn't give you a specific date but there was 
one time when she said that a battleship [we were the 
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only battleship out there at the time] had been sunk. 
Seemingly the Japanese had very good intelligence. It 
was the rapidity with which she reported the actions— 
we wondered how could she get this information so fast? 
Often we weren't told of what ships might have been 
sunk or damaged in another task force or group. We 
hadn't been told a thing—we learned these things from 
Tokyo Rose. 
C: Did you believe them? 
L: Not all of them. 
C: Any of them? 
L: We might have . . . For instance, I remember when the 
Chicago was sunk and we took on the survivors, 
approximately 36 to 48 hours off the Chicago, and I can 
remember that broadcast--what date I can't remember, 
whether it was one or two days after we took the 
survivors aboard. But the Chicago had been sunk; they 
knew—they had sunk it. And the only way we knew about 
it at the time was from the survivors. 
C: Did it ever make you think that there might be spies on 
your own ship or in your^ own forces? 
L: Not at all, and the reason would be that radio 
communications was a controlled area, and it would have 
been very difficult for anyone to have a radio 200 or 
300 miles from nearest land and to be relaying 
information from the ship, such as a crew member. No, 
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it never dawned on us that this would occur. 
C: Did you know anybody who was depressed by any of her 
broadcasts? 
L: I cannot recall anyone's name, but various 
personalities who were homesick or who had received a 
"Dear John" letter—yes, they would get slightly 
depressed but it usually passed very soon. 
C: How about the . . . did you have a girlfriend at the 
t i me ? 
L: I was engaged at the time. 
C: How about all those remarks about the 4-F people going 
out with your girlfriend? 
L: Certainly that occurred, and there were men that were 
transferred from the ship that had listened to Tokyo 
Rose that had written back to their shipmates and said, 
"When I got home my girlfriend was going out with 
someone and I guess Tokyo Rose might have known what 
she was talking about." But this was rare, this was an 
exception when this would occur. Anything in 
communications—letters primarily, at that time—we 
very seldom got a Red Cross telegram that far at sea— 
but anything that would abrase you, play upon the 
personality of unknowing reality, Tokyo Rose seemed to 
be pretty good in applying these suggestive statements. 
That, "Yes, your girlfriend is back there. You've been 
gone so many months she's probably dating so-and-so. 
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Not a specific person, but a fella she works with, 
maybe. Don't keep your hopes up that she's going to be 
waiting for you." Such information as that. 
C: What about requests? Did she play requests for music? 
L: I certainly can't remember her playing any specific 
requests from—there was no way we could get in touch 
with her for a request. 
C: How about prisoners-of-war? 
L: Well, of course at that time the major prisoners of 
war, the Americans, were those that had been captured 
in the Philippines, although a few in Hong Kong. And 
we had absolutely no information about those prisoners-
of-war. 
C: What year was that? 
L: Of course I was only in the South Pacific from, as I 
said before, the initial attacks on Guadalcanal up 
through the New Britain campaigns in the eastern 
Solomons, up to about September 1, 1943. 
C: Then were you sent home? 
L: Yes. You rotate your men after two years in the Navy. 
Assignment for schooling, new construction, or, like 
myself, back to flight training, shore duty for a 
while. Remember the whole period I am talking about we 
have not enlarged our forces, naval forces; we're 
almost at a very boresome state, long days at sea, 
boring routine, and under those circumstances, hanging 
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on waiting for the Navy to increase, send ships—it was 
many times just ... it got on your nerves because it 
was so boring. All you could do was study for 
advancement, stand your watches, and of course we would 
get up at anywhere from 4:00 to 4:30 in the morning to 
be at our battle stations against the submarines 
primarily, until about 30 minutes after dawn, then it 
was breakfast, then training, gun practice or specific 
technical training in your field, on watch. (Talks 
about watch schedules—day after day, week after week, 
etc. ) 
(Talked about staying at the Royal Hawaiian for 
25szf per day. ) 
C: Tokyo Rose had a reputation for referring to specific 
bars and hang-outs that people liked and she'd talk 
about the Coconut Grove or about the team she'd rooted 
for, or something like that, and it was those little 
pieces of playing on homesickness—did you ever hear 
any of that, being a Californian? 
L: Well, of course Tokyo Rose was a southern California 
gal just like I was a southern California boy, raised 
in Long Beach area. I think she must have been 3-5 
years older than myself, having graduated from the 
University of Southern California or California about 
1940-41, because she was in Japan when war broke out on 
December 7 and I didn't graduate until very early '39 
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from high school. Yes, I was acquainted with some of 
the places, but in the Depression those people that 
didn't have the money did not go to the Coconut Grove 
but, of course, the Coconut Grove was used from time to 
. time for a U.S.O. show or for dances put on by the-
Hollywood Theater Guild, just on occasion, and a lot of 
servicemen would go up there. But there were other 
places—and of course not being 21 I didn't go to bars 
in '3 9, '3 8. 
C: Did you have any idea of what she looked like? 
L: I think we all tried to match her very sweet voice with 
her face. Having gone to school with about 90-100 
Nisei there were some very cute Japanese girls, 
including some in my class, and of course having never 
served in Japan at that time you would put together . . 
. well, such a voice like that she must be a very nice-
looking, by American standards, woman. And then years 
later when I served in Japan in 1946 and again from 
1950-1953 in Sugei, Japan, it's just like in the United 
States—the variations- in females' looks cover a broad 
spectrum. 
C: Was she a fantasy for the various servicemen who were 
out there for months at a time, or do you think that it 
worked that way? 
L: I don't think so. I believe that we were pretty 
steadfast in our thinking about, "Hey, this is a 
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propagandist." We all would conceive in our minds what 
she might look like but, no, I could see no concept 
applied by individuals. 
C: Were you wounded in the course of the war? 
L: I can just say "nearly." (Discussed being coverage for 
the "Enterprise" and the near-hit for him during an 
attack.) 
C: Just to finish up with Tokyo Rose, did you have any 
anger or hostility for her or for what she was doing? 
How did you feel about that? 
L: I really think I was unconcerned about her personally. 
I did not know that she was a citizen of the United 
States at the time. I cannot remember that being 
revealed to us. It may have been and I could have 
forgotten. But as far as any feelings at all pro or 
con, I can't recollect. All I can say is that I 
certainly appreciated the music she played. 
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N A V Y  D E P A R T M E N T  
HOLD FOR RELEASE 
PRESS MD RADIO 
UNTIL 1:15 P. M. (E.W.T.) 
AUGUST 7, 19't5 
NAVY "CITATION" FOR TOKYO ROSE OF RADIO TOICYO 
The Nr.vy Department, through Captain T. J. O'Brien, U.3.H., 
Director of Welfare, today citod Tokyo Rose of Rr.dio Tokyo for 
"moritorious service contributing greatly to the morale of 
United States armed services In the Pacific," and gave her per-
miasi.on to "broadcast soon to the United States Army of Occupation 
in Japan and to the ships of tho United States Fleet at ancVior in 
Yokohama Bay, tho history-making sccne of Admiral llalsey ridinp 
the Japanese Emperor's white horso through the streets of Tokyo." 
The "citation" was rocorded by Captain O'Brien for broadcast 
over "The Navy Reporter," radio program which la short-waved to 
all personnel beyond tho continental limits. 
The text of Captain O'Brion's statement follows: 
"The men and women of the Navy, Marine Cor]i3 and Coast Guard 
take pleasure in presenting this citation to Tokyo Rose of Radio 
Tokyo, for service as sot forth in the following: 
"For meritorious achievement while serving as a radio 
propaganda broadcaster for the Japanese. While the United 
States armed forces in tho Pacific have been extremely buny 
capturing enemy-held islands, sinking Jap ships, and killing 
Japs and more Japs, Tokyo Rose, ever solicitous of their 
morale, has persistently entertained them during those long 
nights In fox-holcg and on board ship, by brintjinf? them 
excellent state-aide music, laughter and news about home.. 
Those broadcasts have reminded all our men of tho things 
they are fighting for, which are the things Axnerica has 
given them. And they have inspired them to a greater 
determination than ever to get the war over quickly, which 
explains why they are now driving onward to Tokyo itself, so 
that soon they will be able to ihank Tokyo Rose in person. 
"As the Japanese Empire crumbles about her, Tokyo Rose 
zealously continues to bring laughter and entertainment to 
our men and women. 
"In recognition of this meritorious service, this 
citation is presented and with it goes permission to broad­
cast r.oon to the United States Army of Occupation in Japan 
and to the ships of the United States Fleet at anchor in 
Yokohama Bay, the history-making scene of Admiral Halsey 
riding the Japanese Emperor's white horse through the streets 
of Tokyo." 
(Photographs available in Pictorial Section, Office of 
Public Information.) i,,. 
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O  ̂
Y~ /'^ 
u€  ̂ U>C-U<J(̂  i{J<^u2-cjj_, 
^̂ ^C6f̂ /̂CZ^C02.̂  
uJ [a  ̂^̂ AiJ ji&c  ̂ flt̂ -
199 
ujJoU. 
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^AAr̂ -̂~î ~^<SiAĵ  OM  ̂2,AJUUX«L JLa/^J^O-. g-gJr^ 
ct-^L. -/->J  ̂FJ -̂02-VU'̂  O-A^^ iytkny)̂  A-<L<1ju6->< 
'•/R^RJVI' -J"' O-FI-A/̂  
I, .-^A  ̂JiM 
•̂ i: 
••^"^*• —v.-' •^'^j" 
v/ni; H; Ohmann 
6]j5 ilv/y 10-A 
Drummondf MT 5?B3i 
203 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Blakefield, William J. Documentary Film Classics. 
Washington, D.C.: National Audiovisual Center, National 
Archives and Records Center. 
Choukas, Michael. Propaganda Comes of Age. Washington, 
D.C.! Public Affairs Press, 1965. 
Doob, Leonard W., ed. "Ezra Pound Speaking"; Radio Speeches 
of World War II. Westport, Connecticut: Greenward Press, 
1978, 
Doob, Leonard. Public Opinion and Propaganda. New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1948. 
Dower, John W. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the 
Pacific War. New York: Pantheon Books, 1986. 
Duus, Masayo. Tokyo Rose: Orphan of the Pacific. New York: 
Harper and Row, 1979. 
Edwards, Violet. Group Leader's Guide to Propaganda 
Analysis . New York: Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 
Inc., 1938. 
Ellul, Jacques. Propaganda; The Formation of Men's 
Attitudes. New York; Alfred A. Knopf, 1969. 
Gunn, Rex B. They Called Her Tokyo Rose. North Olympic 
Library System, Port Angeles, WA, 1976. 
Hada, John Juji. The Indictment and Trial of Iva Ikuko 
Toguri d'Aguino - "Tokyo Rose." University of San Francisco, 
M.A. Thesis, History Department, 1973. 
Hagoromo Society of Kamikaze Divine Thunderbolt Corps. 
Survivors. Born to Die; The Cherry Blossom Sguadrons. Los 
Angeles, 1973. 
Hankey, Lord Maurice. Politics. Trials and Errors. Chicago; 
Henry Regnery Co., 1950. 
Harter, D. Lincoln, and John Sullivan, Propaganda Handbook. 
Philadelphia: Twentieth Century Publishing Company, 1953. 
Hosoya, C., et al. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial . New York: 
Harper and Row (Kodansha International Ltd.), 1986. 
204 
Hurst, James Willard. The Law of Treason in the United 
States; Collected Essays. Connecticutt: Greenwood Publishing 
Corp. , 1971 . 
Inoguchi, Captain Rikihei, and Commander Tadashi Nakajima. 
The Divine Vind. New York: Bantam Books, 1958. 
Irwin, Will. Propaganda and the News. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, 1936. 
Japanese American Citizens League. Iva Toguri (d'Aguin o) : 
Victim of a Leg-end, San Francisco: National Committee for 
Iva Toguri, 1976. 
Kodama, Yoshio. Sugamo Diary. Japan: Radiopress, 1960. 
Kutler, Stanley. The American Inguisition: Justice and 
Injustice in the Cold War. New York: Hill and Wang, 1982. 
Lowenthal, Leo, and Norbert Guterman, Prophets of Deceit; A 
Study of the Technigues of the American Agitator. Pa1o Alto, 
California: Pacific Books, 1970. 
Meo, L. D. Japan's Radio War on Australia. 1941-1945 . 
Melbourne University Press, 1968. 
Minear, Richard H. Victor's Justice; The Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial . New Jersey; Princeton University Press, 1971. 
Piccigallo, Philip R. The Japanese on Trial: Allied War 
Crimes Operations in the East. 1954 - 1951. University of 
Texas Press, 1979. 
Rolo, Charles J. Radio Goes to War. New York; G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1942. 
Roosevelt, Kermit, ed. War Report of the OSS (Office of 
Strategic Services) . New York; Walker and Co., 1976. 
Schaar, John H. Loyalty in America. Connecticut; Greenwood 
Press, 1957. 
Seth, Ronald. The Truth Benders. London; Leslie Frewen, 
1969. 
Short, K.R.M., ed. Film and Radio Propaganda in World War 
II. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983. 
Stewart, Kenneth, and John Tebbel . Makers of Modern 
Journal ism. New York: Prentiss-Hall, Inc., 1952. 
205 
Thomas, Bob. Winchel1. New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 
1971 . 
Toland, John, The Rising Sun; The Decline and Fall of the 
Japanese Empire. 1936-1945. New York: Random House, 1970. 
Uyeda, Clifford I. Final Report and Review. San Francisco: 
The National Committee for Iva Toguri, 1976. 
Weiner, Ed. Let's Go to Press; A Biography of Walter 
Winchell . New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons;' 1955. 
Whitton, John B. and Arthur Larson. Propaganda; Towards 
Disarmament in the War of Words. New York; Oceana 
Publications, Inc., 1964. 
Willoughby, Major General Charles A., U.S.A. (Ret.) The 
Guerrilla Resistance Movement in the Philippines; 1941-1945. 
New York; Vantage Press, 1972. 
Winkler, Allan M. The Politics of Propaganda; the Office of 
War Information. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978. 
Winslow, Capt. W. G. The Fleet the Gods Forgot. Annapolis, 
Maryland; Naval Institute Press, 1982 
RECORDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 
262-107 Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, Japan. Foreign Broadcast 
Intelligence Service. Music, War News, commentary; voice of 
"Orphan Ann," August 14, 1944 
262-108 Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, from Pobru. August 14, 1944. 
262-197, -197A Radio Tokyo, Zero Hour, August 12, 1945. 
262-21439 "Berlin to North America" German Radio Broadcast 
in English; "Lord Haw Haw" (William Joyce) broadcast to 
England. 
262-09315 Berlin broadcast to Allied forces; war news; 
Goebbels propaganda; "Home Sweet Home," American music and 
comments by Mildred Elizabeth Gillars ("Axis Sally"). 
Voices of World War II. audiotape 12, "The Media in World 
War II." Mildred E. Gillars, 18 May, 1943, National 
Archives 262-00650. General MacArthur, 22 October, 1944, 
National Archives 200-174 . 
206 
PROPAGANDA COVERAGE IN THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Chronological Order) 
"Tokyo Radio Slights Milne Bay," New York Times. September 
1, 1942, p.3. 
"Japanese Camps Stir Investigation," New York Times. January 
16, 1943, p.5. 
"Japanese Decide to Make Their Propaganda 'Brisk'," New York 
Times. January 26, 1943, p.4. 
Arms, W.T. "The Short Waves at the Half Year," New York 
Times. June 27, 1943, Sec. 2, p, 7. 
"Japanese Radio Attacks Morale of Fighting Men On 
Guadalcanal With Tales of Home Folk," New York Times. June 
29, 1943, p.8. 
"Captive 'Messages' Amuse Chunking," New York Times. 
February 2, 1944, p.5. 
Home, George. " 'Tokyo Rose' a Hit With U.S. Soldiers," 
New York Times. March 27, 1944, p.4. 
"Tokyo Rose Stirs Philippine Mirth," New York Times. October 
29, 1944. 
Davies, Lawrence E. "Directed to Tokyo," New York Times. 
April 1, 1945, Sec. 2, p. 7. 
OTHER ARTICLES 
(Chronological Order) 
Strauss, Lt. (JG) I. Henry, U.S.N.R. "The Zero Hour," 
Col1ier's Magazine, January 8, 1944, 
"By Any Other Name," Time Magazine, April 10, 1944, Radio 
Section, p. 58-60, 
"So Smelly the Rose," Time Magazine, August 21, 1944, Radio 
Section, p. 75. 
"Tokyo Rose," Time Magazine, December 18, 1944, People 
Section, p.24. 
"Your Old Friend," Time Magazine, July 11, 1949, National 
Affairs Section, p. 18. 
"Axis Sally" Treason Trial, New York Times. January 25 -
March 12, 1949. 
207 
Delaplane, Stanton. "Tokyo Rose On Trial," San Francisco 
Chronic 1e. July 1 - October 7, 1949. 
"Tokyo Rose" Treason Trial, New York Times. July 5 - October 
11, 1949. 
Yates, Ronald. "Tokyo ,Rose's Accusers Claim U.S. Forced 
Them to Lie," Chicag-o Tribune. March 22-23, 1976. 
CBS Television Network, "Sixty Minutes," vol. VIII, no. 26, 
"Tokyo Rose," Sunday, June 20, 1976. 
208 
